Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. BC377361 Ruth Ann Kwan and Joseph R. Kalin, Judges.
Marie Mangine, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Procter, Slaughter & Reagan, William M. Slaughter and Gabriele M. Lashly for Defendants and Respondents.
JACKSON, J.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Marie Mangine appeals from a postjudgment order denying her motion to vacate a judgment of dismissal in favor of defendants Howard Steier, 1105 Alta Loma Road Apartments, LLC and Steier Properties (No. B219022). She also appeals from a postjudgment order awarding defendants attorney’s fees (No. B222822).
Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in granting defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion, in lifting the automatic stay of proceedings pending the appeal of the order granting the special motion to strike, and in granting defendants’ motion for summary adjudication. She also contends the trial court erred in awarding defendants attorney’s fees for a number of reasons. We affirm both orders.
An anti-SLAPP motion is a special motion to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff began renting unit 2 in an apartment building located at 1105 Alta Loma Road in the City of West Hollywood in September 1988. The building is owned by defendant 1105 Alta Loma Road Apartments, LLC, of which defendant Howard Steier (Steier) is the sole member. Plaintiff had a month-to-month tenancy pursuant to an oral agreement.
In April 2003, one of the tenants in unit 4 informed Steier that floor tiles removed from that unit contained asbestos. Steier offered to have all apartments, including plaintiff’s, tested for asbestos. Plaintiff’s apartment was tested on May 13, 2003.
Steier arranged for Criterion Environmental to test the property and submit a cleanup plan to the South Coast Air Quality Management District. He hired Miller Environmental to conduct the cleanup of the property.
On July 1, 2003, Steier arranged for Criterion Environmental to conduct environmental sampling in plaintiff’s apartment. Criterion Environmental suggested minor remediation and additional air sampling. On July 23, Taylor Leak Detection tested the water lines and found no leaks in plaintiff’s apartment. On July 27, Criterion Environmental collected additional air samples in the wall cavities of plaintiff’s apartment. Criterion Environmental recommended additional remediation.
During the course of remediation, mold was discovered along the back side of the common wall with plaintiff’s closet, and the scope of the remediation was expanded. Steier notified plaintiff of this on August 21, 2003. On September 23, Criterion Environmental notified Steier that plaintiff’s apartment had passed its testing and plaintiff could move back in.
Plaintiff moved back into her apartment but demanded additional environmental sampling. Andersen Environmental collected additional air samples and recommended additional remediation. Steier contacted Marcor Remediation to prepare an estimate for the remediation. When Steier presented plaintiff with this information on January 27, 2004, plaintiff disagreed with Marcor’s recommendations.
Plaintiff hired Andrew Puccetti to advise her. He and plaintiff met with Andersen Environmental and Marcor Remediation and they were able to agree on the scope of remediation.
The remediation was scheduled to begin in May 2004, but Andersen Environmental was unable to begin the work until June 2004. On August 20, 2004, Andersen Environmental confirmed the apartment had passed its final clearance. Plaintiff was allowed to return to her apartment.
However, on June 30, 2004, Steier had his attorney, Todd Elliott (Elliott), notify the tenants that he was taking the apartment building off the rental market. On July 19, plaintiff responded that she was disabled and was entitled to an extension of time in which to relocate, and she also qualified for a lower income relocation fee. Elliott wrote back on July 27, informing plaintiff she would have to provide the nature of her disability. He also told her the steps necessary to qualify as a lower income tenant.
Plaintiff responded on July 29 with a letter from her doctor, which failed to specify the nature of her disability. On July 30, she wrote to Elliott disputing the requirement that she specify the nature of her disability. Elliott wrote back on August 3, providing plaintiff with additional information on qualifying as a disabled and lower income tenant.
After plaintiff failed to provide Elliott with the information he required, on January 5, 2005, he filed an unlawful detainer action against her. However, plaintiff filed for bankruptcy and the action was stayed. Elliott therefore dismissed the unlawful detainer action voluntarily.
At a hearing on May 3, 2005, the automatic stay was lifted. The bankruptcy judge ruled that defendants had to pay plaintiff an $8,000 relocation fee, allow her to apply for a lower income relocation fee, and not evict her until July 1, 2005.
A second unlawful detainer action was filed on June 1, 2005, then voluntarily dismissed. When plaintiff failed to vacate her apartment, a third unlawful detainer action was filed on July 1. Defendants obtained a writ of possession and plaintiff vacated her apartment in September 2005.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In September 2007, plaintiff, in pro. per., filed this action against defendants. She filed her first amended complaint in February 2008. In her first cause of action, she alleged that defendants “sought to terminate Plaintiff’s tenancy using reasons that were not permissible by [the West Hollywood Municipal Code] through a Chapter 7 petition filed by Plaintiff. Plaintiff was NOT legally required to notify Defendants of Plaintiff’s Chapter 7 filing because NO monies were owed to Defendants. Defendants, through means unknown to Plaintiff, uncovered the filing and contacted the court appointed Trustee to make an offer in compromise based upon fictitious claims made by Defendants. In return, Defendants requested the authority to terminate Plaintiff’s tenancy through the Chapter 7 filing. This deliberate interference in Plaintiff’s Chapter 7 petition by Defendant caused the Trustee to pull Plaintiff’s No Asset Report, and open up an investigation into the matter. After an extensive investigation lasting almost two years, the Chapter 7 case finally closed with NO change to Plaintiff’s original Chapter 7 petition because the Trustee determined that Defendant’s claims were unfounded, and there was no legal basis to terminate Plaintiff’s tenancy.” Plaintiff alleged that the foregoing conduct violated the Unlawful Competition Law (UCL, Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.).
Plaintiff further alleged that defendants violated the West Hollywood Municipal Code by paying her a relocation fee of only $8,000 as a disabled tenant rather than the $15,000 due her as a disabled, lower income tenant. Additionally, plaintiff alleged defendants violated the implied warranty of habitability by demanding rent from her while her apartment was uninhabitable and she was forced to live elsewhere. Plaintiff also alleged a cause of action for unlawful retention of her security deposit.
In her fifth cause of action, plaintiff alleged that defendants “attempted a buyout of Plaintiff’s tenancy without her approval, demanded and accepted rent payments while Plaintiff was unable to live in her rental unit, failed to timely and properly repair habitability issues and in doing so kept Plaintiff from her home in an effort to constructively evict, and refused to pay Plaintiff a proper and lawful relocation fee. Only after Defendant was unsuccessful at constructively evicting Plaintiff and other tenants at the Alta Loma property, did Defendants invoke the Ellis Act. Defendants[’] willful, malicious, intentional and fraudulent acts were in retaliation against Plaintiff for exercising her legal rights.” Defendants’ acts violated the UCL.
Defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion on May 23, 2008. They sought to strike the first and fifth causes of action. They also moved to strike portions of the punitive damages allegations and filed a demurrer.
Plaintiff moved to conduct discovery regarding the anti-SLAPP motion, as well as to continue the hearing on the motion. Following a hearing on July 17, defendants agreed to turn over documents plaintiff was requesting. Hearing on the anti-SLAPP motion, motion to strike and demurrer was continued. Plaintiff filed opposition to all three motions.
On August 18, 2008, the trial court granted defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion. It explained that defendants’ participation in plaintiff’s bankruptcy proceedings was protected activity within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute and protected by the litigation privilege (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b)). Plaintiff failed to present evidence or argument showing a probability of prevailing on the merits. Therefore, the first cause of action, and the fifth cause of action to the extent it was based on defendants’ participation in the bankruptcy proceedings, were stricken.
The trial court also overruled defendants’ demurrer as to the second cause of action and sustained it with leave to amend as to the third and fourth causes of action. It granted the motion to strike with leave to amend.
Plaintiff filed her second amended complaint on September 8, 2008. Her first two causes of action were for unfair competition, arising in part from defendants’ participation in the bankruptcy proceeding, breach of the warranty of habitability, bad faith retention of plaintiff’s security deposit, infliction of emotional distress, and a sixth cause of action for unfair competition similar to the fifth cause of action in the prior complaint.
Defendants again moved to strike the punitive damages allegations. They filed a demurrer to the unfair competition and infliction of emotional distress causes of action on the grounds of uncertainty and failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
Defendants also filed a second anti-SLAPP motion. They noted that “[d]espite the fact that this Court granted defendants’ Anti-SLAPP motion regarding plaintiff’s allegations in her First Amended Complaint that defendants wrongfully interfered with her bankruptcy proceedings, plaintiff remains undeterred. In her Second Amended Complaint, plaintiff again alleges that defendants... interfered with plaintiff’s bankruptcy proceedings.”
On November 17, 2008, the trial court granted the motion to strike and sustained defendants’ demurrer. Although the demurrer was not based on the previous granting of defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion, the trial court noted that plaintiff had no right to amend a cause of action stricken through an anti-SLAPP motion. Allowing amendment would undermine the anti-SLAPP statute by permitting another round of pleading and another anti-SLAPP motion.
The court also noted that plaintiff had filed an appeal from its order granting defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion. It ruled that the appeal did not stay proceedings as to the causes of action unaffected by the anti-SLAPP motion. It also gave plaintiff leave to amend.
On December 1, 2008, plaintiff, now represented by counsel, filed a third amended complaint. She alleged causes of action for violations of the West Hollywood Municipal Code, breach of the warranty of habitability, bad faith retention of security deposit, infliction of emotional distress and unfair competition.
Defendants again filed a motion to strike. They also demurred to the first cause of action for violation of the West Hollywood Municipal Code, the fifth cause of action for infliction of emotional distress and the sixth cause of action for unfair competition.
The trial court overruled the demurrer. It granted the motion to strike as to the allegations of negligent infliction of emotional distress but denied the motion as to the punitive damages allegations.
On May 29, 2009, defendants filed a motion for summary adjudication. They sought an adjudication that there were no triable issues of fact as to whether they violated the West Hollywood Municipal Code, were liable for a breach of the warranty of habitability, were liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress, or that the punitive damages claim was without merit.
Plaintiff failed to file opposition to the motion for summary adjudication, and on June 25, 2009, the trial court granted the motion. It found that defendants met their burden of establishing there was no merit to plaintiff’s first through third and fifth causes of action. Therefore, the only causes of action remaining were the fourth cause of action, for bad faith retention of the security deposit, and the sixth, UCL, cause of action insofar as it was based on the fourth cause of action.
Plaintiff’s counsel failed to appear at the final status conference before the July 6, 2009 trial date. The court issued an order to show cause why the case should not be dismissed. On July 2, plaintiff’s counsel moved to stay trial pending appellate review of a discovery ruling and the order granting summary adjudication. Plaintiff also sought to have the order granting summary adjudication vacated under both the mandatory and discretionary provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b). This motion was followed four days later by plaintiff’s counsel’s motion to be relieved as counsel due to “[a] complete breakdown in the attorney-client relationship.”
On July 29, 2009, the trial court dismissed the action on defendants’ motion, after plaintiff was unprepared to proceed with trial. Thereafter, plaintiff’s counsel’s motion to be relieved was placed off calendar. Defendants filed a memorandum of costs on August 18.
On August 25, 2009, plaintiff’s counsel filed motions to vacate the summary adjudication and dismissal under both the mandatory and discretionary provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b). The trial court denied both motions on September 15 and 17. On September 17, plaintiff filed an appeal from an order after judgment. (No. B219022.)
Plaintiff’s appeal from the order granting the anti-SLAPP motion was dismissed on September 18, 2009, due to plaintiff’s default.
Defendants filed motions for attorney’s fees on October 6, 2009. They sought statutory attorney’s fees under Civil Code section 1942.4 pertaining to the cause of action for breach of the warranty of habitability. They also sought contractual attorney’s fees under Civil Code section 1717 for the breach of contract cause of action based on an attorney’s fee provision in a written lease agreement plaintiff entered into with the former owner of the property.
Plaintiff moved for an order discharging her counsel on November 30, 2009.
On February 11, 2010, the trial court granted defendants’ motion for statutory attorney’s fees in the amount of $71,500. It denied the motion for contractual attorney’s fees, finding the parties had no written lease agreement containing an attorney’s fees provision. Plaintiff appealed from the order granting attorney’s fees on March 1, 2010. (No. B222822.)
DISCUSSION
A. No. B219022
As stated above, plaintiff contends the trial court erred in granting defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion, in lifting the automatic stay of proceedings pending the appeal of the order granting the special motion to strike, and in granting defendants’ motion for summary adjudication. None of these contentions is properly before us.
1. Plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal
The judgment of dismissal was entered on July 29, 2009. Plaintiff filed motions to vacate the summary adjudication and dismissal on August 25. Orders denying the motions were filed on September 15 and 17. On September 17, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal which specified that the appeal was taken from an order after judgment.
Our jurisdiction on appeal is limited in scope by the notice of appeal; where it specifies the order from which the appeal is taken, this court has no jurisdiction to consider other orders. (Polster, Inc. v. Swing (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 427, 436.) While there is a rule that a notice of appeal is to be liberally construed in favor of its sufficiency (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(2)), where a notice of appeal refers to one of two separate appealable judgments or orders, the notice of appeal will not be construed to refer to the separate appealable judgment or order not referred to in the notice of appeal (Unilogic, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 612, 625). This is because the rule of liberal construction “favoring appealability in cases of ambiguity cannot apply where there is a clear intention to appeal from only part of the judgment or one of two separate appealable judgments or orders. [Citation.]” (Norman I. Krug Real Estate Investments, Inc. v. Praszker (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 35, 47.)
Moreover, even if we were to liberally construe plaintiff’s notice of appeal to refer to the judgment, as well as the postjudgment order denying her motions to vacate, the result would be the same.
2. Anti-SLAPP Motion
As defendants point out, an order granting or denying an anti-SLAPP motion is separately appealable. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 425.16, subd. (i), 904.1, subd. (a)(13); Kyle v. Carmon (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 901, 906.) It can be reviewed only on appeal from the order itself. (Maughan v. Google Technology, Inc. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1246-1247; see Russell v. Foglio (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 653, 659-660.)
Plaintiff appealed from the order granting defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion. The appeal was dismissed due to plaintiff’s failure to file an opening brief. Following our issuance of a remittitur, the order became final. (Safaie v. Jacuzzi Whirlpool Bath, Inc. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1171.) It is not reviewable on appeal from the judgment.
3. Stay of Proceedings during Appeal of Anti-SLAPP Ruling
As noted in Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, an appeal “stays all further trial court proceedings ‘upon the matters embraced’ in or ‘affected’ by the appeal.” (Id. at p. 189.) A matter is embraced in or affected by the appeal if proceedings on the matter would affect the effectiveness of the appeal. (Ibid.)
Thus, the proceedings must be stayed if they “directly or indirectly seek to ‘enforce, vacate or modify’” the order from which the appeal was taken, would affect the appellate court’s ability to resolve the appeal or if the result of the proceedings might be irreconcilable with the decision on appeal. (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 189-190.)
In claiming that the proceedings should have been stayed, plaintiff cites a statement by defendants’ counsel in support of defendants’ motion for attorney’s fees that “[i]t will be impossible to separate the fees incurred on the breach of habitability claims from the other causes of action as they are inextricably intertwined.” That the matters are “inextricably intertwined” for purposes of determining the amount of attorney’s fees recoverable for litigation of one of several causes of action is irrelevant to our determination as to whether the proceedings should have been stayed. The anti-SLAPP motion removed from the proceedings those portions of the causes of action that were based on defendants’ participation in plaintiff’s bankruptcy proceedings. Any overlap in counsel’s work necessary to resolve the case has no effect on our ability to effectively resolve the question whether the trial court properly granted the anti-SLAPP motion. (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 189-190.)
Plaintiff also argues that the failure to stay the proceedings precluded her from arguing equitable tolling of the statute of limitations as to her cause of action for breach of the warranty of habitability. In support of her argument, she cites the trial court’s refusal to allow her counsel to argue the issue at the hearing on defendants’ first motion for summary adjudication. As defendants point out, however, plaintiff filed no opposition to that motion, and for that reason plaintiff’s counsel was precluded from arguing equitable tolling.
In sum, plaintiff has failed to show error in the refusal to stay the proceedings pending the appeal of the order granting the anti-SLAPP motion.
4. Summary Adjudication
Plaintiff claims the trial court erred in granting defendants’ first summary adjudication motion for a number of reasons. The first of these is that defendants mischaracterized the allegations of the first cause of action in her third amended complaint.
We are not concerned with defendants’ characterization of the allegations of the complaint. The question before us is whether there are no triable issues of material fact and the cause of action may be adjudicated as a matter of law. (Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 573, 579; Torres v. Cool Carriers A.B. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 900, 904.) We examine the evidence and independently determine its effect. (Crouse v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1509, 1524.) We must uphold the trial court’s decision if it is correct on any ground, regardless of the reasons the trial court gave. (Biljac Associates v. First Interstate Bank (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1410, 1419, disapproved on another ground in Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 532, fn. 8.)
The only challenge plaintiff actually makes to the trial court’s decision—as opposed to defendants’ arguments—regarding the first cause of action is that the trial court should have exercised its discretion to disregard Steier’s declaration in support of the motion (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (e)), without which there was insufficient evidence to support summary adjudication of the first cause of action. In the absence of any evidentiary (Willard v. Hagemeister (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 406, 412) basis or authority (Mansell v. Board of Administration (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 539, 545-546) to support plaintiff’s position, we reject it.
The remainder of plaintiff’s arguments are largely unintelligible, unsupported by any evidence (as plaintiff failed to oppose the motion for summary adjudication), adequate citations to the record or authority. Plaintiff seems to be rearguing the motion for summary adjudication rather than pointing out the respects in which the trial court’s decision was incorrect.
It is well established that in addressing an appeal, we begin with the presumption that the judgment or ruling of the trial court is correct. (In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133; Fleishman v. Superior Court (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 350, 357.) The appealing party “has the burden of showing reversible error by an adequate record.” (Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574; Robbins v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 313, 318.) Meeting this burden requires citations to the record to direct the court to the pertinent evidence or other matters in the record which demonstrate reversible error. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1); Guthrey v. State of California (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1115; Culbertson v. R. D. Werner Co., Inc. (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 704, 710.) It also requires citation to relevant authority and argument. (Mansell v. Board of Administration, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at pp. 545-546.)
We acknowledge a self-represented litigant’s understanding of the rules on appeal are, as a practical matter, more limited than an experienced appellate attorney’s. Whenever possible, we do not strictly apply technical rules of procedure in a manner that deprives litigants of a hearing. However, “mere self-representation is not a ground for exceptionally lenient treatment.” (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985.) Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden on appeal. Consequently, we must uphold the trial court’s order granting summary adjudication.
B. No. B222822
Plaintiff sets forth a number of challenges to the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees. The first of these is that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to make the award. This seems to be based on the assumption that the trial court erred in failing to stay the proceedings during the pendency of her appeal of the order granting the anti-SLAPP motion. As stated above, that assumption is incorrect, and the trial court had jurisdiction to act in the matter pending the appeal. (See Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 196-200.)
Plaintiff also argues that since defendants state on appeal that the causes of action were not “inextricably intertwined, ” they should not have been awarded all of their attorney’s fees. As discussed above, defendants’ statements with respect to attorney’s fees were not determinative of the propriety of continuing the proceedings during the pendency of the appeal of the order granting the anti-SLAPP motion.
Plaintiff next claims that the trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees under Civil Code section 1942.4 because her third amended complaint “reveals on its face that [her] claim for uninhabitable conditions is pursuant to” the West Hollywood Municipal Code and the UCL. The third amended complaint reveals that plaintiffs’ first two causes of action were for violations of the West Hollywood Municipal Code. Her third cause of action was for breach of the warranty of habitability. She alleged that defendants demanded that she pay rent while her apartment was uninhabitable. The final allegation in that cause of action is “that as a result of Defendants[’] breach of the warranty of habitability and in accordance with West Hollywood Municipal Code Chapter 17.68 she is entitled to restitution” as specified by law plus attorney’s fees and costs. (Italics added.)
Civil Code section 1942.4 provides a landlord cannot collect rent for housing that is uninhabitable. Subdivision (b)(2) of the section provides that the prevailing party in a suit for violation of the section is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. The section also provides in subdivision (f) that any remedy provided by the statute is in addition to any other remedy provided by law or contract.
We agree with defendants that plaintiff did, in fact, plead a cause of action for breach of the warranty of habitability to which Civil Code section 1942.4 applies. She did not limit her pleading to violation of the West Hollywood Municipal Code.
Plaintiff also relies on the statement of defendants’ counsel at the hearing on attorney’s fees, “So it is clear that she doesn’t make a common law breach of the habitability claim.” This statement is taken out of context. What defendants’ counsel argued was, “Just because the plaintiff didn’t mention the code section, that doesn’t make the attorneys fees under 1942.4 inapplicable. [¶] If you read the amended complaint, it says that the defendant accepted the rent payment with the knowledge that the unit was uninhabitable. That completely mirrors the statutory language. And in 1942 she requested attorneys fees under the West Hollywood ordinance. [¶] So it is clear that she doesn’t make a common law breach of the habitability claim. [¶] And therefore, she should be estopped from claiming that we are not entitled to attorneys fees.” The statement by defendants’ counsel does not support plaintiff’s claim that her cause of action for breach of the warranty of habitability was pled under the West Hollywood Municipal Code only.
Plaintiff further argues that defendants were not entitled to attorney’s fees in a UCL cause of action. The award of attorney’s fees was not based on any UCL claims, so this argument is of no assistance to plaintiff.
Plaintiff’s next argument, to which she erroneously applies the doctrine of stare decisis, is that the trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees related to the anti-SLAPP motion, which had already been decided. As defendants point out, the trial court specified that it was awarding attorney’s fees necessary for the defense of the cause of action for breach of the warranty of habitability only. Thus, plaintiff’s argument is without merit.
Stare decisis applies to appellate decisions, not those of the trial court. (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Appeal, § 486, pp. 546-547; see also People v. Latimer (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1203, 1212-1213.)
Plaintiff asserts, without any citation to the record, that the trial court failed to apply the lodestar method in calculating the attorney’s fee award. In fixing attorney’s fees, the court “ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar, ’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. ‘California courts have consistently held that a computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.’” (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) The court may then adjust the lodestar figure based upon factors specific to the case before it, including “‘the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case.’” (Id. at pp. 1095-1096.) We note, however, that a lodestar calculation is not required, rather, it is the manner in which the court’s calculation of attorney’s fees “ordinarily begins.” (Id. at p. 1095.)
As stated in Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 44 at page 67, there is no requirement that “trial courts... explain their decisions on all motions for attorney fees and costs, or even... an express acknowledgement of the lodestar amount. The absence of an explanation of a ruling may make it more difficult for an appellate court to uphold it as reasonable, but we will not presume error based on such an omission.... In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that the trial court considered the relevant factors. [Citation.]”
Plaintiff has directed us to no evidence that the trial court did not consider the relevant factors in calculating the attorney’s fees award. Hence, she has failed to meet her burden of demonstrating error. (Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp., supra, at p. 67; Guthrey v. State of California, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at p. 1115.)
Plaintiff also asserts that defendants failed to meet their burden of proof on the motion for attorney’s fees, in that “[t]he only evidentiary support for defense counsel’s rates is a conclusory, two sentence statement in the affidavit of defense counsel Karen Harmeling attached to the fees motion that states: ‘The hourly billing rate charged by my firm is $95.00 for paralegals, $150.00 for associates, and $160.00 for partners. I am informed and believe that the hourly rates are less than the prevailing market rate charged in the Los Angeles area for this kind of work.’” In plaintiff’s view, defendants were required to name the individuals who worked on the case and to set forth their qualifications, reputations in the legal community and other factors which would allow the trial court to determine whether the fees charged were reasonable.
That kind of detailed information is not necessary for the trial court to determine the reasonableness of attorney’s fees requested. The trial court is well able to judge the reasonable value of the professional services provided in the matter before the court. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1095; Weber v. Langholz (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1578, 1587.)
Plaintiff also complains that defense counsel’s time records contained numerous redacted entries, “block billing” and “overreaching.” In Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, on which plaintiff relies, the court noted that “[t]o enable the trial court to determine whether attorney fees should be awarded and in what amount, an attorney should present ‘(1) evidence, documentary and oral, of the services actually performed; and (2) expert opinion, by [the applicant] and other lawyers, as to what would be a reasonable fee for such services.’ [Citations.] ‘In many cases, the trial court will be aware of the nature and extent of the attorney’s services from its observation of the trial proceedings and the pretrial and discovery proceedings reflected in the file.’ [Citation.] However, in the absence of such crucial information as the number of hours worked, billing rates, types of issues dealt with and appearances made on the client’s behalf, the trial court is placed in the position of simply guessing at the actual value of the attorney’s services. That practice is unacceptable and cannot be the basis for an award of fees.” (Id. at pp. 558-559.)
However, Martino also states that the “[t]estimony of an attorney as to the number of hours worked on a particular case is sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time records.” (Martino v. Denevi, supra, 182 Cal.App.3d at p. 559.) An attorney’s statement as to the hours worked, billing rates and actions taken may be found sufficient. (Steiny & Co. v. California Electric Supply Co. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 285, 293.) If the documentation is insufficient to enable the trial court to determine a reasonable attorney’s fee, the court is free to require additional documentation. (Farber v. Bay View Terrace Homeowners Assn. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1007, 1014-1015.)
The trial court found defendants’ documentation was adequate for a determination as to a reasonable attorney’s fee for the one cause of action on which attorney’s fees could be recovered. Plaintiff has failed to convince us otherwise.
Plaintiff additionally contends that defendants were not entitled to attorney’s fees due to their misconduct and that of their counsel. The claimed misconduct includes alleged factual misrepresentations in papers filed with the court and participation in plaintiff’s bankruptcy proceedings.
Plaintiff had an opportunity to challenge the actions and statements she claims constituted misconduct by prosecuting her appeal of the order granting defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion and by opposing defendants’ motion for summary adjudication. She did neither.
Plaintiff made the same claims of misconduct in her opposition to defendants’ motion for attorney’s fees. The trial court rejected her claim that defendants exhibited such misconduct that they were not entitled to attorney’s fees. (See City of Sacramento v. Drew (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1287, 1303.)
In general, we review an award of attorney’s fees for abuse of discretion, reversing it only where there is no reasonable basis for the trial court’s award. (Ramos v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 615, 621.) We cannot say that the claimed misconduct deprived the trial court of a reasonable basis for awarding attorney’s fees to defendants. Hence, we find no abuse of discretion in making the award.
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed. Defendants are to recover their costs on appeal.
We concur: PERLUSS, P. J., ZELON, J.