The BIA's adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence in light of "specific and cogent reasons" offered by the BIA. Manes v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 1261, 1263 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
The BIA's adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence in light of three "specific and cogent reasons" offered by the BIA. Manes v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 1261, 1263 (9th Cir. 2017).
The IJ considered this explanation but did not accept it, and the record does not compel a contrary conclusion. See Manes v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 1261, 1263 (9th Cir. 2017) ("Because credibility determinations are findings of fact by the IJ, they are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
Petitioner's testimony about the events underlying his claimed fear of persecution conflicted with his supporting documentation. See Manes v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 1261, 1264-65 (9th Cir. 2017). Petitioner testified, for example, that he was in a state of shock and diminished consciousness following the attack, but a purported witness interview from that night suggests a highly aware and articulate interviewee.
1. Substantial evidence supports the agency's adverse credibility determination. Under the REAL ID Act, an IJ may "base an adverse credibility determination on any relevant factor that . . . can reasonably be said to have a 'bearing on a petitioner's veracity,'" Ren v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1079, 1084 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1044), including any "inconsistencies between the petitioner's statements and other evidence of record," Manes v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 1261, 1263 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). Although an IJ cannot rely on "an utterly trivial inconsistency, such as a typographical error," inconsistencies need not "'go to the heart' of the petitioner's claim to form the basis of an adverse credibility determination."
1. We uphold an adverse credibility determination unless "any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary." 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Manes v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 1261, 1263 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
We must uphold an adverse credibility determination "unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary." 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Manes v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 1261, 1263 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). There is no presumption that an applicant is credible and the IJ may base an adverse credibility determination on the totality of the circumstances.
The BIA and IJ were permitted to afford substantial weight to inconsistencies that "bear[ ] directly on [Rodriguez-Ramirez]’s claim of persecution." Manes v. Sessions , 875 F.3d 1261, 1264 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). Rodriguez-Ramirez testified that he fled to the United States after gang members threatened him outside his daughter's school.
In my view, neither the IJ nor the BIA provided a specific and cogent reason to disregard Bossa's explanation regarding his fear of disclosing his sexual orientation in public during the border patrol interview. See Manes v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 1261, 1263 (9th Cir. 2017). Accordingly, I will dissent.
1. Substantial evidence supported the adverse credibility determination, namely major inconsistencies between Singh's testimony and his statements from prior interviews. See Manes v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 1261, 1263 (9th Cir. 2017). One major inconsistency related to whether Singh's parents remained in India. During an interview with a border agent in 2010, Singh stated that his parents resided in India.