Manes v. Depew

6 Citing cases

  1. Sofia v. Dodson

    571 S.W.3d 225 (Mo. Ct. App. 2019)

    First, to the extent Appellants' wrongful death lawsuit against Dr. Dodson and Mercy Hospital contained two wrongful death actions, one per defendant, Mercy Hospital's separate dismissal did dispose of an entire action.SeeReese v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., , 293-94 (Mo. App. W.D. 2005); Manes v. Depew, , 529 (Mo. App. E.D. 1999). Second, the Supreme Court of Missouri has broadly defined "nonsuit" to include various terminations of a cause of action that do not adjudicate the merits of the issues.

  2. Reese v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co.

    173 S.W.3d 287 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005)   Cited 12 times
    In Reese, a consequential damage claim was specifically excluded in the employer's liability section of a Business Auto Insurance Policy but was not excluded under the "Fellow Employee" exclusion in the same policy, which applied to claims made against a fellow employee.

    The Missouri wrongful death statute, section 537.080.2, provides that "[o]nly one action may be brought under this section against any one defendant for the death of any one person." Manes v. Depew, 987 S.W.2d 527, 529 (Mo.App.E.D. 1999), held that section 537.080.2 "does not mandate that only one wrongful death action may be prosecuted for the death of a person when there is more than one defendant." Manes allowed the plaintiffs to pursue a wrongful death claim against a defendant who was not a party to a previous wrongful death action arising from the same death.

  3. Cousin's Advertising, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Adjustment of Kansas City

    78 S.W.3d 774 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 9 times

    If the ordinance is clear and unambiguous when the terms used are given their legislative definition or their plain and ordinary meaning, then there is no room for construction and the courts must give effect to the statute as written. Manes v. Depew, 987 S.W.2d 527, 529 (Mo.App. 1999). Applying the foregoing rules for interpreting an ordinance, the appellant, in contending that I-70 is not a "street" for purposes of § 80-220(e)(1)d, asserts that the definition of "street" found in § 80-20 of the zoning ordinances must be applied.

  4. Bosch v. St. Louis Healthcare Network

    No. ED76044 (Mo. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2000)

    When the trial court does not state its basis for dismissal, we presume it was based on the grounds stated in the motion to dismiss. Manes v. Depew, 987 S.W.2d 527, 528 (Mo.App.E.D. 1999). Dismissal will be affirmed if it can be sustained on any ground supported by the motion to dismiss.

  5. Bellos v. Winkles

    14 S.W.3d 653 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 6 times

    When reviewing the trial court's dismissal of a cause of action, appellate courts examine "the pleadings, allowing them their broadest intendment, treating all facts alleged as true, and construing the allegations favorably to the pleader, to determine whether they invoke principles of substantive law." Manes v. Depew, 987 S.W.2d 527, 528 (Mo.App.E.D. 1999). "When the trial court does not state its basis for dismissal, we presume it was based on the grounds stated in the motion to dismiss."

  6. Information Technologies v. St. Louis

    14 S.W.3d 60 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 2 times

    Where the language of the statute is unambiguous, there is no room for construction of the statute, and we must give effect to the plain meaning of the statute as it is written. Manes v. Depew, 987 S.W.2d 527, 529 (Mo.App.E.D. 1999). The trial court found and we agree that REJIS is a Missouri body, both corporate and political, with its principal place of business in St. Louis City, Missouri.