Opinion
2013-10369
06-24-2015
Douglas C. MANDITCH, respondent, v. Devon MANDITCH, appellant.
Abrams, Fensterman, Fensterman, Eisman, Formato, Ferrara & Einiger, LLP (Mauro Lilling Naparty LLP, Woodbury, N.Y. [Richard J. Montes and Katherine Herr Solomon ], of counsel), for appellant. Glenn S. Koopersmith, Garden City, N.Y. (Vincent F. Stempel of counsel), for respondent.
Abrams, Fensterman, Fensterman, Eisman, Formato, Ferrara & Einiger, LLP (Mauro Lilling Naparty LLP, Woodbury, N.Y. [Richard J. Montes and Katherine Herr Solomon ], of counsel), for appellant.
Glenn S. Koopersmith, Garden City, N.Y. (Vincent F. Stempel of counsel), for respondent.
REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., PETER B. SKELOS, SHERI S. ROMAN, and HECTOR D. LaSALLE, JJ.
Opinion Appeal from stated portions of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (James F. Quinn, J.), dated July 9, 2013. The judgment, upon a decision of the same court dated February 8, 2013, made after a nonjury trial, inter alia, awarded the plaintiff certain items of personalty, awarded the defendant only $52,000 in counsel fees, and denied the defendant's application for an award of expert fees.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in declining to award her a share of the income generated by stock in a company called BankTel, and to credit her with half of the payments that the plaintiff made in connection with certain stock transactions (see Mahoney–Buntzman v. Buntzman, 12 N.Y.3d 415, 881 N.Y.S.2d 369, 909 N.E.2d 62 ). Moreover, the court providently exercised its discretion in directing the defendant to return to the plaintiff two objects of art purchased during the parties' marriage. The distribution made by the Supreme Court was well within its broad discretion in making an equitable distribution of the parties' marital property (see Schwartz v. Schwartz, 67 A.D.3d 989, 890 N.Y.S.2d 71 ), and we discern no reason to disturb its determination.
Contrary to the defendant's further contention, the Supreme Court properly denied her request for an award of additional counsel fees relating to certain services rendered by her former attorneys (see Schultz v. Hughes, 109 A.D.3d 895, 971 N.Y.S.2d 536 ; Manditch v. Manditch, 92 A.D.3d 645, 937 N.Y.S.2d 883 ). Moreover, under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant's request for an award of expert fees (see Carlin v. Carlin, 120 A.D.3d 734, 991 N.Y.S.2d 335 ; Kim v. Schiller, 112 A.D.3d 671, 978 N.Y.S.2d 229 ; Avello v. Avello, 72 A.D.3d 850, 899 N.Y.S.2d 337 ; Appel v. Appel, 54 A.D.3d 786, 864 N.Y.S.2d 92 ).
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.