Opinion
16896.
JANUARY 10, 1950. REHEARING DENIED FEBRUARY 17, 1950.
Interpleader. Before Judge Boykin. Carroll Superior Court. September 10, 1949.
H. C. Holbrook, M. Neil Andrews, Nall Sterne, and A. Paul Cadenhead, for plaintiff in error.
Boykin Boykin, Moise, Post Gardner, and Hugh E. Wright, contra.
The allegations of the petition as amended, to the effect that a safety-deposit box in the petitioner bank was registered in the name of a husband and wife under a contract which provided that either should have the right, during the life of both and after the death of either, to have access to the box, and that, after the death of the husband, his wife and his administrator were each claiming the sole right to unlock and enter the box, were insufficient to set forth a cause of action for interpleader, and the court erred in overruling a general demurrer to the petition.
No. 16896. JANUARY 10, 1950. REHEARING DENIED FEBRUARY 17, 1950.
This proceeding emanates from a dispute over the right to enter a safety-deposit box. First National Bank of Atlanta filed in Carroll Superior Court, against J. R. Newell, as administrator of the estate of LeRoy C. Mandeville, and Mrs. Margaret C. Mandeville, a petition for interpleader and injunction. As amended it alleged that on May 5, 1949, the bank rented a safety-deposit box to LeRoy C. Mandeville and Margaret C. Mandeville. Under the rental contract each was delivered a key to the box, and the contract, along with various other agreements, provided: "Either renter of a box rented by two persons shall have the right, during the life of both renters and after the death of either, to have access to said box, to surrender or exchange the same, and/or to remove the contents thereof, and neither renter may prevent the other from exercising such rights."
LeRoy C. Mandeville died May 15, 1949, and the defendant Newell qualified as administrator. Described assets are in the box. Neither party wants the other to enter the box, and both claim the contents and the duty of delivery thereof from the bank. All of their adverse claims are derived from a common source, to wit, LeRoy C. Mandeville.
It was alleged that, one day after the death of LeRoy C. Mandeville, certain bonds contained in a letter addressed to the deceased were received by the petitioner. Subsequently Mrs. Mandeville presented to the bank a letter signed by the deceased, authorizing the bank to deliver the bonds to Mrs. Mandeville to be placed in the safety-deposit box. By agreement between Newell and Mrs. Mandeville these bonds were placed in the box on May 19, 1949, four days after the death of LeRoy C. Mandeville. On the same day, Mrs. Mandeville, delivered to the petitioner the following writing: "This is to request that Box Number 3641 in the name of LeRoy C. Mandeville and Margaret C. Mandeville be opened only in the presence of J. R. Newell." On August 8, 1949, Mrs. Mandeville wrote the bank not to permit anyone to go into the box; that certain described bonds and securities therein were her property, that LeRoy C. Mandeville gave her his key to the box, and accordingly she had both keys and no one else was entitled to enter. In a letter to the bank dated August 9, 1949, she canceled and withdrew the previous request dated May 19, 1949, that the box be opened only in the presence of J. R. Newell.
It was further alleged: If either of the defendants should open the box or should demand the right to open same, except under court order, the petitioner would be placed in a position of peril and its rights and liabilities could not be adequately protected. The petitioner does not have or claim any interest in the subject-matter, has incurred no independent liability to either of the defendants, but stands indifferent between them merely as a stakeholder. The petitioner is without adequate remedy at law and is entitled to bring this petition for interpleader. Copies of the written contract for the rental of the safety-deposit box, and of various letters in reference thereto, were attached and made a part of the petition.
The prayers, besides for process, were: That the petition of interpleader be sanctioned, and the defendants be enjoined from opening the box except under court order; that the court determine the issues between the two defendants, and enter a decree wherein the petitioner will be protected; that, after an interlocutory hearing the petitioner be directed to interplead the physical assets, and to turn same over to whatever person or authority the court may designate; that thereupon the petitioner be relieved from any further liability, and recover its proper expenses and costs; that both of the defendants be restrained and enjoined from filing any suit or commencing any action against the petitioner in any manner involving these assets, but that they be required to interplead herein and set up their claims to the aforesaid assets in this suit; and that the court grant to the petitioner such other and further relief as may be appropriate.
The defendant, Mrs. Margaret C. Mandeville, demurred to the petition. Her demurrer was overruled, and the exception here is to that judgment.
The demurrer asserts a failure to state a cause of action for the relief sought, in that the petition shows on its face that the petitioner has an adequate remedy at law by the terms of its contract, which permits either of the respondents to enter the safety-deposit box.
Code § 37-1503 provides: "Whenever a person shall be possessed of property or funds, or owe a debt or duty, to which more than one person shall lay claim of such a character as to render it doubtful or dangerous for the holder to act, he may apply to equity to compel the claimants to interplead."
It is not here insisted that the bank is "possessed of property or funds, . . to which more than one person shall lay claim." In the bank's brief it is specifically stated that it is not interpleading the claimants to a fund in its possession. It is therefore unnecessary to decide whether one who rents the use of a safety-deposit box to others, as here alleged, has such possession of the property or funds as to authorize the bank to interplead rival claimants thereto.
It is insisted though that the bank is placed in the position where it owes a "duty, to which more than one person shall lay claim," as each of the respondents claims the right to enter the safety-deposit box, and each has instructed the bank not to permit the other to do so. The question therefore presented is whether the bank owes a duty to more than one person of such a character as to render it doubtful or dangerous for it to act. While it is not incumbent upon the bank to decide at its peril either close questions of fact or nice questions of law, nevertheless, when it is in possession of all the facts and the questions of law are not intricate or debatable, a petition for interpleader will be denied. Franklin v. Southern Ry. Co., 119 Ga. 855 (1) ( 47 S.E. 344); Knight v. Jackson, 156 Ga. 165 (1) ( 118 S.E. 661); Lassiter v. Bank of Dawson, 191 Ga. 208 (4) ( 11 S.E.2d 910). The petition shows that the bank has a contract in which it is agreed that either Mandeville or Mrs. Mandeville could enter this box. The respondent Newell, as administrator, has all the rights that Mandeville had under the contract. The court is not concerned with the wisdom of such a contract. The bank is in possession of all the facts, and in view of the contract, which permits either Mrs. Mandeville or the administrator of Mr. Mandeville to enter the box, the bank is not confronted with intricate or debatable questions of law, such as would put the bank in peril in permitting either respondent to enter the box.
The fact that described bonds were placed in the box by agreement between the respondents after the death of Mr. Mandeville, and the subsequent acts of the respondents in reference to the right to enter the box, would not constitute a novation of the contract above referred to. Such does not meet the requisites of a novation. Savannah Bank Trust Co. v. Wolfe, 191 Ga. 111 (4) ( 11 S.E.2d 766); Williams v. Rowe Banking Co., 205 Ga. 770 ( 55 S.E.2d 123).
Accordingly, the trial court erred in overruling the general demurrer.
Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur.