Opinion
Civil Action No. DKC 2001-0270
July 25, 2001
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending and ready for resolution is Defendant HQ Global Workplaces' motion to dismiss count II of Plaintiff Stacey Mandalou's complaint. Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendant, her former employer, under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (count I) and under Maryland law, arising from an alleged misrepresentation to the State of Maryland concerning eligibility for unemployment benefits (count II). No hearing is deemed necessary, and the court now rules pursuant to Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons that follow, the court shall DENY Defendant's motion.
I. Background
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant terminated her on or about September 26, 2000, and that she subsequently applied for unemployment compensation with the State of Maryland. Plaintiff alleges that she was notified by the Maryland unemployment commission that she had been denied benefits because Defendant represented that she had resigned from her employment. Plaintiff alleges that she appealed the decision to deny her benefits and was awarded benefits retroactive to the date she was terminated. In count II of her complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's misrepresentation was in violation of MD. CODE ANN., LAB. EMPL., § 8-1302.
II. Standard of Review
A court reviewing a complaint in light of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion accepts all well-pled allegations of the complaint as true and construes the facts and reasonable inferences derived therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 474 (4th Cir. 1997). The purpose of the motion is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint or a particular claim alleged. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243-244 (4th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted); Ginsburg v. Agora, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 733, 735 (D.Md. 1995). Such a motion ought not be granted unless "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
III. Analysis
Defendant contends that Plaintiff fails to state a claim as to count II of her complaint because she cannot assert a private right of action under MD. CODE ANN., LAB. EMPL., § 8-1302. Plaintiff agrees, but states that count II of her complaint arises under Maryland common law, citing Ellett v. Giant Food, Inc., 66 Md. App. 695, 505 A.2d 888 (1986). In response, Defendant contends that Plaintiff still has not pled an adequate claim and cannot prove damages.
MD. CODE ANN., LAB EMPL., § 8-1302(1)(i), prohibits employers from "knowingly mak[ing] a false statement or false representation or knowingly fail[ing] to disclose a material fact to . . . prevent or reduce the payment of a benefit to an individual who is entitled to the benefit. . . ." An employer who "willfully" violates the statute is subject to fine and/or imprisonment. Id. § 1305(a); Department of Econ. and Employment Dev. v. Lilley, 106 Md. App. 744, 755, 666 A.2d 921, 926-27 (1995). However, as Defendant correctly contends, the statute provides no remedies for an individual whose employer violates § 8-1302. Id. at 755, 666 A.2d at 927 ("Title 8 does not contain any specific remedies for employees who fall victim to a violation of L.E. § 8-1302."); Ellett, 66 Md. App. at 708-09, 505 A.2d at 895 (explaining that Art. 95A, § 17(b) [the statutory precusor to § 8-1302] provides no "remedy whatsoever to a former employee harmed by the very lack of truthfulness proscribed by the subsection").
In Ellett, a case factually similar to the one at bar, the defendant, Giant Foods, Inc., allegedly terminated the plaintiff, Juliana Ellett, while she was absent on medically-ordered worker's compensation leave. Id. at 698-99, 505 A.2d at 889-90. After applying for unemployment compensation, Ellett experienced a delay in receiving her benefits because Giant allegedly misrepresented to the unemployment compensation authorities that she had resigned. Id. at 699, 702, 505 A.2d at 890, 891. Based on this alleged misrepresentation, Ellett brought a civil action against Giant for "wrongful interference with plaintiff's right to collect unemployment compensation," and the Maryland Court of Special Appeals found that she had, in fact, alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for the common law tort of intentional interference with prospective advantage. Id. at 707-08, 505 A.2d at 894 ("Giant overlooks the fact that [a]n action may exist for the malicious or wrongful interference with the economic relationships of another . . . [sometimes called] interference with prospective advantage.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Further, the court rejected Giant's argument that the criminal penalties provided by Art. 95A, § 17(b) should be the exclusive remedy for violation of that subsection. Id. at 708-09, 505 A.2d at 895 (allowing plaintiff to bring a common law action as the court saw no legislative intent to make the criminal penalties exclusive).
Defendant contends that Plaintiff still fails to state a claim because, among other things, she cannot prove damages. Plaintiff responds that at this stage in the litigation, she is not required to prove damages. While Plaintiff is correct, her complaint does make clear that she ultimately received all the unemployment benefits she sought. Thus, the source of her damages in this count is unclear. Proof of actual damages is an element of the tort. Ellett, 66 Md. App. at 707, 505 A.2d at 894. Consequently, in order for Plaintiff's claim to survive at later stages in this litigation, she will have to prove actual damages. For now, however, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state a claim.
Defendant also asserts that Plaintiff has failed to allege that its acts were "calculated to cause her damage," one of the elements of intentional interference with prospective advantage. See Ellett, 66 Md. App. at 707-08, 505 A.2d at 894. A similar argument was considered and rejected by the court in Ellett. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that "the charge that Giant's untruthful statement of the reasons for Ellett's termination improperly deferred her receipt of unemployment compensation is sufficient to allege that element of the tort." Id. Similarly, in the instant case, Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant's misrepresentation regarding her termination deferred her receipt of benefits.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the court will DENY Defendant HQ Global Workplaces' motion to dismiss count II. A separate Order will be entered.
ORDER
For the reasons stated in the forgoing Memorandum Opinion, IT IS this ___ day of July, 2001, by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, ORDERED that:
1. The motion to dismiss by Defendant HQ Global Workplaces BE, and the same hereby IS, DENIED; and
2. The clerk will transmit copies of the Memorandum Opinion and this Order to counsel for the parties.