Summary
dismissing pro se prisoner's complaint for lack of standing
Summary of this case from Tatem v. PerelmuterOpinion
14-cv-767
02-25-2014
HENRY MANCINI, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER DORA SCHIRO, WARDEN ROSE ARGO, OFFICER JOHN DOE, Defendants.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
ORDER
JOHN GLEESON, United States District Judge:
Henry Mancini, currently incarcerated at the Anna M. Kross Center at Rikers Island, brings this pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. I grant Mancini's request to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915; however, for the reasons set forth below, the action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
BACKGROUND
Mancini complains that on September 25, 2013, and December 4, 2013, he was forced to pass through a SecurPASS full-body scanning machine that is used to detect contraband and weapons hidden on or in a person's body. Compl., ECF No. 1, at 4. He argues that this machine causes "a very high possibility of cont[r]acting cancer as well as many other ailments for just the brief time going through the machine." Id. Mancini states that on both occasions he was threatened with reprisals if he did not pass through the scanner. Id. Mancini alleges that he is suffering from an "intense mental reaction" from these incidents and he seeks $100,000,000 in damages. Id. at 5.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than pleadings drafted by attorneys; I am required to read the Mancini's pro se complaint liberally and interpret it as raising the strongest arguments it suggests. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); accord Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that pleadings of pro se litigants are accorded "special solicitude"). At the pleadings stage of the proceeding, I assume the truth of "all well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations" in the complaint, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009)), but the complaint must plead sufficient facts to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) ("Even after Twombly, though, we remain obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally.").
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, I must dismiss a prisoner's complaint sua sponte if it "(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2); see also Liner v. Goord, 196 F.3d 132, 134 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that sua sponte dismissal of prisoner complaints for the reasons listed above is mandatory); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (A district court shall dismiss an in forma pauperis action if it "(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.").
DISCUSSION
"In every federal case, the party bringing the suit must establish standing to prosecute the action." Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004). The minimum standing requirement under the Constitution derives from Article III, Section 2, "which limits federal judicial power to 'cases' and 'controversies.'" Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Food and Drug Admin., 710 F.3d 71, 79 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting U.S. Const. art. III, § 2); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
To establish that a case or controversy exists so as to confer standing under Article III, a plaintiff must satisfy three elements: (a) the plaintiff must suffer an injury in fact, (b) that injury must be fairly traceable to the challenged action, and (c) the injury must be likely to be redressed by a favorable decision of the federal court.Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 710 F.3d at 79 (quotation marks omitted).
Here, there is no case or controversy at issue: Mancini has not suffered an injury in fact but only the speculative alleged possibility of contracting cancer. See id.; see also, e.g., Blasingame v. Sisto, No.10-cv-0514, 2011 WL 4344122, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2011) (dismissing claims asserted by prisoners for future suffering or costs of medical care arising from tuberculosis treatment as "too speculative to adjudicate"). Furthermore, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e bars civil actions brought by prisoners "for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury or the commission of a sexual act." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). The complaint here does not allege any physical injury or sexual act. For these reasons, Mancini's complaint is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. I certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
So ordered.
John Gleeson, U.S.D.J. Dated: February 25, 2014
Brooklyn, New York