Opinion
2001-01950
Submitted February 22, 2002.
April 1, 2002.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Hall, J.), entered February 20, 2001, as granted the respective cross motions of the defendants Pedra Construction and Pedra's Excavating, Ltd., for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.
John L. Juliano, P.C., East Northport, N.Y. (Jonathan C. Juliano of counsel), for appellants.
Morenus, Cardoza Conway, Westbury, N.Y. (Thomas B. Goren and Eileen M. Baumgartner of counsel), for respondent Pedra Construction.
Ahmuty, Demers McManus, Albertson, N.Y. (Frederick B. Simpson and Brendan T. Fitzpatrick of counsel), for respondent Pedra's Excavating, Ltd.
Before: ANITA R. FLORIO, J.P., SONDRA MILLER, LEO F. McGINITY, THOMAS A. ADAMS, JJ.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs.
On September 16, 1997, at approximately 2:00 P.M., the plaintiff John Mancini fell and sustained injuries at a construction site, of which the defendant Pedra Construction was owner and general contractor. The plaintiffs commenced this action against the defendants Pedra Construction, Pedra's Excavating, Ltd. (hereinafter Pedra Excavating), a demolition/excavation subcontractor, and another subcontractor, alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1) and 241(6). The plaintiffs contend that the Supreme Court erred in granting summary judgment to Pedra Construction and Pedra Excavating. We disagree.
Since Pedra Excavating, a subcontractor, did not control or supervise the injured plaintiff and did not have the authority to do so, the Labor Law claims were properly dismissed insofar as asserted against it (see O'Connell v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 276 A.D.2d 608; Passananti v. City of New York, 268 A.D.2d 512; Sabato v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 259 A.D.2d 535; D'Amico v. N.Y. Racing Assn., 203 A.D.2d 509). Pedra Construction was entitled to dismissal of the Labor Law § 200 claim because there was no evidence that it controlled or supervised the injured plaintiff's work (see Comes v. New York State Elec. Gas Corp., 82 N.Y.2d 876; Giambalvo v. Chemical Bank, 260 A.D.2d 432; Rosemin v. Oved, 254 A.D.2d 343). Moreover, since the injured plaintiff's fall across and halfway down a trench that was five to six feet deep was not due to an elevation-related risk, the Labor Law § 240(1) claim was properly dismissed (see Magnuson v. Syosset Community Hosp., 283 A.D.2d 404; Somerville v. Usdan, 255 A.D.2d 500; Bradshaw v. Natl. Structures, 249 A.D.2d 921; Ozzimo v. H.E.S., 249 A.D.2d 912; Radka v. Miller Brewing, 182 A.D.2d 1111).
The plaintiffs' contentions regarding the Labor Law § 241(6) claim, which were raised for the first time on appeal, are improperly before this court (see Charles v. City of New York, 227 A.D.2d 429; Rojas v. County of Nassau, 210 A.D.2d 390). In any event, the Supreme Court correctly determined that the Industrial Code provisions the plaintiffs alleged were violated did not furnish a basis for liability under Labor Law § 241(6). 12 NYCRR 23-1.5 merely establishes a general safety standard that is insufficient to give rise to the nondelegable duty imposed by Labor Law § 241(6) (see, Ferreira v. Unico Serv. Corp., 262 A.D.2d 524; Vernieri v. Empire Realty Co., 219 A.D.2d 593). In light of the uncontroverted evidence that Pedra Construction never received written notice of an Industrial Code violation, 12 NYCRR 23-1.32 is inapplicable. 12 NYCRR 23-1.33 does not apply to workers on a construction site (see Lawyer v. Hoffman, 275 A.D.2d 541). Accordingly, the Labor Law § 241(6) claim was also properly dismissed (see Morra v. White, 276 A.D.2d 536; Randazzo v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 271 A.D.2d 667).
The plaintiffs' remaining contentions are without merit.
FLORIO, J.P., S. MILLER, McGINITY and ADAMS, JJ., concur.