Opinion
No. CV065001756
May 11, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO STRIKE
The issue before this court is whether the court should strike the first count of the plaintiff's revised complaint dated October 13, 2006 on the ground that the count is legally insufficient in that the defendant Reade owed no duty of care to the plaintiff.
INTRODUCTION
The facts alleged are fairly straightforward. The plaintiff, Ronald Manchesi, as administrator of the estate of Thomas Manchesi, alleges that the co-defendant, Frank T. Maloney, was the owner of a summer cabin located on Amston Lake in Hebron, Connecticut and the owner of a paddleboat located at the home. The plaintiff alleges that Robert Reade, Sr., the son-in-law of the defendant Maloney, invited four teenaged boys to stay unaccompanied and unsupervised at the summer cabin. The plaintiff alleges that Reade, Sr. undertook a duty to the boys to take reasonable steps to arrange for their safety. The plaintiff further alleges that while staying at the cabin, the plaintiff's decedent was thrown from the paddleboat causing him to drown. He alleges that Reade Sr. was negligent in that he failed to provide adequate supervision to the decedent, under the existing conditions; failed to provide adequate instruction and warning as to the use, risks and limitations of the equipment at the cabin, including the paddleboat; failed to determine whether the decedent was of age and maturity to exercise the judgment to provide for his own safety; failed to advise the decedent's parents that the decedent would be left alone with his young friends at the cabin; and failed to determine whether the equipment, including the paddleboat, was in good condition and safe for the conditions under which he knew or should have known they might be operated.
DISCUSSION
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). "[I]n determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted . . . Indeed, pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Asylum Hill Problem Solving Revitalization Association v. King, 277 Conn. 238, 246, 890 A.2d 522 (2006). "[G]rounds other than those specified should not be considered by the trial court in passing upon a motion to strike . . ." Gazo v. Stamford, 255 Conn. 245, 259, 765 A.2d 505 (2001). Finally, the "inextricably bound concepts of proximate causation and duty" are ones that can be challenged by way of a motion to strike. Id.; Ganim v. Smith Wesson Corp., 258 Conn. 313, 364, 780 A.2d 98 (2001); Mendillo v. Board of Education, 246 Conn. 456, 717 A.2d 1177 (1998).
In the instant case, count one alleges negligence by the defendant Reade, Sr. The essential elements of a negligence action are: duty, breach of duty, causation and actual injury. RK Constructors, Inc. v. Fusco Corp., 231 Conn. 381, 384 (1994). The question for this court is whether the defendant Reade Sr. had a duty to the decedent. Forseeability is a necessary component of the duty element. Waters v. Autuori, 236 Conn. 820, 827 (1996). "[I]f it is not foreseeable to a reasonable person in the defendant's position that harm of the type alleged would result from the defendant's actions to a particular plaintiff, the question of the existence of a duty to use due care is foreclosed, and no cause of action [in negligence] can be maintained by the plaintiff." RK Constructors, Inc., 231 Conn. at 385-86 [emphasis added]. Particularly in cases where a duty is asserted against one who is not the direct cause of the harm, a court cannot separate the question of duty from an analysis of the cause of the harm. Lodge v. Arrett Sales Corp., 246 Conn. 563, 576 (1998).
The threshold inquiry for this court is whether the ordinary person in the defendant's position, knowing what he knew or should have known, would anticipate that harm of the general nature of that suffered was likely to result. In the instant case, after being dropped off by the defendant Reade, Sr., the decedent took out a paddleboat which flipped after encountering stormy weather and choppy water. The defendant did not own the lake house. He did not own the paddleboat. He merely provided transportation to the boys to the lake house. There were no allegations that the defendant provided the paddleboat to the decedent or that he knew of any defect that would cause the paddleboat to capsize.
The sequence of events which led to the death of the decedent was simply too remote. It was unforeseeable that the teenagers would use the paddleboat or that they would use the boat without life jackets. It was unforeseeable that weather conditions would cause choppy waters on the lake or that a defect in the paddleboat combined with those choppy conditions would cause the teenagers to be thrown from the boat and that the decedent would not swim to safety. Based on the allegations in the revised complaint, the defendant Reade, Sr., could not have known nor should he have known that the situation at hand `would obviously and naturally, even though not necessarily, expose [the plaintiff] to probable injury unless preventive measures were taken.' Lepage v. Horne, 262 Conn. 116, 123-24 (2002); Hurlburt PPA Hurlburt v. Baldyga, No. CV 02-0079846S, 2003 WL 22006837 (Conn.Super., Aug. 6, 2003, Scholl, J.)
The allegations in the amended complaint do not suggest conduct by the defendant that was likely to proximately cause harm to others. In the absence of the foreseeability of such an event, the defendant Reade, Sr. owed no duty to the decedent. The defendant Robert Read, Sr.'s motion to strike count one of the plaintiff's revised complaint is granted.