Mammina v. Homeland Insurance Co.

10 Citing cases

  1. Denham v. La Salle-Madison Hotel Co.

    168 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1948)   Cited 48 times
    Holding an insurer's duty to defend terminates with the exhaustion of its policy limits

    After thus attempting to distinguish the cases above cited, as well as others of similar purport, the defendant cites and relies upon three cases in support of its contention that the theft losses were produced by causes separate and distinct from the fire or that the fire was not the proximate cause of such losses. Mammina v. Homeland Insurance Co., 371 Ill. 555, 21 N.E.2d 726; Howard Fire Insurance Co. v. Norwich N.Y. Trans. Co., 12 Wall. 194, 79 U.S. 194, 20 L.Ed. 378; Neering v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 383 Ill. 366, 50 N.E.2d 497. It is interesting to observe that while the defendant attempts to distinguish the cases relied upon by the plaintiff on the ground that they involve single coverage fire policies, both the Mammina and Howard Fire Insurance Company cases so strongly relied upon by the defendant involved policies of the same category. Inasmuch as the Mammina case is a decision of the Illinois Supreme Court and is so greatly relied upon by the defendant, it must be given more than ordinary consideration.

  2. St. Paul Fire Marine v. Protection Mut.

    664 F. Supp. 328 (N.D. Ill. 1987)   Cited 1 times

    To decide how to resolve the question of which insurer must pay, we look to case law. Protection Mutual argues that under Illinois law, when two causes, one insured by A and the other by B, join to cause a loss, each insurer must pay for the damage caused by its covered peril, if the damages can be discriminated, citing Mammina v. Homeland Insurance Company of America, 371 Ill. 555, 21 N.E.2d 726 (1939). Protection Mutual contends that the loss resulted from two causes, arcing on a contactor and a fire, and that the damages caused by the ensuing fire can be readily distinguishable from the electrical arcing damages.

  3. Copley v. Pekin Insurance Co.

    111 Ill. 2d 76 (Ill. 1986)   Cited 21 times
    Noting that "doctrine of cancellation by substitution is now disfavored in many jurisdictions"

    An insurance policy is a contract between the insurer and the insured party. ( Mammina v. Homeland Insurance Co. (1939), 371 Ill. 555.) Under general principles of contract law, contracts afford a degree of certainty to the expectations of contracting parties. By permitting the subjective intent of one of the parties to cancel an insurance policy, however, the doctrine of cancellation by substitution removes some of the certainty from insurance contracts.

  4. Marshall v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.

    90 N.E.2d 194 (Ill. 1950)   Cited 19 times

    Appellant urges the rule stated in Zitnik v. Burik, 395 Ill. 182, that where the language in an insurance policy is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken and applied in its plain, ordinary and popular sense, and it is not to be given a distorted construction that will defeat the purpose of the contract. That is true where the language justifies such an interpretation; however, we find the well-settled rule that where the language of an insurance policy is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation, that construction which favors the insured will be adopted. ( Roth v. Kaptowsky, 393 Ill. 484; Lenkutis v. New York Life Ins. Co. 374 Ill. 136; Mammina v. Homeland Ins. Co. 371 Ill. 555.) This latter rule seems to be applicable here and the trial court did not err in refusing to direct a verdict as to the second policy. Appellant contends the instructions given for appellee were erroneous.

  5. Gonzalez v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

    611 N.E.2d 38 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)   Cited 8 times

    • 2 An insurance policy is a contract and therefore is governed by contract law. ( Mammina v. Homeland Insurance Co. (1939), 371 Ill. 555, 558; Allstate Insurance Co. v. Boston Whaler, Inc. (1987), 157 Ill. App.3d 785, 789.) A trial court must determine initially, as a matter of law, whether the language of a purported contract is ambiguous as to the parties' intent.

  6. O'Sullivan v. Conrad

    358 N.E.2d 926 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976)   Cited 23 times
    Upholding a five-year restriction

    • 5 The defendant contends next that the trial court erred in rejecting the uncontradicted evidence of defendant's witnesses that in their opinion, the defendant's services were needed for the best interests of the public in Harrisburg, Illinois. For authority, he cites the rule that where the testimony of witnesses is uncontradicted, either by positive testimony or circumstances, and is not inherently improbable, it cannot be disregarded by the court. ( Dill v. Widman, 413 Ill. 448, 109 N.E.2d 765; Mammina v. Homeland Insurance Co. of America, 371 Ill. 555, 21 N.E.2d 726; Morris v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 10 Ill. App.2d 24, 134 N.E.2d 21.) The decision whether a restrictive provision of a voluntary contract should be denied enforcement because it is injurious to the public is a question of law that requires the court to exercise its judgment and weigh many factors. ( Lanzit v. J.W. Sefton Manufacturing Co., 184 Ill. 326, 56 N.E. 393; Tarr v. Stearman, 264 Ill. 110, 105 N.E. 957.)

  7. Benkendorf v. Seemann

    158 N.E.2d 109 (Ill. App. Ct. 1959)

    Contrary to plaintiff's contention, the testimony of the plaintiff was not clear or uncontradicted. Therefore, cases such as Porter v. Industrial Commission, 352 Ill. 392, Kelly v. Jones, 290 Ill. 375, and Mammina v. Homeland Insurance Co., 371 Ill. 555, are not in point. In those cases where no countervailing or contradictory evidence was offered, it was held that the testimony of witnesses not contradicted by positive testimony or by circumstances and not inherently false or improbable may not be rejected.

  8. River Valley Cartage Co. v. Hawkeye-Security Insurance

    18 Ill. App. 2d 454 (Ill. App. Ct. 1958)   Cited 4 times

    It is well settled that where the language of an insurance policy is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation, that construction which favors the insured will be adopted. Marshall v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 405 Ill. 90, 102 (1950); Roth v. Kaptowsky, 393 Ill. 484, 491 (1946); Mammina v. Homeland Ins. Co., 371 Ill. 555, 558 (1939); Morris v. Central West Casualty Co., 351 Ill. 40, 45 (1932). Applying this principle we conclude that the insurer was liable for interest on the entire amount of the judgment against the insured until a proper tender, deposit, or payment of the policy limit had been made.

  9. Morris v. Pennsylvania R. Co.

    134 N.E.2d 21 (Ill. App. Ct. 1956)   Cited 5 times
    In Morris v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 10 Ill. App.2d 24 (leave to appeal denied, 11 Ill. App.2d i), this Division handed down an opinion dealing with the right of an attorney to enforce an attorney's lien for fees against the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, which had made a settlement of the case disregarding the alleged rights of Morris under the lien on the ground that his contract of retainer had been obtained by solicitation.

    They are clearly not in point in that the question of agency was either rebutted or not proven. Here we have unrebutted testimony that strongly indicates an agency relationship. [5] Petitioner argues that the trial court had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying and thus could best determine their credibility, interest and motives. We are here confronted with the fact, however, that the testimony of unimpeached witnesses pertaining to the solicitation of the case by Forbes, stood uncontradicted by the testimony of petitioner or by circumstances that would indicate that such testimony was inherently false or improbable. It is our opinion that under the circumstances it was error for the trial court to reject this testimony of the witnesses of respondent. Porter v. Industrial Commission, 352 Ill. 392, 398; Kelly v. Jones, 290 Ill. 375, 378-9; Mammina v. Homeland Ins. Co., 371 Ill. 555, 560; Tenerelli v. Eddy Stoker Corp., 9 Ill. App.2d 390. The issue of solicitation involved in the instant case is one of the gravest problems that confronts the bench and bar of this community.

  10. People v. Roseland State Sav. Bank

    48 N.E.2d 600 (Ill. App. Ct. 1943)

    " (Italics ours.) In the recent case of Mammina v. Homeland Ins. Co., 371 Ill. 555, the court said: "As there was no contradiction of appellant's testimony either by testimony or circumstances, and it is not inherently improbable, the court could not, without committing error, reject it. Kelly v. Jones, 290 Ill. 375; Larson v. Glos, 235 id. 584." It is urged by the receiver, without any basis in fact, that "the testimony of a witness may contain within itself its own impeachment and he may be contradicted by what he states, as well as by adverse testimony," and the suggestion is offered, but not argued, that the chancellor was justified in disregarding Cohen's testimony as improbable. The circumstances under which he signed the note as surety for his son's indebtedness, do not justify any such conclusion.