indicate, nor can it be inferred, why any warnings (or lack thereof) were inadequate or that Moran would not have suffered the harm if adequate warnings were provided. See Mals v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., No. 3:19-CV-01770 (VLB), 2020 WL 3270835, at *6 (D. Conn. June 17, 2020) (dismissing plaintiff's failure to warn claim because he “failed to specify what warnings he did receive about the product and how they were deficient”).

Plaintiff proceeds under two strict liability theories: manufacturing defect and design defect. Mals v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., No. 3:19-cv-1770 (VLB), 2020 WL 3270835, at *2 (D. Conn. June 17, 2020) (noting a manufacturer can be held strictly liable for product defects, including those stemming from manufacturing or design, and citing McConologue v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 8 F.Supp.3d 93, 99 (D. Conn. 2014)). Such product liability claims, “‘whether alleging a design defect [or a] manufacturing defect[,] . . . are governed by the [following] elements . . .: (1) the defendant was engaged in the business of selling the product; (2) the product was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the consumer or user; (3) the defect caused the injury for which compensation was sought; (4) the defect existed at the time of the sale; and (5) the product was expected to and did reach the consumer without substantial change in condition.'” DiBlasi, 2021 WL 619509, at *2 (quoting Bifolck v. Philip Morris, Inc., 324 Conn. 402, 434 (2016)). “‘Even under the liberal pleading standards of Rule 8,'

At the pleading stage, although plaintiffs who assert failure to warn theories generally do not have to allege detailed facts regarding what warnings should have been provided, see Karazin, 2018 WL 4398250, at *5, they cannot rely on conclusory allegations that, for example fail to allege "whether the [product] was accompanied with any warnings or instructions at all and, if so, what they stated and why they were inadequate." See Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co. v. Lennox Indus., Inc., No. 3:18-CV-00217 (CSH), 2019 WL 1258918, at *3 (D. Conn. Mar. 18, 2019) (Lennox I); see also Mals v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., No. 3:19-CV-01770 (VLB), 2020 WL 3270835, at *6 (D. Conn. June 17, 2020) (dismissing failure to warn claim for failure to "specify what warnings [plaintiff] did receive about the product and how they were deficient"). The Court previously dismissed Plaintiff's claim of failure to warn for failure to allege what warnings were provided and how they were inadequate, as Plaintiff alleged only that "the warnings and instructions which were given and which accompanied [the] airbag were inadequate and failed to provide sufficient notice to [Plaintiff] of the dangerous propensities of said product."

But the Court cannot require the plaintiff to possess "technical or scientific knowledge about the inner workings of the product, which would contravene the notice pleading requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, even under the Iqbal-Twombly standard." Mals v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., No. 3:19-cv-1770 (VLB), 2020 WL 3270835, at *3 (D. Conn. June 17, 2020) (quoting Williamson v. Stryker Corp., No. 12 Civ. 7083 (CM), 2013 WL 3833081, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2013)); accord Leonard, 504 F. Supp. 3d at 95.

In Schulz, the court found that plaintiff's allegation alone was insufficient to state a claim for failure to warn because it did not indicate, nor could the court infer, why any warnings (or lack thereof) were inadequate or that the plaintiff would have suffered the harm if adequate warnings were provided. See generally, 2022 WL 503960; see also Mals v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., No. 3:19-CV-01770 (VLB), 2020 WL 3270835, at *6 (D. Conn. June 17, 2020) (dismissing plaintiff's failure to warn claim because he failed to specify what warnings he received and how they were deficient). Here, it is not clear from the Amended Complaint whether any warnings or instructions were given at all, and if so, how they were inadequate.

This is sufficient to state a claim at this stage. See Leonard, 2020 WL 7024906, at *13 (plaintiff's allegations that the vehicle's airbags failed to deploy and the seat belt failed to prevent him from hitting his head on the steering wheel upon impact "adequately establish[] that the airbag and seat belt systems failed to perform as safely as a consumer ordinarily would expect under the consumer expectation test," stating "a colorable design defect claim"); Mals v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., No. 3:19cv1770(VLB), 2020 WL 3270835, at *3 (D. Conn. June 17, 2020) (allegation that the "unicondylar poly insert failed causing an anterior translation of the plastic prosthesis" sufficiently stated a plausible design defect claim). The motion to dismiss the design defect claim is denied.

Leonard has therefore pled enough facts to state a colorable design defect claim. Mals v. Smith & Nephew, Inc. , 2020 WL 3270835, at *4 (D. Conn. June 17, 2020) ("The Court finds that the Plaintiff has met his [design defect] burden by alleging that the product was more dangerous than the average consumer would expect."). I find no merit in General Motors Company's argument that Leonard's failure to identify safer, practicable alternative designs is fatal to his claim.

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mals v. Smith & Nephew, Inc. , Docket No. 3:19-cv-01770 (VLB), 2020 WL 3270835, *5 (D. Conn. June 17, 2020). If the defendant's product differs in some important way from all competitor products, and in a way that is demonstrably responsible for the plaintiff's injuries, then why should it matter that those various, safer alternatives are not in every respect identical?