Criminal statutes prohibiting cruelty to animals or instigating fights between animals have been part of Oklahoma law since at least the early 20th Century. See Maloney v. State, 1975 OK CR 22, 532 P.2d 78; Rev. Laws Okla. 1910, § 2746 (cruelty to animals); Rev. Laws Okla. 1910, §§ 2743-2744 (instigating fights between animals; keeping place for fighting animals). Although in Lock v. Falkenstine, 1963 OK CR 32, 380 P.2d 278, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held the criminal statute prohibiting the instigation of animal fighting inapplicable to the fighting of gamecocks because that court held gamecocks were not animals within the contemplation of the statute, the Court of Criminal Appeals left open the possibility of future prohibition by legislative action.

The trial court correctly stated that a basic rule of statutory construction is that when a general statute and a specific statute declare unlawful the same act or omission, the specific supercedes the general statute. See, Maloney v. State, 532 P.2d 78 (Okla. Cr. 1975). However, when two different provisions regulate the same subject matter both provisions are to be given effect, if such effect would not defeat the intent of the Legislature.

Jones v. State, Okla. Cr. 507 P.2d 1267 (1973). The rule of construction was again applied where a defendant convicted of general Cruelty to Animals should have been charged with the specific offense of Instigating Fights Between Animals. Maloney v. State, Okla. Cr. 532 P.2d 78 (1975). The two statutes involved in the present case do not exhibit this characteristic.

Section 843 is a specific provision, punishing offenders for up to five years imprisonment, whereas Section 642 is a more general provision, punishing offenders a maximum of 30 days in jail or One Hundred Dollars fine or both. And, the common law rules of construction dictate that the more specific of the two applicable provisions be utilized in a given situation. This Court has clearly followed this rule in the cases of Maloney v. State, Okla. Cr. 532 P.2d 78 (1975); Abbott v. State, Okla. Cr. 434 P.2d 957 (1967) and, Lovins v. State, 49 Okla. Cr. 200, 293 P. 273 (1930). In a case such as the one before us the objective of the legislature, in creating a special battery provision, would be thwarted if offenders were convicted under the more general provision when their conduct and the age of their victim fell within the provisions of the more specific statute.