Furthermore, in light of the extensive testimony by defense experts discussing appellant's past violent acts, appellant cannot show how she was harmed by admission of the challenged evidence. See Malone v. State, 219 Ga. App. 728 (3) ( 466 S.E.2d 645) (1995) (purportedly improper character evidence deemed harmless because it was cumulative of other evidence before the jury). 6. Appellant contends she was entitled to a new trial because a fixed podium in the courtroom obstructed her view of the entire jury box. It is uncontroverted that appellant was physically present throughout the proceedings, compare Hanifa v. State, 269 Ga. 797 (6) ( 505 S.E.2d 731) (1998), and that neither her view nor the jury's view of the witnesses against appellant was impeded so as to infringe upon her confrontation rights.

However, a review of the transcript shows that Dixson did not raise a timely objection below. Malone v. State, 219 Ga. App. 728, 729 (2) ( 466 S.E.2d 645) (1995). Moreover, the charge given by the trial court at the end of the evidentiary phase of the case clearly informed the jury that Dixson had no burden of proving that he was innocent of the murder.

Furthermore, the trial court's and the District Attorney's identification of McCord by use of his alias, as named in the indictment, was not error. Haas v. State, 146 Ga. App. 729, 732 (5) ( 247 S.E.2d 507) (1978). See also Malone v. State, 219 Ga. App. 728, 729 (2) ( 466 S.E.2d 645) (1995). 3. McCord contends that the District Attorney, in closing argument, improperly shifted the burden of proof by repeatedly referring to the failure of the defense to present any evidence. "It is not improper to comment on the failure of the defense to present evidence to rebut the State's evidence of guilt. [Cit.

See Young v. State, 280 Ga. 65, 67 (5) ( 623 SE2d 491) (2005). See generally Malone v. State, 219 Ga. App. 728 (1) ( 466 SE2d 645) (1995) (conflicts in details concerning the chain of custody of an object go to the weight, credit and effect of the evidence, not its admissibility).Judgment affirmed.

Johnson, P.J., and Mikell, J., concur. See Appling v. State, 281 Ga. 590, 592 (3) ( 642 SE2d 37) (2007); Harris v. State, 279 Ga. 522, 525 (3) ( 615 SE2d 532) (2005); Malone v. State, 219 Ga. App. 728, 730 (3) ( 466 SE2d 645) (1995); Deal v. State, 199 Ga.App. 184, 187-188 (4) ( 404 SE2d 343) (1991); see generally Johnson v. State, 238 Ga. 59, 61 ( 230 SE2d 869) (1976) (setting forth "highly probable test" as standard for determining whether nonconstitutional error was harmless). PHIPPS, Judge.

Id. See Malone v. State, 219 Ga. App. 728, 730 (3) ( 466 S.E.2d 645) (1995) (purportedly improper character evidence deemed harmless because it was cumulative of other evidence before the jury). (b) Paul Kozachyn also argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial due to the State's failure to redact inadmissible character evidence from Lord's tape recorded conversation before it was played to the jury.

[Hehir's] failure to raise a character objection at trial precludes us from reviewing this issue. See also Malone v. State, 219 Ga. App. 728 (1) ( 466 S.E.2d 645) (1995).Nash v. State, 225 Ga. App. 10, 11 (2) ( 482 S.E.2d 520) (1997).

Because Mency did not preserve this enumeration for appellate review, we do not reach the issue of whether on this record the trial court corrected the pre-evidentiary instructions by giving correct principles of law in the main charge. See Malone v. State, 219 Ga. App. 728, 730 (2) ( 466 S.E.2d 645) (1995); Duggan v. State, 225 Ga. App. 291, 294 (2) ( 483 S.E.2d 373) (1997). Mency neither objected as the trial court gave the two pre-evidentiary instructions, nor when the trial court concluded giving the pre-evidentiary instructions.

Any verbal slip in the preliminary charge was thus corrected. See Malone v. State, 219 Ga. App. 728, 730 (2) ( 466 S.E.2d 645) (1995). Moreover, Matheson deprived the trial court of any opportunity to correct the asserted error because he failed to make a contemporaneous objection.

Nash's failure to raise a character objection at trial precludes us from reviewing this issue. See also Malone v. State, 219 Ga. App. 728 (1) ( 466 S.E.2d 645) (1995). 3. Nash contends the trial court's charge on presumption of innocence was erroneous.