Malone v. Saxony Co Op. Apartments, Inc.

20 Citing cases

  1. Group v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n

    104 F. Supp. 3d 22 (D.D.C. 2015)   Cited 6 times

    Specifically, “there must be mutual assent of each party to all the essential terms of the contract.” Malone v. Saxony Co-op. Apartments, Inc., 763 A.2d 725, 729 (D.C.2000) (“This mutuality of assent is often referred to as a ‘meeting of the minds.’ ”)

  2. REO Acquisition Group v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n

    80 F. Supp. 3d 203 (D.D.C. 2015)

    Specifically, “there must be mutual assent of each party to all the essential terms of the contract.” Malone v. Saxony Co-op. Apartments, Inc., 763 A.2d 725, 729 (D.C.2000) (“This mutuality of assent is often referred to as a ‘meeting of the minds.’ ”)

  3. T Street Development, LLC v. Dereje & Dereje

    581 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2008)   Cited 4 times

    "For there to be an enforceable contract, there must be mutual assent of each party to all the essential terms of the contract." Malone v. Saxony Coop. Apartments, Inc., 763 A.2d 725, 729 (D.C. 2000). Here, there was no "mutual assent" or "meeting of the minds" as to a number of material "terms": the parties disagreed on the per diem amount to be paid for each day of delay until the closing was accomplished, the parties disagreed on the amount of money to be termed an earned deposit, and the parties disagreed on the setting of a firm and final deadline for reaching settlement.

  4. Perles v. Kagy

    362 F. Supp. 2d 195 (D.D.C. 2005)   Cited 5 times
    Describing “confusion” in the law “surrounding the term ‘ quantum meruit,’ ” and noting that it has been used to describe a contract implied-in-fact

    Agreement as to all material terms is a prerequisite to finding an implied-in-fact contract between the parties. Simon, 753 A.2d at 1012 (D.C. 2000) (quoting Georgetown Entertainment Corporation, 496 A.2d at 590 (D.C. 1985). The Court must find that there was an agreement between the parties as to the amount of remuneration to be received by Kagy for her work. Simon, 753 A.2d at 1012; See also Malone v. Saxony Cooperative Apartments, Inc., 763 A.2d 725, 729 (D.C. 2000) (holding that "failure to agree on or even discuss an essential term of a contract may indicated that the mutual assent required to make or modify a contract is lacking." Malone, 763 A.2d at 729 (D.C. 2000) (quoting Owen v. Owen, 427 A.2d 933, 937 (D.C. 1981).

  5. Sellers v. Anthem Life Ins. Co.

    Civil Action 16-2428 (TJK) (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2022)

    But the “purported acceptance of an offer does not create a valid contract if the accepting party has altered the offer's material terms.” REO Acquisition Grp. v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 104 F.Supp.3d 22, 28 (D.D.C. 2015) (citing Malone v. Saxony Co-op Apartments, Inc., 763 A.2d 725, 728 (D.C. 2000)); accord Foster v. Ohio State Univ., 534 N.E.2d 1220, 1222 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987). Such an “acceptance” is a counteroffer that must be accepted by the original offeror to form a binding contract. Malone, 763 A.2d at 728; accord Foster, 534 N.E.2d at 1222.

  6. Proctor v. First Premier Corp.

    Civil Action No. 20-2162 (BAH) (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2021)   1 Legal Analyses

    See Pl.'s Opp'n at 3. Under District of Columbia law, "an offeror is entitled to prescribe an exclusive method of acceptance," Vaulx v. Cumis Ins. Soc'y, Inc., 407 A.2d 262, 264 (D.C. 1979); see also Malone v. Saxony Coop. Apartments, Inc., 763 A.2d 725, 729 (D.C. 2000), including with specified conduct, see, e.g., Malone, 763 A.2d at 729 (holding that purchaser's tender of earnest money constituted assent to contract terms), such as plaintiff's use of her credit card or her failure to specifically reject terms, see Agreement at 1 (providing that credit card user assents to credit card agreement unless she provides, within 30 days, written notice of cancellation of account); id. (providing that credit card user agrees to the arbitration provision of the credit card agreement unless she provides, within 30 days, written notice of rejection). Whether South Dakota or District of Columbia law applies need not be resolved, because the result is the same: if plaintiff received the credit card agreement, then her subsequent use of the card would constitute acceptance of the agreement's terms, including its arbitration provision, and she must arbitrate her claims.

  7. Johnson v. Mercedes-Benz, USA, LLC

    182 F. Supp. 2d 58 (D.D.C. 2002)   Cited 6 times
    Noting that "indemnity may be granted to an indemnitee if there is a `significant difference in the kind and quality' between the indemnitee's and the indemnitor's wrongdoing" (quoting Quadrangle Dev Corp., 748 A.2d at 435)

    Under District of Columbia law, the offeror determines the manner by which a contract is accepted. See Malone v. Saxony Cooperative Apartments, Inc., 763 A.2d 725, 729 (D.C. 2000) (citation omitted). In his letter dated June 10, 1998, Viedma, the representative of Short's insurer, offered to settle with the Estate in exchange for a general release of liability and payment of $20,000.

  8. Brooks v. Rosebar

    210 A.3d 747 (D.C. 2019)   Cited 2 times

    Boks v. Charles E. Smith Mgmt., Inc. , 453 A.2D 113, 117 (D.C. 1982) ; seeDyer v. Bilaal , 983 A.2d 349, 354 (D.C. 2009).Malone v. Saxony Coop. Apartments, Inc. , 763 A.2d 725, 729 (D.C. 2000).Id.

  9. Queen v. Schultz

    747 F.3d 879 (D.C. Cir. 2014)   Cited 20 times
    Holding that plaintiff could not raise his claim at summary judgment stage where he failed to raise it in his complaint, nor could he "constructively amend" his complaint where claim had not been fully briefed

    Because we conclude that Queen fails to make the requisite showing with regard to an “agreement as to all material terms,” we need not consider whether the parties intended to be bound. See Malone v. Saxony Coop. Apartments, Inc., 763 A.2d 725, 729–30 (D.C.2000). The “material terms” of a contract generally include “subject matter, price, payment terms, quantity, quality, and duration.”

  10. Golden v. Mgmt. & Training Corp.

    Civil Action No.: 16-1660 (RC) (D.D.C. Nov. 15, 2019)

    If the parties to a purported settlement agreement have "failed to agree on . . . an essential term" of the agreement, then that failure may show that the parties did not mutually assent to the creation of a settlement. Id. (quoting Malone v. Saxony Coop. Apartments, Inc., 763 A.2d 725, 729 (D.C. 2000)). IV. ANALYSIS