Opinion
23CA3
07-25-2024
MELISSA R. MALONE, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. WENDY CREMEANS, et al., Defendant-Appellee.
Ryan Shepler, Logan, Ohio, for appellants. Sierra L. Meek, Nelsonville, Ohio, for appellee.
CIVIL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT
APPEARANCES:
Ryan Shepler, Logan, Ohio, for appellants.
Sierra L. Meek, Nelsonville, Ohio, for appellee.
DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Peter B. Abele, Judge
{¶1} This is an appeal from an Athens County Common Pleas Court judgment in favor of Wendy Cremeans, defendant below and appellee herein. Melissa and Malcolm Malone, plaintiffs below and appellants herein, assign the following errors for review:
Appellee's boyfriend, Derrick Exline, initially had been named as a defendant. Appellants later dismissed him from the action.
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED ENFORCING THE DRAFT, [SIC] CONTRACT, THE ENFORCEMENT OF WHICH IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS."
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY CONSTRUING THE CONTRACT AS A LEASE WITH AN OPTION TO PURCHASE RATHER THAN AS A LAND INSTALLMENT CONTRACT."
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
"THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE INCORRECT STANDARD OF PROOF IN REACHING ITS DECISION."
FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING FOR DEFENDANT ON HER CLAIM FOR FRAUD AND AWARDING PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES."
FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
"THE TRIAL COURT OTHERWISE ERRED IN CALCULATING DAMAGES."
We observe that the substance of appellants' second assignment of error argues the reverse of this assignment of error, i.e., appellants assert that the trial court erred by construing the document as a land contract rather than as a lease with a purchase option.
{¶2} The present appeal arises out a dispute regarding the existence of an agreement to sell appellants' property (located at 31 Atkins Street, in Glouster, Ohio) to appellee. In 1999, Melissa and her ex-husband purchased the property for $31,000. In 2011, Melissa refinanced the loan so as to place the mortgage in her name only. The amount of this mortgage was $32,000, and carried a 4.25% interest rate.
{¶3} In 2014, Melissa moved to live with her new husband, Malcolm. Melissa's son, however, continued to reside at the Atkins Street property. When her son left for college, Melissa rented the property. Unfortunately, the tenants damaged the property, and in 2016, Melissa evicted the tenants. Melissa subsequently repaired the property and started to post photographs of the property on Facebook.
{¶4} Upon doing so, appellee asked Melissa, a childhood friend, about the availability of the property for sale on a rent-to-own basis. Melissa said she would consider selling the property if her son was not interested in it. Melissa later prepared a document, titled "Rent to own/land contract agreement," by gathering terms that she found on the internet. As a result, this document does not contain clear terms. Moreover, the document contains no signatures and the parties dispute whether the document was signed. Appellee claims that all parties signed the document, while Melissa stated that she did not sign it. Nevertheless, in 2016 appellee moved into the Atkins Street residence and complied with one of the terms listed in the document: Appellee paid appellants $1,000, which the document referred to as "[t]he first down payment."
{¶5} Shortly thereafter, appellee wrote some social media posts to express her happiness with finally having her own home. In January 2017, Melissa wrote a post to indicate that she "was willing to sell [the property] to [appellee] because [she] knew [appellee] would love and care for it and make it back to a nice home!"
{¶6} Appellee's posts about her happiness partially resulted from some of the terms of the parties' "Rent to own/land contract agreement." This document began by stating, "We have agreed upon these conditions[:] For a period of not more than 3 years[,] we will be [s]elling the property to" appellee and her boyfriend "on a land contract/rent to own" basis. The document listed "[t]he monthly payment" as $450 and stated that the amount included "the house payment, interest, property taxes, [and] homeowners insurance."
{¶7} The document further recited that within three years, appellee "will obtain [financing through a bank or financial institution." It later referred to this provision as "[t]he option to buy" and stated that this option "may be exercised anytime prior to the November 1, 2019 expiration date." The document indicated that "[u]pon expiration of this date the landlord/seller will be released from all obligations to sell the property [t]o the tenants."
{¶8} At the end of the three-year period, appellee had not obtained financing. Instead, she continued to live at the Atkins Street property and continued to pay $450 per month. Appellee claimed that Melissa agreed to extend the purchase option until appellee's credit improved to a point to allow her to obtain financing.
{¶9} However, in July 2021 appellants gave appellee a 30-day notice to vacate the property. Appellee, however, did not vacate the property. Thus, on August 13, 2021 appellants filed a forcible entry and detainer complaint in Athens County Municipal Court. Appellants asserted that the parties had an "oral agreement" and that appellee has been unlawfully and forcibly held over since July 5, 2021.
{¶10} Appellants attached to the complaint a copy of the 30-day notice to vacate. It stated: "Per our agreement you signed on October 27, 2016[,] the property was to be financed in your name and purchased no later than December [sic] 1, 2019. This agreement was not met." The notice additionally stated that the agreement provided for a $35 late fee and that appellee had not paid the late fee "on the occasions that [the payment] was late." The notice stated that appellants "have decided to put the property on the market to sell effective August 5, 2021."
{¶11} On September 8, 2021, appellee filed a motion to dismiss appellants' complaint or, in the alternative, a motion to transfer the case to the Athens County Common Pleas Court. The parties subsequently agreed to transfer the case to the Athens County Common Pleas Court.
{¶12} On November 5, 2021, appellants filed an amended complaint and alleged that appellee and her boyfriend, Derrick Exline, started to reside at appellants' property in November 2016. Appellants claimed that the parties started to negotiate "a contract that would grant [appellee and Exline] an option to purchase the Property," and further claimed that the parties did not finalize the agreement by signing the document.
{¶13} Appellants further asserted that, although the document was titled "Rent to own/land contract agreement," the terms "provided that [appellee and Exline] would be granted an option to purchase the [p]roperty." They alleged that "[t]he parties never intended to agree to the terms of the Unsigned Contract as it was unsigned and missing several critical terms, including but not limited to, (a) the purchase price and (b) the interest rate." Appellants further claimed that "[t]he parties never intended for the Unsigned Contract to be a land installment contract as it did not comply with the requirements of R.C. 5313.02(A) and was never signed nor recorded."
{¶14} Consequently, appellants asked the court to declare the unsigned document not a valid contract between appellants and appellee and Exline and that appellee and Exline are month-to-month tenants. Alternatively, appellants requested the court to declare that (1) the document granted appellee an option to purchase the property, (2) appellee and Exline did not exercise this option, and (3) appellee and Exline are month-to-month tenants. Appellants attached to their amended complaint an unsigned copy of the "Rent to own/land contract agreement." In addition to the provisions noted above, the document lists appellants as the sellers and appellee and Exline as the buyers. The document contains signature lines for all of the parties, in addition to spaces for notary acknowledgments, but contains no signatures.
{¶15} Appellee filed an answer and counterclaims. In her answer, she asserted that on October 27, 2016, "the parties signed a land contract," but appellants did not give appellee a copy of the signed contract. In her counterclaims, appellee alleged breach of contract, fraud, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment. More particularly, appellee's counterclaims alleged that before October 27, 2016, the parties "negotiated an agreement whereby [appellee and Exline] would purchase the property from [appellants] for $30,000 with the understanding that their payments would be applied toward the mortgage (principal and interest), taxes, and insurance." On that same date, appellants gave appellee and Exline "a written contract" that Melissa had prepared. This document was titled, "Rent to own/land contract agreement" (which appellee subsequently referred to in her counterclaims as a "Land Contract").
{¶16} On October 29, 2016, appellee and Exline moved into the Atkins Street residence, and appellee has remained living at the property since that time. In September 2020, Exline vacated the premises. As of December 1, 2021, appellee "has paid a total of $28,000.00 ($1,000.00 deposit + $450 x 60 payments) towards the Land Contract over a period of five (5) years." She also "paid for all repairs and maintenance associated with the Property as required by the Land Contract."
Appellants later dismissed their claim against Exline.
{¶17} Appellee acknowledged that the parties had agreed that appellee would obtain financing for the property by November 1, 2019. Appellee claimed, however, that she advised appellants that she needed "to improve her credit score to secure financing." Appellee alleged that Melissa "verbally agreed to extend the Deadline to enable [appellee] to secure the required financing."
{¶18} Appellee also agreed that in July 2021, appellants gave her a 30-day notice to vacate the property. Appellee contended that she contacted Melissa "and requested that [appellants] provide a total of the remaining balance owed on the Land Contract so that [appellee] could arrange to pay-off [sic] the Land Contract." Appellee asserted that Melissa "refused to provide a balance" and informed appellee that appellants "had no intention of selling the house to" appellee.
{¶19} Appellee further claimed that on July 12, 2021, Melissa, "acting pro se," discussed the situation with appellee's "attorney via telephone." She alleged that during that conversation, Melissa "confirmed that the purchase price of the Property was $30,000.00." Appellee's attorney asked Melissa for a signed copy of the contract, loan-payment documentation, tax payments, and insurance payments so that appellee "could determine the ability to pay-off the balance." Appellee asserted that appellants did not produce any documents. Appellee thus maintained that appellants "breached their duty to perform their obligations pursuant to the Land Contract and Extension by refusing to sell the Property to [appellee] at the agreed upon price."
{¶20} Appellee also contended that appellants engaged in fraud. Appellee asserted that appellants (1) stated "that they would sell the Property to her for $30,000.00," (2) "intentionally omitted the purchase price" from the document, (3) "intentionally refused to provide" appellee with an executed copy of the document, and (4) verbally agreed "to extend the financing deadline on the Land Contract." Appellee claimed that appellants "now allege that there was no agreed upon purchase price, that they did not extend the financing deadline, and that [appellee] never signed the Land Contract." Appellee alleged that she relied upon appellants' representations, and in reliance upon those representations, paid appellants a total of $28,000 as of December 2021. Appellee further asserted that she paid for property repairs. Appellee claimed that she "has been injured by her reliance upon [appellants'] material misrepresentations and deceit with regard to this matter."
The fraud counterclaim then states: "By virtue of this eviction, it is unjust for the Plaintiff to retain this benefit without commensurate compensation." The counterclaim requested "the Court order Plaintiff to pay her the sum of $12,000.00 as compensation for said garage." Presumably, this information is a mistake.
{¶21} For her promissory estoppel claim, appellee alleged that appellants "made clear and unambiguous representations to" appellee "that they would sell her the Property on Land Contract for $30,000.00 and that they would extend the financing deadline." Appellee contended that she relied upon those representations and "has been financially injured as a result of that reliance." Appellee additionally asserted that appellants have been unjustly enriched. She claimed that appellants have benefitted from appellee's deposit, monthly payments, and repairs to the property.
{¶22} Consequently, appellee asked the court to dismiss appellants' complaint, to enter a judgment ordering specific performance of the land contract, and to award attorney fees. Appellee additionally requested the court to award "[a] punitive award for [appellants'] fraudulent actions in an amount deemed reasonable by this Court." Appellee alternatively asked the court to award damages in the amount of $30,000.
{¶23} On November 15, 2022, the trial court held a bench trial. Appellee and Melissa, the only witnesses, each offered different versions of the events that led to appellee residing at the property. Ultimately, the court did not find Melissa's testimony credible, and on January 12, 2023, it granted judgment in appellee's favor. The court found that the evidence established that the parties had entered into a valid land contract, even though the court recognized that the document lacked 11 of the 16 requirements to form a valid land contract. The court noted that the document did not contain a legal description of the property, the purchase price, an interest rate, the term, or a description of the method to calculate the balance owed. Also, the document is "not in a format that could be recorded with the Athens County Recorder's Office." Moreover, the parties did not produce any "written communications, whether text messages, Facebook messages, or otherwise, relating to or discussing the 'missing' terms of the Draft Contract purchase price, interest rate, term, and/or application of rental payments to the principal balance." The court nevertheless found "that a land contract was formed based on a totality of all the other evidence."
{¶24} More specifically, the trial court determined that the parties verbally discussed the terms and agreed that the purchase price would be an amount sufficient to pay off Melissa's existing mortgage. The court observed that (1) Melissa had obtained the existing mortgage in 2011, (2) the mortgage was a 30-year term that carried a 4.25% interest rate, and (3) the amount financed was $32,000. The court found that in October 2016, when the parties had their discussions, the payoff amount was approximately $29,000 or $30,000.
{¶25} The trial court recognized that Melissa "testified that the parties never discussed whether [appellee] would be purchasing the Property." The court noted, however, that Melissa posted a comment on social media that stated "she was glad that she had found someone to buy the property, [appellee], who she knew would take care of it." The court specifically found this January 2017 Facebook post more credible than Melissa's in-court testimony that she agreed to sell appellee the property because appellee "was essentially badgering her to do so and [Melissa] was tired of it." The court explained that Melissa's post is more "closely related in time to [appellee] taking possession of the Property versus statements made a[t] trial that there was never an agreement/contract." The court thus determined that Melissa's social media post helped establish that she had agreed to sell the property to appellee.
{¶26} The trial court additionally found that Melissa "wanted out from under the mortgage" and essentially allowed appellee "to assume the mortgage by paying $450.00 per month[,] which would include the house payment, interest, property taxes, and homeowner's insurance." The court stated that, although the written document does not contain a purchase price or an interest rate, the parties verbally agreed that the purchase price would be "based upon paying off [Melissa]'s existing mortgage after a three-year period passed at which time the mortgage would be paid down to a definite amount and a payoff figure could be provided by the bank."
{¶27} The trial court further found that, even though none of the parties had a copy of a signed contract, a signed copy did exist at some point. The court noted that appellee testified that all parties signed the agreement and appellee returned the signed document to Melissa. The court stated: "The fact that [appellee] saw the parties' signatures on the Agreement and [appellants] signed the Agreement and [appellee] returned same to [Melissa] is sufficient evidence to find the land contract agreement existed." The court did not believe Melissa's testimony that she did not sign the contract.
{¶28} The trial court also determined that the parties agreed that appellee's $450 monthly payment would be applied to taxes, insurance, and the mortgage payment and any excess amount would be applied to the principal balance. The court found that this monthly payment included "the mortgage, real estate taxes and house insurance" and that these amounts totaled "approximately $291.07 each month." The court indicated that the remaining amount, $152.99, "was to be applied * * * to the mortgage principal to reduce the balloon payment due in three years." The court concluded that appellants did not, however, use the excess amount to pay down the principal balance of the mortgage.
The trial court's calculation does not appear to be correct (i.e., $450 minus $291.07 equals $158.93). Additionally, the court later stated that the excess amount equaled $194.75, which was the amount listed in appellee's amortization table.
{¶29} The trial court explained that, at the time of trial, "the mortgage payoff was still approximately $24,298.85." From this fact, the court decided that Melissa "never applied any leftover money from the $450 installment to the principal as agreed upon by the parties." Instead, the court determined that Melissa "kept any excess money from the $450 payments being applied to [Melissa]'s mortgage, taxes, and house insurance costs of the Property instead of applying an[y] remainder towards principal as contemplated by the parties." The court thus found that Melissa "failed to apply the $194.75 remaining from the monthly payment to the outstanding mortgage principal which was the agreement of the parties." The court thus concluded that appellants were "unjustly enriched" by not applying the excess amount to the principal balance.
{¶30} The trial court further noted that the purported land contract did not include an amortization table or reference any interest rate. The court found, however, that the parties intended to rely on Melissa's "mortgage terms to calculate the payoff balance at the end of three years." The court thus determined that the interest rate for the parties' agreement is the same as the interest rate for Melissa's mortgage, 4.25%, and that appellee was "assuming the provisions of [Melissa]'s mortgage and promissory note."
{¶31} Additionally, the trial court adopted the amortization table that appellee presented and found "the payoff amount at the end of the three-year period" was $43,995.19, less $8,562.62 that Melissa paid through October 28, 2016. From these facts, the court concluded that the "purchase price was $30,000."
{¶32} With respect to the purchase option, the trial court found that Melissa extended "the November 1, 2019 deadline to allow [appellee] to continue to work on her credit." The court stated that this behavior is "consistent with a friend dealing with a person who has been a friend to them since childhood." The court also determined, however, that, at the end of the three-year period when appellee "sought to finance the remainder of the mortgage," appellants "never provided the mortgage payoff figure to [appellee], even after [appellee] requested the payoff amount." The court indicated that Melissa did not give appellee a payoff amount for the mortgage, and appellee "was unable to apply for a loan, in part, because she did not know the amount of the payoff to finance."
{¶33} The trial court further found that Melissa's "actions (or lack thereof) obstructed [appellee] and her ability to complete the terms of the agreement by purposely NOT providing [appellee] the payoff figure." The court determined that Melissa "failed to provide a payoff amount to [appellee] because [she] had not been applying any excess payment after the mortgage/taxes/insurance was paid according to the Agreement and therefore the payoff amount was fairly substantial." The court decided that because Melissa "created a legal impossibility of compliance with the agreement," Melissa could not claim that appellee breached the contract given Melissa's failure to give appellee a payoff amount.
{¶34} The trial court also found that after November 1, 2019, appellee "continued to make the monthly payments and to make the Property repairs required by the Agreement." And Melissa "continued to collect the monthly contract payments until July of 2021." The court additionally determined that on July 5, 2021, appellants gave appellee a 30-day "notice to vacate the premises." Upon receipt of the notice, appellee asked Melissa for the "balance of the debt in order to secure financing" and for a copy of the contract. Melissa "did not provide the payoff or a copy of the Agreement."
{¶35} The trial court stated that as of October 14, 2022, Melissa had a mortgage loan balance of $24,298.88, and as of November 1, 2022, appellee paid appellants a total of $32,950. The court explained that "[i]f [Melissa] paid her $32,000 mortgage at a rate of $157.42 at an interest rate of 4.25%, it would take until December 2024 to pay the mortgage in full. The total amount paid under the mortgage would be $43,995.19 meaning the purchase price of $32,000 and $11,995.19 in interest."
{¶36} Later, the trial court indicated that appellee paid a total of $32,950 in monthly payments towards a purchase price of $29,003.81, which the court stated was the payoff amount as of October 28, 2016, plus interest at a rate of 4.25% for a term of 13 years. The court found that appellee owes appellants $5,248.76 in finance charges that accumulated from October 28, 2016, through December 31, 2024. The court additionally determined that appellants failed to meet their burden of proof for forcible entry and detainer and dismissed that complaint.
{¶37} Next, the trial court discussed appellee's counterclaims. The court concluded that appellee established that appellants breached the agreement and that she "suffered money damages as a result." However, the court's judgment does not clarify whether it granted appellee monetary damages for appellants' breach of contract, and if so, the amount of those damages.
{¶38} With respect to appellee's request for attorney fees, the trial court determined that appellee incurred attorney fees in the amount of $3,575.40, that this amount is reasonable and further decided that appellants "should pay that amount."
{¶39} The trial court also concluded that appellee established that appellants (more specifically, Melissa) engaged in fraud by representing to appellee that they were selling the property to her and by attempting to evict appellee five years later and disclaiming the existence of any agreement to sell the property to appellee. The court additionally pointed out that appellants did not apply the excess monthly payment to the principal balance. The court thus determined that appellee suffered $13,827.85 in damages (the amount of the excess payment, $194.75, multiplied by the number of payments (71) as a result of appellants' fraudulent conduct.
{¶40} The trial court further found that appellee established her claims for promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment and found that she suffered $13,827.85 in damages for each of these two claims.
{¶41} Based upon the foregoing, the trial court ordered the specific performance of the land contract. The court ordered appellee to continue to pay appellants $450 per month until the remaining balance, $2,159.69, has been paid. The court stated that after appellee pays the remaining balance, appellee will have paid the $30,000 purchase price. The court ordered appellants to convey to appellee, within 30 days of appellee satisfying the remaining balance, a general warranty deed for the property. The court further indicated that if appellants do not transfer the property within that 30-day time period, "then absent an agreement to the contrary, [appellee] shall pay [appellants] a reduced sum of $260 per month."
{¶42} The trial court additionally awarded appellee attorney fees "in the amount of $2860.00," monetary damages in the amount of $3,575, and punitive damages in the amount of $2,500. This appeal followed.
{¶43} Before we may consider the merits of appellants' assignments of error, we first must consider whether we have jurisdiction to review the trial court's decision. E.g., Whitaker-Merrell v. Geupel Co., 29 Ohio St.2d 184, 186, 280 N.E.2d 922 (1972) (explaining that appellate court must sua sponte consider jurisdiction); State v. Kitchen, 4th Dist. Ross No. 18CA3640, 2018-Ohio-5244, ¶ 21 (addressing, sua sponte, jurisdiction to hear appeal). Courts of appeals have jurisdiction to "affirm, modify, or reverse judgments or final orders of the courts of record inferior to the court of appeals within the district." Section 3(B)(2), Article IV, Ohio Constitution; State v. Jackson, 149 Ohio St.3d 55, 2016-Ohio-5488, 73 N.E.2d 414, ¶ 46; State v. Thompson, 141 Ohio St.3d 254, 23 N.E.3d 1096, ¶ 37, 2014-Ohio- 4751. "As a result, '[i]t is well-established that an order [or judgment] must be final before it can be reviewed by an appellate court. If an order [or judgment] is not final, then an appellate court has no jurisdiction.'" Gehm v. Timberline Post & Frame, 112 Ohio St.3d 514, 2007-Ohio-607, 861 N.E.2d 519, ¶ 14, quoting Gen. Acc. Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 44 Ohio St.3d 17, 20, 540 N.E.2d 266 (1989); Jackson at ¶ 46 (stating that courts lack "jurisdiction over orders that are not final appealable"). If a court's order is not final and appealable, we must dismiss the appeal. Eddie v. Saunders, 4th Dist. No. 07CA7, 2008-Ohio-4755, ¶ 11.
{¶44} "An order is a final, appealable order only if it meets the requirements of both R.C. 2505.02 and, if applicable, Civ.R. 54(B)." Lycan v. Cleveland, 146 Ohio St.3d 29, 2016-Ohio-422, 51 N.E.3d 593, ¶ 21, citing Gehm at ¶ 15; accord Chef Italiano Corp. v. Kent State Univ., 44 Ohio St.3d 86, 541 N.E.2d 64 (1989), syllabus; Mayberry v. Chevalier, 2018-Ohio-781, 106 N.E.3d 89, ¶ 9 (4th Dist.). Under R.C. 2505.02(B)(2), an order is a final order if it "affects a substantial right made in a special proceeding or upon a summary application in an action after judgment[.]" A" '[s]ubstantial right' means a right that the United States Constitution, the Ohio Constitution, a statute, the common law, or a rule of procedure entitles a person to enforce or protect." R.C. 2505.02(A)(1). "[A]n order affects a substantial right for purposes of R.C. 2505.02(B)(2) only if 'in the absence of immediate review of the order [the appellant] will be denied effective relief in the future.'" Thomasson v. Thomasson, 153 Ohio St.3d 398, 2018-Ohio-2417, 106 N.E.3d 1239, ¶ 10, quoting Bell v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 67 Ohio St.3d 60, 63, 616 N.E.2d 181 (1993).
{¶45} Additionally, to terminate an action, a judgment must set forth the outcome of the dispute and contain a clear statement of the relief afforded to the parties. Burns v. Morgan, 165 Ohio App.3d 694, 2006-Ohio-1213, 847 N.E.2d 1288, ¶ 8 (4th Dist.), citing Harkai v. Scherba Industries, Inc., 136 Ohio App.3d 211, 215, 736 N.E.2d 101 (9th Dist. 2000); accord Downard v. Gilliland, 4th Dist. Jackson No. 10CA2, 2011-Ohio-1783, ¶ 10. The court's judgment need not"' "be encyclopedic in character, but it should contain clear language to provide basic notice of rights, duties, and obligations." '" Harkai, 136 Ohio App.3d at 216, 736 N.E.2d 101, quoting In re Michael, 71 Ohio App3d 727, 730, 595 N.E.2d 397 (11th Dist 1991), quoting Lavelle v Cox, 11th Dist Trumbull No 90-T-4396, 1991 WL 35642 (Mar 15, 1991), (Ford, J, concurring)" '[T]he content of the judgment must be definite enough to be susceptible to further enforcement and provide sufficient information to enable the parties to understand the outcome of the case'" Id., quoting Walker v Walker, 9th Dist Summit No 12978, 1987 WL 15591, *2 (Aug 5, 1987)"' "In other words, the judgment entry must be worded in such a manner that the parties can readily determine what is necessary to comply with the order of the court" '" Burns at ¶ 10, quoting Yahraus v Circleville, 4th Dist Pickaway No 00CA04, 2000 WL 33226190 (Dec 15, 2000), quoting Lavelle v Cox, Trumbull App No 90-T-4396, 1991 WL 35642 (Mar 15, 1991) (Ford, J, concurring).
{¶46} "If the judgment fails to speak to an area which was disputed, uses ambiguous or confusing language, or is otherwise indefinite, the parties and subsequent courts will be unable to determine how the parties' rights and obligations were fixed by the trial court." Harkai, 136 Ohio App.3d at 216, 736 N.E.2d 101, quoting Walker at *2. Accordingly, a judgment does not properly terminate an action when it is "ambiguous, confusing, and not certain in itself." Clyburn v. Gregg, 4th Dist. Ross No. 09CA3115, 2010-Ohio-4508, 2010 WL 3722260, ¶ 7; Brown v. Brown, 183 Ohio App.3d 384, 2009-Ohio-3589, 917 N.E.2d 301, ¶ 21 (4th Dist.); accord Jones v. Jones, 4th Dist. Highland No. 18CA10, 2019-Ohio-2684, ¶ 12; see Harkai, 136 Ohio App.3d at 216, 736 N.E.2d 101 (citations omitted) ("[t]he judgment entry unequivocally orders the relief"); 62 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, Judgments ("[i]t is a fundamental rule that a judgment must be complete and certain in itself").
{¶47} In the case sub judice, we do not believe that the trial court's judgment is clear and unambiguous. Here, the court orders specific performance of the contract and determines that under the contract, appellee's remaining balance is $2,159.69. The court calculated this amount as follows: the court found that the property purchase price was $30,000, and $4,998.81 had accumulated in interest between October 28, 2016 and November 15, 2022. The court thus found that the total amount owed is "$34,002.64." However, $30,000 plus $4,998.81 does not equal $34,002.64. The court then added late fees and taxes ($1,107.07) to reach the total amount owed, $35,109.69, then subtracted the total amount of payments appellee made ($32,950) to reach the remaining balance of $2,159.69.
{¶48} Subtracting the amount of interest ($4,998.81) from the trial court's total ($34,002.64) indicates that the principal balance would have been $29,003.81, which is the amount listed in appellee's amortization table as the mortgage balance as of October 2016. Then, beginning with November 2016, the amortization table shows the result if appellants had applied the excess amount, $194.75, to the principal each month. Had appellants applied that excess amount to the principal balance, then, according to the amortization table, the remaining mortgage balance at the end of October 2022 (the month before the trial) would have been $8,586.70.
{¶49} Additionally, at one point the trial court stated that it found that the $30,000 purchase price based upon its finding that the payoff amount at the end of the three-year period would have been $43,995.19 less the $8,562.62 that appellants had paid before appellee started to reside at the property. However, $43,995.19 minus $8,562.62 does not equal $30,000, but rather $35,432.57.
{¶50} The trial court's decision also contains conflicting information regarding the calculation of the excess amount. At one point, the court stated that the excess amount was $152.99, but at another point the court indicated that the amount was $194.75. However, using the figures that the trial court identified ($450 and $291.07) suggests that the excess amount was $158.93.
{¶51} Furthermore, at one point, the trial court found that appellants paid a total of $6,838.98 in taxes and insurance, but at another point, the trial court stated that the average monthly property tax payment was $60.61 and the average monthly insurance payment was $35.71. Adding those two numbers to the monthly mortgage payment ($157.42) equals $253.74. Subtracting $253.74 from $450 equals $196.26.
{¶52} The trial court additionally stated that it found the total purchase price, with a 4.25% interest rate calculated from October 28, 2018 to November 15, 2022, was $34,002.62. The court used this figure to then calculate appellee's remaining balance, $2,159.69 ($34,002.62 plus $1,107.07 for late fees and taxes minus $32,950 already paid). However, not all of the amount already paid ($32,950) was applied to principal and interest. Instead, as noted in one of appellee's exhibits, appellants applied some of that amount to taxes and insurance.
{¶53} Furthermore, the trial court's judgment entry contains other numbers that are not explained. For example, the court found that "$5,348.76 in finance charges accumulated from October 28, 2016 until December 31, 2024[,] and that [appellee] owes this amount to" appellants. However, the trial court did not incorporate any of this language into an unequivocal statement of relief. Moreover, the court's attorney-fee award is conflicting. The court found that appellee incurred $3,575 in attorney fees, but ordered appellants to pay $2,860 in attorney fees. The court also awarded appellee "money damages in the amount of $3575.00" without explanation as to what those damages were intended to compensate.
{¶54} Likewise, the trial court finds that appellants had been unjustly enriched by failing to apply the excess amount to the mortgage principal, but does not explain the relevance of that finding or incorporate it into a clear, unambiguous statement of relief. Additionally, the court found that appellee established her fraud, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment claims and that she sustained $13,827.85 in damages for each claim (i.e., the court's judgment seemingly awards appellee $13,827.85 three times), however the court does not incorporate this amount into any of the statements of relief.
{¶55} Unfortunately, we believe that the judgment is too confusing, contradictory, and ambiguous for this court to conduct a meaningful review. We also recognize, however, that the trial court had an unenviable task to decipher the facts and arguments set forth in this matter. To say that the underlying facts and arguments are confusing would appear to be a vast understatement.
{¶56} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we hereby dismiss this appeal.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the appeal be dismissed and that appellee recover of appellants costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Athens County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Smith, P.J. & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.