There are no reported cases in this jurisdiction which deal directly with the issue involved here. However, we find the case of Malloy v. Head, 4 A.2d 875, 90 N.H. 58 (1939) 123 A.L.R. 941 to be in point. In that case a young boy was injured by the insureds' horse and died from the injuries.

I. Reasonable notice in accordance with the policy terms is generally considered a condition precedent to any liability on the part of the insurer, so that the insured's delay or failure to give such notice would operate to relieve the insurer of liability under the policy. Clements v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co. of N.Y., 41 F.2d 470, 76 A.L.R. 17; Malloy v. Head (N.H.), 4 A.2d 875, 123 A.L.R. 941; State Mutual, etc., Ins. Co. v. Watkins, 181 Miss. 859, 180 So. 78; Annos. 76 A.L.R. 23, 123 A.L.R. 950; 29A Am. Jur., Insurance, Secs. 1379, 1380; 45 C.J.S., Insurance, Secs. 1053, 1054, 1055; 8 Appleman's Insurance Law and Practice, Secs. 4731, 4732, 4734. RODGERS, J.

Where by the terms of an insurance contract, the giving of notice of an accident as soon as practicable is made a condition precedent to liability on the part of the insurer, the failure to do so will release the insurer from the obligations imposed by the contract, even though no prejudice may have resulted, the existence of prejudice being immaterial. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Arghyris, 189 Va. 913, 55 S.E.2d 16; Indemnity Co. of America v. Bollas, 223 Ala. 239, 135 So. 174; 18 A.L.R.2d 443; State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Cassinelli, 67 Nev. 227, 216 P.2d 606, 18 A.L.R.2d 431; Arthur v. London Guarantee Accident Co., 78 Cal.App.2d 198, 177 P.2d 625; Young v. Travelers Ins. Co., 5 Cir., 119 F.2d 877; Weller v. Atlantic Cas. Ins. Co., 128 N.J.L. 414, 26 A.2d 503; Whittle v. Associated Indem. Corp., 130 N.J.L. 576, 33 A.2d 866; Butler v. Employers Cas. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 241 S.W.2d 964; Malloy v. Head, 90 N.H. 58, 4 A.2d 875, 123 A.L.R. 941; Hoffman v. Employer's Liability Assur. Corp., 146 Or. 66, 29 P.2d 557; Simmon v. Iowa Mut. Cas. Co., 3 Ill.2d 318, 121 N.E.2d 509; Gluck v. London L. Indem. Co., Sup., 134 N.Y.S.2d 889; Jeannette Glass Co. v. Indem. Ins. Co., 370 Pa. 409, 88 A.2d 407; New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Hamblen, 144 Tex. 306, 190 S.W.2d 56; Houran v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co., 109 Vt. 258, 195 A. 253. McKay Livingston, C. W. McKay, Jr., Sylacauga, for appellee Tankersley.

It was said in McCarthy v. Rendle, 230 Mass. 35, where the insured had a well founded belief that the injuries were trivial (page 39), "It is plain that the fact, that the insured has a reasonable and bona fide doubt as to the existence of any injury or of any liability, cannot be used to deprive the insurer of his contractual right to have an immediate notice of the occurrence of an accident, regardless of the damages that may be claimed to flow from that accident." See also Malloy v. Head, 90 N.H. 58; Jeannette Glass Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. 370 Pa. 409. If the claim letter may be considered as a notice of the accident as the plaintiff contends (although the policy distinguished each kind of notice, Potter v. Great American Indemnity Co. 316 Mass. 155, 157), it was not received until more than four months after the accident and about two months after the person injured had died. Notice of an accident is required in order to give the insurer an opportunity to investigate the cause and nature of a claim while the facts are still fresh in the minds of the parties.

To determine the application of the doctrine to this case requires an examination of the facts. From the time that the defendant disclaimed liability and until after the trial began, the only cause of the loss which it had reason to believe existed, either as a result of information furnished it by the plaintiff or by its own investigation, was windstorm. Such a claim was unequivocally excluded from coverage by the plain language of the policies and the plaintiff was bound to know this. Malloy v. Head, 90 N.H. 58, 60. On the other hand, it claims to have discovered more than three months before the commencement of the trial that a sprinkler pipe froze and burst which it now asserts was the true cause of the damage, and to have known even earlier that the loss was due to another cause than windstorm. Notwithstanding these facts the plaintiff never filed at any time sworn proofs of loss stating its "knowledge and belief" of the "origin of the loss" as required by the conditions of the policies, nor gave the defendant the slightest intimation that the damage arose from any cause covered by the policies until after the trial commenced.

eat weight of authority is that where, as in the policy involved in this case, notice of the accident and forwarding of any demand, notice, summons or other process are specifically made a condition precedent to any action against the insurer, the failure to give a reasonably timely notice of the accident or of the receipt of any demand, notice, summons or other process will release the insurer from the obligations imposed by the contract, although no prejudice may have resulted. Sears, Roebuck Co. v. Hartford Accident c. Co., 50 Wn.2d 443 ( 313 P.2d 347)); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Cassinelli, 67 Nev. 227 ( 216 P.2d 606, 18 ALR2d 431); Houran v. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co. of N. Y., 109 Vt. 258 ( 195 A 253); Whittle v. Associated Ind. Corp., 130 N. J. L. 576 ( 33 A.2d 866); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Arghyris, 189 Va. 913 ( 55 S.E.2d 16); Courtney v. Stapp, 232 Miss. 752 ( 100 So.2d 606); Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Independence Mut. Ins. Co., (Mo.App.) 319 S.W.2d 898; Malloy v. Head, 90 N.H. 58 ( 4 A.2d 875, 123 ALR 941); M. F. A. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mullin, (DC) 156 F. Supp. 445; Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Turgeon, (1 Cir.) 140 F.2d 94." (Emphasis supplied.)

The trouble with the contention of the [insured that they reasonably believed that neither a claim nor a lawsuit would arise out of an accident], is that they assumed to become the judges of the prospect for claim and suit, whereas one of the purposes of the notice of accident is to afford opportunity to the insurer, the responsible party in case the policy is to continue in effect, to decide that very question and to act in accordance with its own judgment.Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Shannon, 701 S.W.2d 615, 620 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1985) (quoting Malloy v. Head, 90 N.H. 58, 4 A.2d 875, 878 (N.H. 1939)). Although the beliefs of Vanderbilt's lawyers regarding whether they reasonably believed a claim would arise might be given some weight, the opinions of scientific researchers not trained in the law must be given little weight.

Of course, if Turgeon had no knowledge that he was involved in an accident, if he could reasonably believe that he was not involved in an accident, he would be excused from giving notice. See Sherwood Ice Co. v. United States Casualty Co., supra, 40 R.I. at page 268, 100 A. 572; Farrell v. Nebraska Indemnity Co., 1931, 183 Minn. 65, 235 N.W. 612; Vande Leest v. Basten, 241 Wis. 509, 6 N.W.2d 667; Cf. Malloy v. Head, 1939, 90 N.H. 58, 4 A.2d 875, 123 A.L.R. 941. The following facts were stipulated.

It was said in McCarthy v. Rendle, 230 Mass. 35, at page 39, 119 N.E. 188, at page 189, L.R.A. 1918E, 111, where the insured had a well founded belief that the injuries were trivial, "It is plain the fact the insured has a reasonable and bona fide doubt as to the existence of any injury or of any liability, cannot be used to deprive the insurer of his contractual right to have an immediate notice of the occurrence of an accident, regardless of the damages that may be claimed to flow from that accident." See also Malloy v. Head, 90 N.H. 58, 4 A.2d 875, 123 A.L.R. 941; Jeannette Glass Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 370 Pa. 409, 88 A.2d 407. 8.

The foregoing being true, the narrow issue involved in this case is one of first impression for Tennessee. This issue has been raised in other jurisdictions, however, and it has been held that the insured's lack of knowledge as to the existence in his policy of a notice or proof of loss requirement, arising out of his failure to read the policy, or, having read it, his failure to remember its conditions, does not excuse his delay in giving notice or proof of loss within the period specified by the policy. See generally, Bozich v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 155 Kan. 573, 127 P.2d 499 (1942); Bennett v. New York Life Ins. Co., 63 Idaho 427, 121 P.2d 551 (1942); Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Babin, 125 S.W.2d 411 (Tex.Civ.App. 1939); Malloy v. Head, 90 N.H. 58, 4 A.2d 875 (1939); Milam v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 117 W. Va. 77, 183 S.E. 865 (1936); Lewis v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 94 S.W.2d 499 (Tex.Civ.App. 1936). See also, 17 A.L.R.3d 530 (1968).