Opinion
H048262
03-08-2022
In re the Marriage of SMITHA MALLIKARJUNAIAH and PRASAD SHANKAR. v. PRASAD SHANKAR, Appellant; SMITHA MALLIKARJUNAIAH, Respondent, MONTEREY COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES, Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Monterey County Super. Ct. No. DR43762
Danner, J.
Representing himself, appellant Prasad Shankar appeals trial court orders that increased his monthly child support payments. Shankar raises a variety of claims, most of which challenge the trial court's factual conclusions. Respondent Monterey County Department of Child Support Services (the Department) asserts that only one order (the July 2, 2020 order) is properly before us, and Shankar has not shown reversible error. For the reasons explained below, we agree and affirm the order.
We refer to appellant's last name as Shankar consistent with the trial court record and the parties' briefing in this court. We note that at least one court record refers to appellant's last name as "Shankarlingiah."
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We set forth only the procedural history relevant to the disposition of those issues properly raised in this appeal.
A. Marital Dissolution and Child Support
Shankar (father) and respondent Smitha Mallikarjunaiah (mother), who has not participated in this appeal, married in 2000 and divorced in 2006. A judgment of dissolution was entered in 2006. They are the parents of one son, born in 2004, and who is now 18 years old (son). Following the dissolution of their marriage, Shankar and Mallikarjunaiah litigated various issues, including child support, in Monterey County Superior Court. The Department entered the case, apparently at mother's request, to provide child support services and filed a notice of substitution with the trial court that substituted the Department as the payee for Shankar's child support payments. As discussed further below, the Department filed motions to modify the monthly child support at issue here.
The Department assisted mother in the trial court and has participated as respondent in this appeal.
This court on its own motion orders the record augmented to include the judgment of dissolution filed on December 18, 2006. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a).)
To protect his personal privacy interests, we do not use son's name. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(1).)
Although son was also under Shankar's care for a time, mother had primary physical custody of him at all times relevant to this appeal. Mother moved to Ohio with son for work, and the Monterey County Superior Court ordered, pursuant to the parties' stipulation, that it would have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over child support.
The parties reached a stipulation in 2017 on child support and arrears following contested proceedings. On April 11, 2017, the trial court issued an order pursuant to the stipulation that, inter alia, ordered Shankar to pay monthly child support of $1,441 as of June 2016 (April 11, 2017 stipulation and order). The stipulation and order attached a document from the Department titled "Guideline Calculation Results Summary" that set forth the calculations for the $1,441 monthly child support amount. The document listed mother's monthly taxable and non-taxable gross income as $11,501.
The April 11, 2017 stipulation and order set arrears to zero, and arrears are not at issue in this appeal.
In April 2017, mother's counsel submitted mother's income and expense declaration, which stated that she worked full time at her current job in Ohio and her monthly gross pay was $11,250 before taxes. Mother's income and expense declaration also noted she had last filed taxes for tax year 2016 as head of household and had also filed a state tax return in Ohio. The declaration noted son (who was then 13 years old) was living with mother. The declaration attached two pay stubs from mother's then-employer in Ohio.
Shankar submitted an income and expense declaration in June 2017 indicating he was working as a systems engineer for a bank based in San Francisco. Shankar's declaration stated that his average monthly salary was $8,025 (and attached pay stubs), and he had rental property income of $160 for the "[l]ast month."
The amount of monthly child support ($1,441) ordered in the April 11, 2017 order appears to have remained unchanged through 2019.
B. Proceedings in 2019 to Modify Child Support
On November 8, 2019, the Department filed a motion seeking to increase Shankar's monthly child support payments to $1,738 (modification motion).
The Department's modification motion was supported by the declaration of a Department child support officer (Alejandra Rojas) (Rojas declaration). The Rojas declaration summarized financial information for both parents. As to mother, the Rojas declaration stated mother had not submitted an income and expense declaration but, as previously determined by the trial court, her "average gross monthly income was listed as $11,501.00" and her monthly itemized deductions were $330 for property tax and $654 for mortgage interest. The Rojas declaration further noted mother's "tax filing status is head of household with two exemptions" and she received certain tax credits including a child tax credit for son, who was then 15 years old.
Regarding Shankar, the Rojas declaration stated that he had submitted an income and expense declaration with supporting documents. The declaration noted Shankar was employed as a software engineer and calculated his gross monthly income as $12,609, which "was taken from total gross earnings of $151,303.00, reported by his employer to the National Directory of New Hire[s]" for the period between July 2018 and the end of June 2019. The declaration also noted that Shankar had rental property income and described information about that income (from two separate properties) that was derived from a 2018 tax form (Schedule E Form 1040 for supplemental income and loss). The Rojas declaration stated son's visitation with Shankar was set at one percent and attached Shankar's visitation verification. The declaration also attached as an exhibit a document titled "Guideline Calculation Results Summary." The declaration stated that based on the "California Guideline Calculator" Shankar's monthly child support payments should be $1,738.
The National Directory of New Hires is a directory maintained pursuant to federal law as part of the Federal Parent Locator Service. (See 42 U.S.C. § 653.)
On December 2, 2019, mother submitted an income and expense declaration using mandatory Judicial Council form FL-150. The declaration, which mother signed under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California, listed her monthly gross salary as $12,054, and it stated she had last filed taxes for tax year 2018 as the head of household and had filed state tax returns in Ohio and Florida. The declaration attached two pay stubs from her then-employer in Ohio. The pay stubs indicated mother was residing in Florida.
On December 17, 2019, the trial court held a hearing on the Department's modification motion. The minute order for that hearing indicates that Shankar, mother's attorney, and an attorney for the Department were present. The record on appeal does not contain a transcript of the hearing.
At the hearing, Shankar represented himself. Although Shankar had counsel at various times in the proceeding, in 2016 he filed a substitution of attorney indicating he was representing himself and appears to have represented himself thereafter.
The minute order for the December 17, 2019 hearing states Shankar was ordered to pay monthly child support of $1,589 to the Department effective November 20, 2019. The order was "subject to [Shankar] providing proof of the health insurance amount and the Mother providing proof of the property tax and mortgage interest" to the Department and the other party within 30 days, "[a]fter which, the Department . . . is authorized to recalculate the child support if the difference is $50.00 and/or 20 [percent]."
On December 24, 2019, Shankar filed a document titled "Opposition/Objections to court order/decision dated Dec 17[th] 2019 at Marina court house" (hereafter Shankar's opposition). Shankar's opposition asserted inaccuracies in the financial information about mother submitted by the Department. For example, the opposition contended that at the December 17, 2019 hearing the Department "produced to court that [mother's] income is approximately [$]12, 500" but the "actual amount was approximately [$]16, 000." The opposition further asserted Shankar had unsuccessfully made "several requests" to the Department to assist him in getting mother's "2017 and 2018 tax returns." Shankar's opposition stated that on December 17, 2019, "prior to the court hearing," he had informed mother's attorney, the Department, and the trial court that he "want[ed]" to "see" mother's last two years of tax returns. Shankar's opposition also stated he was a software engineer and that, based on his experience building software applications, he "noticed that the calculations [of child support] are not user friendly" and he had "some concerns" about "the Logic, algorithm and calculation's [sic]" used in calculating the child support amount. Shankar's opposition also expressed doubts about the accuracy of mother's financial information used to calculate the support amount, including concerns about mother's 2016 taxable income based on a prior statement that she had returned certain monies to her employer.
C. February 4, 2020 Order
On February 4, 2020, using Judicial Council form FL-687 the trial court issued an order after hearing based on the December 17, 2019 hearing. Consistent with the December 17, 2019 minute order, the order after hearing required Shankar to pay monthly child support of $1,589 to the Department, effective November 20, 2019. The order also checked the preprinted box on the form stating that "Attached is a computer printout showing the parents' income and percentage of time each parent spends with the [child]. The printout, which shows the calculation of child support payable, will become the court's findings." The printout reflected Shankar had custody over son one percent of the time. The printout also included details about the parents' monthly income and tax information for tax year 2019, including that mother's federal tax filing status was as head of household and she claimed two federal tax exemptions.
The February 4, 2020 order further stated that it was "subject to [Shankar] providing proof of the health insurance amount and the Mother providing proof of the property tax and mortgage interest" to the Department and Shankar within 30 days and "[a]fter which, the Department . . . is authorized to recalculate the child support if the difference is $50.00 and/or 20 [percent]."
D. Department's Recalculation of Child Support and June 24, 2020 Hearing
On February 10, 2020, the Department submitted a motion recalculating Shankar's monthly child support payments to $1,616 (second modification motion). The Department's motion noted this was a "highly contested case" and that "rather than submitting the recalculation by ex parte declaration" it asked the court to re-set the matter to consider "[Shankar]'s insurance premiums, and Mother's Itemized Deductions for real property taxes and mortgage interest, and Mother's possible rental income." The Department did not request a de novo hearing on all issues.
Certain portions of the clerk's transcript were marked confidential. Shankar requested the release of certain pages of the record marked as confidential, and this court granted the limited release of those pages in orders dated January 29, 2021, and March 18, 2021. This court subsequently issued a letter to the parties notifying them of this court's intent to publicly file certain portions of the confidential transcript, namely pages 428 to 440 of the clerk's transcript, consisting of the Department's motion and supporting Davis declaration. Having received no objection from the parties, we direct the clerk to publicly file pages 428 to 440 of the clerk's transcript.
The Department's motion was supported by the declaration of a Department child support attorney, Victoria Davis (Davis declaration). The declaration attached financial documents related to mother and Shankar. Regarding mother's finances, the motion stated that there were two itemized deductions at issue (one relating to mother's mortgage interest and one as to her real property tax) and an issue relating to mother's "possible rental income."
The Davis declaration noted that mother had provided a mortgage statement which reflected a monthly mortgage interest payment on her residence of $598. Regarding the property tax, the Davis declaration noted that this information was not clear from the statement mother provided. Nevertheless, the Department had accessed that information "directly from the tax rolls" and had adjusted the calculation accordingly. Regarding mother's rental income, the Davis declaration stated the following: Mother had provided a copy of her rental mortgage statement (attached to the Davis declaration) and the statement showed that she paid $1,184 per month for principal, interest, and escrow; "[a]ccording to the testimony in court, her rents were $1,650.00 per month"; and therefore the rental property provided mother monthly cash income of $466 per month that should be included in the recalculation of child support.
Regarding Shankar's medical insurance premiums, the Department noted in its motion that while Shankar had claimed at the hearing to have paid higher premiums, he had not provided any additional documentation to the Department. Using the evidence available to it, the Department changed the relevant deduction to $241.
Based on the above changes in information for both mother and Shankar, the Department calculated Shankar's monthly child support to be $1,616 and requested that amount in its second modification motion. The Davis declaration attached a document titled "Guideline Calculation Results Summary" that summarized this recalculated support payment.
On June 24, 2020, the trial court held a contested hearing on the Department's motion to increase child support. The record on appeal does not contain a transcript of the hearing. Shankar and an attorney for the Department were present. The minute order for the June 24, 2020 hearing states the trial court granted the Department's modification request and ordered Shankar to make monthly child support payments of $1,616 beginning November 20, 2019.
Five days after the hearing, on June 29, 2020, and prior to the issuance of a written order by the trial court, Shankar filed the notice of appeal in this matter.
E. July 2, 2020 Hearing
On July 2, 2020, the trial court issued an order after hearing based on the June 24, 2020 hearing. Consistent with its June 24, 2020 minute order, the trial court ordered Shankar to make monthly child support payments of $1,616 beginning November 20, 2019. The order stated this amount was "based on the proof provided regarding [Shankar's] [h]ealth insurance premiums and Mother's itemized deductions for real property taxes and mortgage interest and Mother's rental income." The order referenced Shankar's opposition filed on December 24, 2019, deemed it a request for reconsideration, and denied it.
II. DISCUSSION
Shankar asserts a variety of claims on appeal. He generally contends that the trial court and the Department erred in the calculation of the monthly child support amount. Shankar also asserts the trial court wrongfully twice ordered his removal from the courtroom, once at the December 2019 hearing and once at the June 2020 hearing. Not all of Shankar's assertions are cognizable in this appeal. We first examine our jurisdiction and then analyze Shankar's contentions that fall within its scope.
A. Jurisdiction and Scope of Appellate Review
The notice of appeal defines the scope of an appeal by identifying the judgment or order being appealed. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(2); see Morton v. Wagner (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 963, 967.) In this matter, Shankar has filed one notice of appeal. It purports to appeal orders entered on December 17, 2019, and June 24, 2020. Those dates correspond to the dates of hearings and associated minute orders. The trial court subsequently issued final orders on February 4, 2020, (for the December 17, 2019 hearing) and on July 2, 2020, (for the June 24, 2020 hearing).
The Department notes that Shankar's opening briefing appears to challenge the April 11, 2017 stipulation and order, as well as the February 4, 2020 and July 2, 2020 orders. The Department asserts our review of the 2017 order is jurisdictionally barred. Although we agree we would have no jurisdiction over an appeal of the 2017 order on timeliness grounds (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(2)), Shankar does not appear to raise any substantive claims of error related to that order.
The Department contends Shankar's appeal of the February 4, 2020 order is moot, as that order was effectively superseded by the July 2, 2020 order. We agree.
The February 4, 2020 order specifically stated that it was "subject to [Shankar] providing proof of the health insurance amount and the Mother providing proof of the property tax and mortgage interest" to the Department and Shankar within 30 days, "[a]fter which, the Department [] is authorized to recalculate the child support if the difference is $50.00 and/or 20 [percent]." Six days later, the Department submitted additional proof and information based on the specified information in the order and submitted a recalculated child support amount, which the trial court ultimately accepted when it entered its July 2, 2020 child support modification order.
In his reply brief, Shankar correctly notes that the difference between the previously calculated support amount ($1,589) and the new support amount ($1,616) is only $27. He therefore appears to argue the Department was not authorized to submit any recalculation because the February 2, 2020 order only allowed a recalculation if the difference is $50.00 or 20 percent. We conclude he forfeited this claim because he failed to raise it in the trial court and because he belatedly raised it in his reply brief. Furthermore, the trial court's February 2, 2020 order could be fairly read to mean the difference related to the specific items (e.g., mother's property tax and mortgage interest or Shankar's medical insurance premiums). For instance, the Department noted in its supporting papers that Shankar had been given a deduction of $595 for his premiums but had not provided any documentation. The resulting change of $241, a difference of well over $50, met the stated threshold.
Therefore, it is clear from the record that the February 4, 2020 order included in Shankar's notice of appeal is no longer in effect due to the subsequent July 2, 2020 order entered by the trial court. As there could be no practical effect to this court reversing the February 2020 order (even assuming arguendo the appeal as to that order was timely and reversible grounds exist), his challenge on appeal to that order is moot. (Cf. MHC Operating Limited Partnership v. City of San Jose (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 204, 214.) Nevertheless, we do consider the February 4, 2020 order and related records when relevant to our analysis of the July 2, 2020 order.
We have jurisdiction over the appeal from the July 2, 2020 order as an order after an appealable judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(2); see Berman v. City of West Hollywood Rent Stabilization Dept. (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 837, 842.) While Shankar filed his appeal on June 24, 2020, prior to entry of the order, we have authority to treat Shankar's notice of appeal as if it had been timely filed. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(d)(2); In re Marriage of Grimes & Mou (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 406, 420.)
"Our jurisdiction on appeal is limited in scope to the notice of appeal and the judgment or order appealed from." (Polster, Inc. v. Swing (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 427, 436.) "If an appeal is from the judgment, the general rule is that the appeal will review the correctness of a judgment at the time it is rendered and matters occurring later are irrelevant." (Soldate v. Fidelity Nat. Financial, Inc. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1073.) We therefore will not consider any events occurring after the July 2, 2020 order or documents that post-date that order, including Shankar's arguments related to a January 6, 2021 hearing and related documents.
B. Principles of Appellate Review
It "is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment." (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608- 609.) As a general rule, "[a] judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct [with] [a]ll intendments and presumptions . . . indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent." (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564, italics omitted, (Denham).)
This court must hold a self-represented litigant to the same procedural rules as an attorney. (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247 (Nwosu).) Even though he is self-represented, Shankar must present an adequate record demonstrating purported error by the trial court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C); Nwosu, at p. 1247.) "When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived." (Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852 (Benach).)
C. Trial Court Calculations of Child Support
Shankar contends the trial court's calculation of child support under the applicable guidelines was both inaccurate and unsupported. More specifically, as best understood by this court, Shankar asserts the trial court erred factually by (1) basing its decision to modify child support on certain "false information" related to the parents' respective financial information, and (2) issuing its decision to modify child support without supporting documentation.
1. Child Support Principles
The Family Code sets forth California's uniform child support guideline. (See In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 283, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re Marriage of Morton (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1025, 1049.) Family Code section 4055 sets forth a mathematical formula to calculate child support that each trial court must implement." 'The support amount rendered under the guideline's algebraic formula "is intended to be presumptively correct in all cases, and only under special circumstances should child support orders fall below the child support mandated by the guideline formula." '" (Y.R. v. A.F. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 974, 983; see also In re Marriage of Hein (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 519, 527 (Hein).)
Unspecified statutory citations are to the Family Code.
Section 3651 governs the modification or termination of support orders, including child support. (§ 3651, subd. (e); In re Marriage of Bodo (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 373, 386 (Bodo).) "As a general rule, courts will not modify child or spousal support unless there has been a material change of circumstances following the previous determination." (In re Marriage of Usher (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 347, 357.)" 'There are no rigid guidelines for judging whether circumstances have sufficiently changed to warrant a child support modification. So long as the statewide statutory formula support requirements are met (Fam. [Code, ] § 4050 et seq.), the determination is made on a case- by-case basis and may properly rest on fluctuations in need or ability to pay.'" (In re Marriage of Leonard (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 546, 556 (Leonard).)
2. Standard of Review
Our standard of review of the trial court's modification order is well-established. (Bodo, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 384.) We must affirm the trial court's determination "unless the trial court abused its discretion" and we may reverse the order "only if prejudicial error is found from examining the record below." (Ibid.) "Thus, '[t]he ultimate determination of whether the individual facts of the case warrant modification of support is within the discretion of the trial court. [Citation.] The reviewing court will resolve any conflicts in the evidence in favor of the trial court's determination.'" (Ibid.) "In conducting our review for an abuse of discretion, we determine 'whether the court's factual determinations are supported by substantial evidence and whether the court acted reasonably in exercising its discretion.' [Citation.] We do not substitute our own judgment for that of the trial court, but determine only if any judge reasonably could have made such an order." (Ibid.)
3. Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court's Factual Findings
Shankar alleges multiple factual errors in the trial court's child support determination. Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude Shankar's assertions lack merit. At the outset, we observe Shankar does not argue that the trial court erred in calculating child support pursuant to the statewide guideline child support formula, set forth in section 4055. Shankar does not argue here, nor does the record reflect he argued in the trial court, that any deviation from the guideline was just or appropriate.
Rather, Shankar repeatedly claims in conclusory fashion that certain financial information relied upon by the trial court was incorrect. However, he fails to provide any legal analysis or supporting record citations, and we therefore deem his unsupported claims forfeited. (See Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785; Kim v. Sumitomo Bank (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 974, 979.) This court has no obligation to develop legal arguments for the parties. (Jefferson Street Ventures, LLC v. City of Indio (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1175, 1196, fn. 2.)
Evening assuming he has not forfeited his claims, we conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court's rulings. As to mother's financial information, Shankar appears to argue incorrect information was entered into the guideline child support calculator related to mother's rental income, property tax, and mortgage interest, which was incorporated into the December 17, 2019 minute order and then the later order. However, as detailed below, the Department submitted documentary evidence supporting mother's income and financial information, including mother's pay stubs from her employer and the Davis declaration that attached various documents related to mother's finances including rental income. The record does not reflect any countervailing evidence submitted by Shankar to prove this information was inaccurate (nor does Shankar appear to argue he presented any such evidence). To the extent he presented any at the hearings, we do not have the transcripts for the hearings and thus cannot evaluate any such evidence. More fundamentally, we may not reweigh the evidence on appeal and must resolve "any conflicts in the evidence in favor of the trial court's determination." (Leonard, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 556; see also In re Marriage of Calcaterra & Badakhsh (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 28, 38.)
Also unavailing is his general claim that the child support guideline calculation was somehow unjustified for lack of supporting documents. As discussed above, the record contains documentation related to mother's finances, including a declaration of her income and expenses that she signed under penalty of perjury, pay stubs, a mortgage statement, and information related to her rental income. We therefore decide substantial evidence supports the trial court's determinations of mother's income and itemized deductions to support its child support guideline calculation.
D. Mother's Tax Returns
We understand Shankar to make two related arguments related to mother's tax returns. He maintains he was entitled to mother's tax returns under the rules of discovery and the trial court erred by not requiring the production of her tax returns to him as he had requested. More generally, he appears to contend the trial court's child support order was substantively deficient because it was not based on mother's tax return information and therefore the trial court's understanding of mother's income was incorrect, incomplete, or unverified.
Shankar also appears to argue that the Department should have retrieved information about mother's income from the National Directory of New Hires, similar to how it collected information about him from that directory. Shankar cites no legal authority for his contention the Department was required to have done so, and we are unaware of any. (Benach, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 852; Nwosu, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 1247.)
It is true that courts have stated that tax returns are "the core component of determinations under the guideline formula." (In re Marriage of Loh (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 325, 332.) Section 3552 states: "(a) In a proceeding involving child, family, or spousal support, no party to the proceeding may refuse to submit copies of the party's state and federal income tax returns to the court, whether individual or joint. [¶] (b) The tax returns may be examined by the other party and are discoverable by the other party. A party also may be examined by the other party as to the contents of a tax return submitted pursuant to this section. [¶] (c) If the court finds that it is relevant to the case to retain the tax return, the tax return shall be sealed and maintained as a confidential record of the court. If the court finds that the tax return is not relevant to disposition of the case, all copies of the tax return shall be returned to the party who submitted it." Section 3655 states in part that a "copy of the prior year's federal and state personal income tax returns shall be attached to the income and expense declaration of each party" (id., subd. (a)) and that the "tax returns shall be controlled by the court as provided in Section 3552" (id., subd. (c)).
As to his claim that the trial court's child support modification order was substantively deficient for lack of tax return information about mother, we conclude Shankar has not carried his burden on appeal of showing error. Substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings and "[w]e cannot presume error from an incomplete record." (Christie v. Kimball (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1412.) Shankar nevertheless asks this court to reweigh the evidence before the trial court. For example, he maintains mother worked other jobs and received unspecified bonuses "from more than one employer" and also had unspecified "multiple business" income, However, Shankar does not provide any record citation for these assertions, and unsupported assertions are insufficient to meet Shankar's burden on appeal of demonstrating reversible error. Further, we may not engage in factfinding in the first instance.
As noted above, this court when reviewing a child support modification order may "not substitute our own judgment for that of the trial court, but determine only if any judge reasonably could have made such an order." (Bodo, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 384.) The trial court had before it, mother's income and expense declaration, signed under penalty of perjury, and some of mother's pay stubs. Moreover, the Department submitted additional evidence as to mother's income, including her rental income, and, following a hearing in June 2020 (for which we have no transcript), the trial court adopted the Department's recalculation of $1,616 in monthly child support. On this record, we cannot conclude the child support calculation reflected in the July 2, 2020 order was unreasonable because it was not based on information in mother's tax returns.
The record does not include mother's tax returns attached to her December 2019 income and expense declaration, and there is no basis in the record to assume the trial court had a copy of them.
To the extent Shankar appears to argue that the trial court could not calculate the child support amount without mother's tax returns, he does not provide any authority for that proposition. While the statutory provisions quoted above contemplate that the trial court would have in the normal course of events the tax returns of a parent as attachments to a parent's income and expense declaration (see § 3665), we have found no requirement in the statutory or decisional law that requires a trial court to base its decision to modify child support on tax return information when it has other, multiple reliable sources of information about a parent's finances, as it did here.
Regarding the discovery of mother's tax returns, Shankar does not show any prejudicial error occurred. Section 3552, subdivision (b), states in pertinent part that another party's tax returns "may be examined by the other party and are discoverable by the other party." While this language authorizes discovery of any party's tax returns, that statutory authorization alone did not require mother to turn over her tax returns to Shankar. Discovery must follow procedural requisites, which Shankar does not show he met. (See, e.g., Code of Civ. Proc., ¶ 2031.030 [requirements for inspection demand]; § 210 ["the rules of practice and procedure applicable to civil actions generally . . . apply to, and constitute the rules of practice and procedure in, proceedings under [the Family Code]"].)
While Shankar claims to have served a "subpoena" related to a tax return, he provides no record citation for that assertion. There is no evidence in the record that Shankar did so, or that he complied with the pertinent procedural requirements. Rather, Shankar's opposition that he filed in the trial court raised the question of mother's tax returns but stated that on December 17, 2019, "prior to the court hearing" he had requested from mother's attorney, the Department, and the trial court that he "want[ed]" to "see" mother's last two years of tax returns.
Shankar attempts to introduce evidence post-dating the order related to the tax returns, such as e-mails he sent in January 2021 to mother and various other individuals indicating Shankar "will be sending a subpoena to a couple of parties." As we have stated ante, we do not consider events that occurred following the order at issue in this appeal, that is the July 2, 2020 order. Those events are not properly before us in this appeal. We therefore do not consider those parts of his briefing.
Moreover, even assuming Shankar properly served a discovery request, there is no indication that the Department or mother refused to comply with such a request or that Shankar then filed and served a motion to compel. At oral argument, Shankar stated he had filed a motion to compel on December 24, 2019, and provided a citation to the appellate record for the motion. But the record citation that he provided is to Shankar's opposition and is not a motion to compel or a request for discovery. Rather, it is to the document discussed ante, that made various assertions, including that Shankar had unsuccessfully made "several requests" to the Department to assist him in getting mother's "2017 and 2018 tax returns." As noted in the trial court's June 24, 2020 minute order, the trial court viewed this document as effectively a "Request for Reconsideration" of the trial court's prior decision as to child support. In any event, it is not a motion to compel discovery.
Further, this motion did not comply with the requirements for a motion (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1112) or with formal discovery requirements that apply in family court proceedings. (§ 210; Code of Civ. Proc. § 2031.300 ["If a party to whom a demand for inspection . . . is directed fails to serve a timely response to it . . . [¶] . . . [¶] [t]he party making the demand may move for an order compelling response to the demand."]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.12(c) ["Discovery proceedings brought in a case under the Family Code must comply with applicable civil rules for motions."].) The record does not support Shankar's contention that he filed a noticed motion to compel, supported by a memorandum of points and authorities, or that he served wife with a formal discovery request, to which she failed to respond.
While we understand Shankar's frustration that the Department obtained information from his tax returns but did not do the same for mother, he has not shown on appeal that the trial court's failure to secure mother's tax returns was error requiring reversal of the order.
Shankar cites to Hein in his reply brief to argue tax returns are "important" to verify parental income and "should be produced to court/DCSS by [] both parents." Hein addressed complex tax return-related issues regarding child support where one of the parents was self-employed and had organized his businesses through certain corporate structures. (Hein, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 539.) Although the court discussed the tax returns involved in that case, the court did not address the discoverability of tax returns as a general matter, and the decision does not assist Shankar.
E. Shankar's Removal from the Hearings
Shankar asserts the trial court wrongfully removed him from the courtroom at both hearings in December 2019 and June 2020. Shankar, as the appellant, has the burden to affirmatively prove an error, and thus has the burden of providing an adequate record on appeal. (Randall v. Mousseau (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 929, 935 (Randall).) Shankar elected to proceed without a record of the oral proceedings or a settled statement for the December 2019 or June 2020 hearings. "Failure to provide an adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be resolved against appellant. [Citation.] Without a record, either by transcript or settled statement, a reviewing court must make all presumptions in favor of the validity of the judgment." (Ibid.) Further, "[t]he absence of a record concerning what actually occurred at the hearing precludes a determination that the court abused its discretion." (Wagner v. Wagner (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 249, 259.)
Shankar does not provide the necessary citation to the record for his claim that he was removed from the courtroom. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).) For example, in his statement of facts in his opening brief, Shankar asserts he "was forced to leave the court twice (once using force by cops on dec [sic] 17[th] 2019) and second time during June 24[th] 2021 [sic], " but he provides no record citation for that assertion. Furthermore, in independently reviewing the record for the purposes of analysis here, we have not found any support for his claim that he was actually removed from the courtroom, let alone any reasonable inference or suggestion that he was wrongfully removed. To the contrary, the record affirmatively reflects he was present for both the December 17, 2019 and June 24, 2020 hearings. We therefore decide Shankar has not met his burden of demonstrating he was wrongfully removed from the court proceedings or that prejudicial error occurred.
The hearing date pertinent to this appeal was June 24, 2020.
Relatedly, Shankar asserts at least one of the hearings went forward "without notifying" him, presumably referring to the December 2019 hearing. However, as stated previously, the record indicates Shankar was actually present at that hearing. Shankar does not explain how any lack of notice prejudiced him and thus has not established prejudicial error.
F. Remaining Arguments
We also reject Shankar's request to this court to "share the logics, algorithms and functional specification of the software" used to calculate the child support amount. The Department argues both that Shankar has forfeited this claim by failing to raise it in the trial court and it lacks merit because courts must use the guideline child support calculator where a local support agency is providing services. (See § 3830; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.275 [setting forth "standards for computer software to assist in determining the appropriate amount of child or spousal support"].) The Department further asserts there is no indication the child support computation software failed to comply with the applicable standards. Shankar's briefing does not appear to raise any error with respect to the software other than his unsupported assertion it should be shared with him so he can further study it. Shankar provides no legal authority for the proposition that this contention requires this court to reverse an otherwise proper order modifying child support. (Cf. Bodo, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 384.)
Shankar's briefing also alleges various improper actions taken by the Department. For example, Shankar states the Department "erred by blocking his account to DCSS Customer representative." He provides no record citations or supporting authority for his argument. Moreover, these various undated actions allegedly taken by the Department bear no relation to the order at issue in this appeal. We therefore lack jurisdiction to consider them. Even assuming we have jurisdiction over these arguments as conceivably related to the July 2, 2020 order (which the Department disputes), Shankar has forfeited them by failing to adhere to the principles of appellate review.
Shankar's reply brief, while purporting to respond to the Department's briefing, raises multiple, new lines of argument, such as (for example) that an exhibit showing mother's residence as being in Florida was "altered," that he is entitled to request in this appeal certain values for the variables in the child support formula (see § 4055) so that he can "complete the equation" and "verify" the accuracy of the amounts used to calculate child support, and that the trial court violated his (unspecified) constitutional rights. "Generally, the raising of a new ground for the first time in a reply brief is not proper appellate practice." (Murray & Murray v. Raissi Real Estate Development, LLC (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 379, 388.) We decline to address Shankar's arguments raised for the first time in his reply brief. (See Ajaxo, Inc. v. E*Trade Financial Corp. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 129, 194.)
Shankar has not met his burden on appeal of demonstrating reversible error in the trial court's order, and we therefore affirm it.
III. DISPOSITION
The July 2, 2020 order modifying child support is affirmed. In the interests of justice, all parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
WE CONCUR: Greenwood, P.J. Wilson, J.