Opinion
No. 04-1246 MMC, Docket No. 8.
September 23, 2004
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT; VACATING HEARING
Before the Court is the motion of defendants City of Clearlake ("Clearlake") and Robert McDonald ("McDonald") for a more definite statement, pursuant to Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs Louetta Mallard and Bruce Wells have filed opposition, to which defendants have replied. Having reviewed the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the motion, the Court deems the matter suitable for decision thereon, VACATES the hearing scheduled for September 10, 2004, and rules as follows.
Plaintiffs did not provide the Court with a chambers copy of their opposition, which the docket reflects was electronically filed on September 13, 2004. The Court, nonetheless, has considered the filing. For future reference, plaintiffs are reminded of the following provision in the Court's Standing Orders: "In all cases that have been assigned to the Electronic Case Filing Program, the parties are required to provide for use in chambers one paper copy of each document that is filed electronically. The paper copy of each such document shall be delivered no later than noon on the day after the document is filed electronically. The paper copy shall be marked 'Chambers Copy' and shall be delivered to the Clerk's Office in an envelope clearly marked with the judge's name, case number, and 'E-Filing Chambers Copy.'"
BACKGROUND
In their complaint, plaintiffs allege that on April 15, 2003, "defendants, and each of them, without reasonable cause or justification shot and severely wounded plaintiff's mixed-breed puppy, Dosha, and left him for dead." (See Compl. ¶ 9.) The complaint further alleges that after the dog was "impounded and placed in a freezer for disposition, it was discovered that Dosha was not in fact dead, only severely wounded." (See id.)
In Count One, plaintiffs allege that defendants' conduct violated "plaintiffs' 4th and 14th Amendment rights under the United States Constitution." (See Compl. ¶ 10.) In Count Two, plaintiffs allege that defendants' conduct was "in violation of California statutory law." (See Compl. ¶ 13.) In Count Three, plaintiffs allege that Clearlake is liable under the theory the shooting "would not have occurred" but for Clearlake's "custom or habit of providing woefully inadequate training, supervision and discipline of its officers, and otherwise acting with deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of its citizens." (See Compl. ¶¶ 16-17.)
Plaintiffs allege defendant McDonald is a "duly-qualified and acting police officer of the City of Clearlake." (See Compl. ¶ 3.)
DISCUSSION
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint "must simply 'give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (quotingConley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).) "This simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims." Id. If, however, "a pleading fails to specify the allegations in a manner that provides sufficient notice, a defendant can move for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e) before responding." See id. at 514. Specifically, if a complaint is "so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more definite statement." See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e). In any such motion, the moving party shall "point out the defects complained of and the details desired." See id.
Defendants argue that they are entitled to a more definite statement because the complaint does not give defendants notice of "whose rights were violated, how they were violated or who violated them." (See Defs.' Mot. at 2:10-11.) The Court disagrees.
The complaint gives defendants notice of the claim that plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights, as well as plaintiff's state statutory rights, were violated by the shooting of the dog that they owned. See, e.g., Fuller v. Vines, 36 F. 3d 65, 67 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding dog owned by plaintiff is property that, for purposes of Fourth Amendment, "can be seized"),overruled on other grounds, Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F. 3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002); Venegas v. County of Los Angeles, 32 Cal. 4th 820, 8413 (2004) (holding California Civil Code § 52.1 provides remedy for, inter alia, unconstitutional search and seizure violations). Also, by referring to one officer by name, McDonald, the complaint gives defendants notice of the claim that McDonald, possibly along with "Does" unidentified in the complaint, deprived plaintiffs of the rights identified in the complaint. Additionally, the complaint gives defendants notice of the claim that the deprivations occurred as a result of a policy or practice of the City of Clearlake. See Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep't., 839 F. 2d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding claim of municipal liability under § 1983 sufficient even where "based on nothing more than a bare allegation that the individual officers' conduct conformed to official policy, custom, or practice").
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, defendant's motion for a more definite statement is hereby DENIED.
This order terminates Docket No. 8.
IT IS SO ORDERED.