Opinion
Nos. HHB CV 06-4011383, HHB CV 06-4011500, HHB CV 06-4011904, HHB CV 07-4014026
July 15, 2008
Memorandum of Decision
In Longley v. State Employees Retirement Commission, 284 Conn. 149, 931 A.2d 890 (2007), our Supreme Court held that, under the state employees retirement act; General Statutes § 5-160 et seq.; retirees from state employment are entitled to have their final, prorated longevity payment added directly to their salary for their final year of state service for purposes of calculating the base salary from which their retirement income is determined. The principal issue in these administrative appeals is whether Longley applies retroactively to other cases that were pending at the time that the Supreme Court decided it.
I
General Statutes § 5-213(a) provides in relevant part: "[E]ach employee in the state service who has completed not less than ten years of state service and who is not included in any collective bargaining unit, except those employees whose compensation is prescribed by statute, shall receive semiannual lump-sum longevity payments based on service completed as of the first day of April and the first day of October of each year . . ." Section 5-213(b) provides: "The semiannual longevity lump-sum payments shall be made on the last regular pay day in April and October of each year, except that a retired employee shall receive, in the month immediately following retirement, a prorated payment based on the proportion of the six-month period served prior to the effective date of his retirement." The question in Longley, which the Court answered in the affirmative, was whether to include this final, prorated longevity payment in the calculation of "base salary" for purposes of determining retirement income.
As defined by General Statutes § 5-162(b)(1), "base salary" is the "average annual regular salary . . . received by [a retiree] for his three highest-paid years of state service . . ."
The record establishes the following facts. Plaintiffs Louis R. Malerba and Robert L. Smith retired from state employment on April 1, 2003. Plaintiffs Robert T. Morrin and Michael Harder retired, respectively, on June 1, 2003 and April 1, 2006. The plaintiffs filed petitions for a declaratory ruling concerning the applicability of the final, prorated longevity payment, as well as other retirement questions, with the defendant Connecticut state employees retirement commission (commission) on the following respective dates: December 27, 2005 (Morrin), March 9, 2006 (Smith), April 24, 2006 (Malerba), and April 26, 2006 (Harder). The commission rendered decisions rejecting the plaintiffs' claims on June 30, 2006 in the case of Malerba and Morrin, August 14, 2006 in Harder's case, and February 28, 2007 in Smith's case. All four plaintiffs filed administrative appeals to the Superior Court within the forty-five-day period provided by General Statutes § 4-183[c]. These four administrative appeals were pending in Superior Court on October 2, 2007, when our Supreme Court decided Longley. The plaintiffs now contend that Longley should apply retroactively to their cases, thus invalidating the commission's rulings on their petitions for declaratory rulings with respect to the final, prorated longevity payment.
II
General Statutes § 4-183(j) governs this court's review of the merits of an agency's decision. This section provides:
The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by other error of law; (5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. If the court finds such prejudice, it shall sustain the appeal and, if appropriate, may render a judgment under subsection (k) of this section or remand the case for further proceedings. For purposes of this section, a remand is a final judgment.
General Statutes § 4-183(j). The dispositive issue in this case is whether the commission's decisions are "[i]n violation of constitutional or statutory provisions" or "affected by other error of law."
A
Because Longley held that the commission must include the final, prorated longevity payment in the base salary calculation, there is no longer any dispute that the commission's decisions in the declaratory rulings are now incorrect on the merits of that issue. The commission nonetheless asserts two legal reasons why Longley should not apply to the plaintiffs' cases. First, the commission argues that three of the plaintiffs took too long after their retirement to file the petitions to the commission for a declaratory ruling and that they are now time-barred.
The commission makes no such argument in the case of plaintiff Harder, who retired from state employment on April 1, 2006 and filed his petition with the commission on April 26, 2006.
There is no merit to this argument. The statute governing declaratory rulings with state agencies contains no universal limitations period for filing petitions. General Statutes § 4-176. Instead, each state agency has its own limitations period for filing claims or challenges, either as a matter of statute or regulation. See, e.g., General Statutes § 1-206(b)(1) (30 days to file appeal with the freedom of information commission concerning denial of rights to inspect or copy records or to attend meeting of public agency); General Statutes § 46a-82(e) (30 or 180 days to file complaint alleging discrimination with the commission on human rights and opportunities); Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 14-227b-12(b) (seven days to request hearing with department of motor vehicles to challenge license suspension); Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 29-36m-21 (ninety days to appeal denial of firearms permit with board of firearms permit examiners.) The commission, however, has no written time limitation for filing challenges to its decisions.
Although the defendant now encourages the court to apply analogous statutes of limitation, the court declines to do so. The commission did not assert any limitations bar during the proceedings on the petitions. It appears from that fact that the commission's true position may be that, in order to fulfill its mission to state retirees, it will not reject claims solely due to delay. In any event, the commission has had ample opportunity to enact its own statute or regulation containing a limitations period. It has failed to do so. The court will not interfere with the legislative or executive branch processes that led to this end result. Accordingly, the court rejects the argument that the plaintiffs' claims are time-barred.
B CT Page 11618
The commission's second argument is that Longley does not apply retroactively to cases, such as the present ones, that were pending in the courts at the time of the decision. As the commission acknowledges, the law in Connecticut is that "judgments that are not by their terms limited to prospective application are presumed to apply retroactively . . ." Marone v. Waterbury, 244 Conn. 1, 10-11, 707 A.2d 725 (1998). The Langley decision does not specifically address its retroactive or prospective operation. Therefore, it is presumptively retroactive.
In order to overcome this presumption, the commission must satisfy Connecticut's version of the Chevron Oil test. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971). This test provides that "[a] common law decision will be applied nonretroactively only if: (1) it establishes a new principle of law, either by overruling past precedent on which litigants have relied . . . or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed; (2) given its prior history, purpose and effect, retrospective application of the rule would retard its operation; and (3) retroactive application would produce substantial inequitable results, injustice or hardship." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ostrowski v. Avery, 243 Conn. 355, 377-78 n. 18, 703 A.2d 117 (1997); accord Denardo v. Bergamo, 272 Conn. 500, 510, 863 A.2d 686 (2005).
Although the Chevron Oil test is inapplicable to jurisdictional rulings; Denardo v. Bergamo, supra, 272 Conn. 510; it appears fully applicable to nonjurisdictional statutory decisions such as Longley. See Ostrowski v. Avery, supra, 243 Conn. 377-78 n. 18.
The commission has satisfied the first prong of the test. Longley unquestionably established a new principle of law, as it changed the approach that the commission had traditionally taken on the longevity payment issue. See Longley v. State Employees Retirement Commission, supra, 284 Conn. 156-57, 166.
The commission, however, cannot establish the other two factors. As for the second factor, retroactive application of Longley would not retard its operation, but rather would further it by providing employees retirement benefits to which Longley held they are statutorily entitled.
With regard to the third factor, the commission cannot demonstrate any particular inequity or hardship from retroactive application to pending cases. At oral argument, the commission did not dispute the plaintiffs' representation that this decision affects only the four cases that are before the court. While making the appropriate upward adjustments in the plaintiffs' retirement incomes in light of Longley undoubtedly has a tangible fiscal impact on the commission, there is no indication that this impact poses a significant burden. Accordingly, Longley applies retroactively to the plaintiffs' cases.
In Longley, for example, for assistant attorneys general who retired after thirty-three years of service, the final, prorated longevity payment was $1,150. See Longley v. State Employees Retirement Commission, supra, 284 Conn. 153-54 nn. 5, 6. The commission would then have to average this rather modest amount into the employee's three highest paid annual earnings to redetermine the base salary, and from that amount calculate retirement income. Id., 154.
The court expressly does not decide, and takes no position concerning, whether Longley applies to cases that were not pending at the time of its decision.
CT Page 11619
III
The court sustains the plaintiff's appeals and orders the commission to apply Longley to the plaintiffs' retirement income calculation from the time of their retirement from state service.It is so ordered.