("Every action at law for an injury to the person caused by the wrongful act . . . of any person within this State shall be commenced within two years next after the cause of any such action shall have accrued. . . .); see also Maldonado v. Leeds, 374 N.J. Super. 523, 530 (App.Div. 2005) (N.J. Stat. Ann. 2A:14-2 requires that a personal injury claim for emotional distress be brought within two years of the accrual of the cause of action.) Thus, because it was brought after August 4, 2002 (such as this claim which was brought in January 2006), Plaintiff's claim is untimely and Count P will be dismissed.

As we explain further below, we reject plaintiffs' claim that the judge failed to use an objective standard in conducting his analysis. Maldonado v. Leeds, 374 N.J.Super. 523, 531 (App. Div. 2005). The judge's opinion may be clearly read as finding that it was not just that plaintiffs failed to exercise reasonable diligence and intelligence, but rather, that a prudent sophisticated business investor would have, through the exercise of reasonable diligence and intelligence, discovered facts - for example, that the property was titled in TSP's name in 1994, DEP permits were issued to TSP in 1994, and TSP was listed on the tax records as the property's owner - "that would alert a reasonable person to the possibility of an actionable claim." Catena, 447 N.J.Super. at 54 (quoting Lapka v. Porter Hayden Co., 162 N.J. 454, 555-56 (2000)). Plaintiffs never had any interest in TSP.

At points, he eschewed the opportunity to make specific credibility determinations regarding plaintiff's testimony. However, "[t]o determine whether the discovery rule applies, a plenary hearing is necessary 'since credibility is usually at issue.'" Maldonado v. Leeds, 374 N.J.Super. 523, 531 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting J.L. v. J.F., 317 N.J.Super. 418, 429 (App. Div. 1999)); Lopez, 62 N.J. at 275. Nevertheless, the judge made some factual findings based on the evidence adduced at the plenary hearing, and, as to those, we defer under our standard of review. See, e.g., Nelson v. Elizabeth Bd. of Educ., 466 N.J.Super. 325, 336 (App. Div. 2021) ("[W]e do not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless we are convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence so as to offend the interests of justice[.]"