Opinion
97 Civ. 4794 (RLE)
October 4, 2000
OPINION ORDER
The plaintiff, acting pro se, brought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against correctional officers at the Fishkill Correctional Facility, alleging that he was the victim of a retaliatory disciplinary proceeding in violation of his due process rights. Following a jury trial that commenced on June 6, 2000, and lasted four days, a verdict was rendered in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff now moves pursuant to Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for a judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, a new trial under Rule 59(a). For the reasons stated below, the plaintiffs motions are DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
At the time of the incidents that form the basis of this action, plaintiff Richard Maldonado was an inmate at Fishkill Correctional Facility. See Pl. Pre. at 2. On or about July 22, 1996, at approximately 5:45 p.m., plaintiff left his work assignment with the approval of Correctional Officer Davis. See Def. Exh. O at 1. Plaintiff did not punch his timecard upon leaving the work assignment, instead relying on Davis to "take care of" his time card. See P1. Pre. at 3, 14; Tr. at 12 His timecard was punched at 7:35 p.m. See Def. Exh. O at 1. The following morning, Maldonado was terminated from the work assignment for failure to punch his own timecard. See Pl. Pre. at 14; Tr. at 12, 17-18.
"Pl. Pre" refers to Plaintiffs Pre-Trial Order, dated April 26, 1999.
"Def. Exh." refers to the Defense Exhibits submitted to the Court at trial.
"Tr." refers to the trial transcript.
Later that day, plaintiff initiated a grievance proceeding regarding his termination from the work assignment. The grievance officer instructed plaintiff to wait for a phone call from Sergeant McCarroll before filing the complaint. Plaintiff later approached McCarroll, who allegedly told plaintiff "[Y]ou know what's going to happen if you go ahead with this grievance." Pl. Pre. at 15.
The next morning, July 24, 1996, defendant Correctional Officer McFarlin instructed plaintiff to report to the porter pool at approximately 8:25 a.m. While plaintiff was on duty, several officers, including defendant McCarroll, conducted a search of the plaintiffs bed area. See Tr. at 182, 183. Plaintiff was then sent to the Special Housing Unit ("SHU"). See Pl. Pre. at 4. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff was served with a misbehavior report issued by defendant Correctional Officer Candidus. The report stated that during a "routine" search, contraband (specifically, a metal shank) had been found in plaintiffs locker. See Def. Exh. A. On July 26, 1996, plaintiff filed a second grievance, alleging that the shank had been planted in his locker in retaliation for filing his first grievance. See Def. Exh. W.
On or about August 16, 1996, a Tier III hearing officer found plaintiff guilty of violating prison Rule 113.10 (possession of a weapon) and imposed a punishment of twelve months of SHU confinement and loss of package, commissary, and phone privileges. See Def. Exh. Z at 186. At the hearing, McCarroll testified the search was conducted pursuant to confidential information received by McFarlin. Id . at 23, 24. Plaintiffs appeal of the judgment was unammously denied by the Central Office Review Committee ("CORC"), see Def. Exh. V, but the confinement portion of the punishment was reduced to four months. See Def. Exh. B at 1.
At trial, plaintiff contended that he was punished in retaliation for the initial grievance. He contended that McCarroll and McFarlin, with the help of Candidus, had framed him for possession of the weapon. Plantiffs theory was that the officers retaliated because his grievance report implicated Davis in a timecard punching scheme. See Tr. at 532 ("Their retaliation was because I was a snitch. I said that a staff member offered to punch my card, and according to Sergeant McCarroll's testimony, it was a common practice for officers to punch out inmates' cards.") He argued that McFarlin did not actually have a confidential informant concerning the shank. See Tr. at 535.
Defendants disavowed knowledge of plaintiffs grievance report and of any retaliatory motive. See Tr. at 511-17, 525-26. In turn, plaintiff attacked their credibility, pointing to alleged inconsistencies in their paperwork and in their testimonies. See Tr. at 185, 529, 530.
The jury found that plaintiff had failed to show that the grievance complaint was a motivating factor in Candidus' filing of the misbehavior report. See Tr. at 577-78. The jury also found that the plaintiff had failed to show that defendants were personally involved in the placement of the shank in retaliation for Maldonado's filing of a grievance. See Tr. at 578-79.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
Maldonado first moves to overturn the jury's verdict pursuant to Rule 50(b). He argues that the jury's verdict was rendered against the weight of the evidence. As a threshold issue, plaintiff has failed to meet the procedural requirements of Rule 50(b). To invoke the rule, a party must have made an initial motion under Rule 50(a) at trial before seeking to renew the motion under Rule 50(b). However, mindful of the fact that the plaintiff has proceeded pro se, the Court will not treat the procedural deficiency as a bar to consideration of plaintiff s motion on the merits.
Judgment as a matter of law may only be granted where there is a complete absence of evidence supporting the jury's verdict, or if the evidence in favor of the moving party is so overwhelming that no reasonable person could arrive at a verdict against it. Galdieri-Ambrosini v. National Realty Development Corp ., 136 F.3d 276, 289 (2d Cir. 1998); Luciano v. Olsten Corp ., 110 F.3d 210, 214 (2d Cir. 1997); Cruz v. Local Union No. 3 , 34 F.3d 1148, 1154 (2d Cir. 1994). In assessing the record, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. See Galdieri-Ambrosini , 136 F.3d at 289; Vasbinder v. Ambach , 926 F.2d 1333, 1339 (2d Cir. 1991). Further, the court may not weigh the testimony of the witnesses, but must defer to the jury's credibility determinations. Galdieri-Ambrosini , 136 F.3d at 289; Vasbinder , 926 F.2d at 1339. Under this standard, plaintiffs motion for judgment as a matter of law must be denied.
At trial, Maldonado advanced two theories. First, he claimed Candidus filed a misbehavior report charging him with possession of a weapon in retaliation for the exercise of his right to file a grievance. Second, he claimed the defendant officers planted a metal shank in his cell in retaliation for filing the grievance. To prevail on a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the protected conduct was a substantial and motivating factor for the alleged retaliatory conduct. Mount Healthy Sch. Dist. v. Doyle , 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). With respect to his second theory, plaintiff bore the added burden of proving that defendant officers were individually involved in the planting of the shank in plaintiffs cell. If the plaintiff makes this initial showing, the burden then shifts to the defendants to show they would have taken the same actions "even in the absence of the protected conduct." Id .
On both theories, the plaintiffs case rested largely on determinations of credibility. Plaintiff relied primarily on his own uncorroborated testimony that the officers were motivated by the desire to avenge plaintiffs claims that officer Davis participated in a card punching scheme. He also argued that there were certain factual inconsistencies in the defendants' testimonies. Given the importance of the jury's credibility determinations in this case, and given the lack of other evidence to support plaintiffs rendition of events, the Court finds it must deny Maldonado's motion.
B. Motion for a New Trial
If the court is convinced the verdict is seriously erroneous or constitutes a miscarriage of justice, it should order a new trial. Smith v. Lightning Bolt Productions, Inc ., 861 F.2d 363, 370 (2d Cir. 1988). The court is free to weigh the evidence and may grant a new trial even if there is substantial evidence supporting the jury's verdict. United States v. Landau , 155 F.3d 93, 104 (2d Cir. 1998). The judge retains this discretion even if the jury's determination was based on evaluating the credibility of witnesses. Id . at 104-06.
In this case, the evidence proffered by the plaintiff is not strong enough to convince the Court that the verdict was seriously erroneous or constituted a miscarriage ofjustice. Plaintiffs motion for a new trial is therefore denied.
III. CONCLUSION
Upon review of the transcripts and the evidence submitted at trial, the Court remains firmly convinced that the evidence presented at trial fully supported the jury's verdict. Plaintiffs motion for judgment as a matter of law, or, in the alternative, for a new trial, is therefore DENIED. In accordance with the jury verdict, judgment shall be entered in favor of the defendant.
SO ORDERED this 3rd day of October 2000 New York, New York.