Opinion
3:23-CV-1215 (MAD/ML)
10-17-2023
JOSHUA MALAVE-SYKES, Plaintiff, v. ENDICOTT POLICE DEP'T; OFFICER E. RIEGEL, Individual Capacity; LINDA JACKSON, Mayor of Endicott; and JESSICA A. HINKLE, Defendants.
JOSHUA MALAVE-SYKES Plaintiff, Pro Se Endwell Motel
JOSHUA MALAVE-SYKES Plaintiff, Pro Se Endwell Motel
ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
MIROSLAV LOVRIC, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The Clerk has sent a pro se complaint in the above captioned action together with (1) an application to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP"), (2) a motion for an order to show cause for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, (3) motion for submission of a supplemental affidavit, (4) a letter motion, and (5) a motion to obtain ECF login and password, filed by Joshua Malave-Sykes ("Plaintiff) to the Court for review. (Dkt. Nos. 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 9.) For the reasons discussed below, I (1) grant Plaintiffs in forma pauperis application, (2) deny Plaintiffs motion to obtain ECF login and password, (3) grant Plaintiffs motion for submission of a supplemental affidavit (Dkt. No. 7) and letter motion (Dkt. No. 8) to the extent that the factual allegations contained therein were considered as part of the Complaint and denied in all other respects, (4) recommend that Plaintiffs Complaint be dismissed in its entirety with leave to amend, and (5) recommend that Plaintiffs motion for an order to show cause for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction be denied. (Dkt. Nos. 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 9.)
I. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
Plaintiff commenced this action on September 28, 2023, by the filing of a complaint and motion for leave to proceed IFP. (Dkt. Nos. 1, 2.) In addition, Plaintiff filed a motion for an order to show cause for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. (Dkt. No. 4.) On September 29, 2023, United States District Judge Mae A. D'Agostino referred this case for an initial review noting that the Court had "serious doubts regarding whether [a temporary restraining order] would be available in this matter" because, inter alia, "the motion appears to ask the Court to interfere with an ongoing state criminal case and perhaps a state court order that directed him to vacate his premises. Pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), however, a federal court may not interfere with ongoing state criminal proceedings by granting injunctive or declaratory relief except under special circumstances. . . . Additionally, to the extent that Plaintiff is seeking damages related to an ongoing state criminal proceeding, such claims are potentially subject to dismissal pursuant to Younger and Heck v. Humphrey, since a judgment in his favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of the ongoing state criminal proceedings." (Dkt. No. 6.)
On October 2, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion for submission of a supplemental affidavit. (Dkt. No. 7.)
On October 3, 2023, Plaintiff filed a letter motion requesting ex parte relief pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(d) and a motion to obtain ECF login and password. (Dkt. Nos. 8, 9.)
B. Complaint
Construed as liberally as possible, Plaintiffs Complaint appears to allege that his civil rights were violated by Defendants Endicott Police Department ("Defendant Endicott PD"), Officer E. Riegel, Linda Jackson, and Jessica A. Hinkle (collectively "Defendants"). (See generally Dkt. No 1.) More specifically, Plaintiff-who is Black-alleges that he was racially discriminated against by Defendants-who are all white-based on their responses to numerous domestic disputes between Plaintiff and Defendant Hinkle. (Id)
The court must interpret pro se complaints to raise the strongest arguments they suggest. Soto v. Walker, 44 F.3d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2dCir. 1994)).
Plaintiff alleges that on September 5, 2021, he contacted Defendant Endicott PD after Defendant Hinkle vandalized his apartment in violation of New York Penal Law § 145.00. (Dkt. No. 1 at 2; Dkt. No. 7 at 4.) Plaintiff alleges that the responding officers refused to arrest Defendant Hinkle. (Dkt. No. 1 at 2.) Plaintiff alleges that he was informed by officers employed by Defendant Endicott PD that Defendant Hinkle was entitled to enter the apartment and that if (1) Plaintiff put a lock on his bedroom, and (2) officers came back to the apartment and saw the lock, then Plaintiff would be arrested for violating Endicott Housing Codes. (Id. at 2-3.)
Plaintiff alleges that he has explained to officers of Defendant Endicott PD "on every occasion they are summoned to his residence] that he works and pays all the bills and [Defendant Hinkle] has not contributed her share on agreed household expenses, rent, utilities, food [for] approximately one year." (Dkt. No. 1 at 3.)
Plaintiff alleges that in or around September 2021, he contacted Defendant Jackson seeking her intervention and discipline of the involved Defendant Endicott PD officers for their discriminatory conduct. (Dkt. No. 1 at 4.)
Plaintiff alleges that on September 22, 2023, he was charged with strangulation in the second degree pursuant to N.Y. Penal Law § 121.12, a class D felony, based on an interaction that he had with Defendant Hinkle. (Dkt. No. 1 at 1-2.) Plaintiff alleges that at the time of his arrest, he had "brutal scars" on his face that should have made clear to Defendant Riegel that Plaintiff was not the aggressor. (Id)
Based on these factual allegations, Plaintiff asserts the following four causes of action: (1) false arrest and unlawful detention against Defendants Hinkle and Endicott PD in violation of the Fourth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) gross negligence against Defendant Endicott PD in failing to arrest Defendant Hinkle; (3) differential treatment on the basis of race against Defendant Endicott PD in violation of 42 U.S.C. of 42 U.S.C. § 19183; and (4) "superior subordinate doctrine" against Defendant Jackson. (See generally Dkt. No. 1.) As relief, Plaintiff seeks, inter alia, an "injunction and declaration restraining [Defendant Endicott PD] from engaging in discriminatory conduct," a declaration that Plaintiff "is recognized and deemed the sole legal occupant of the residence] at 7 Adams Avenue, Apartment No. 2R, Endicott, New York 13760," an order that Defendant "Hinkle is an unlawful occupant of the premises," a declaration that Plaintiffs arrest and criminal charges were unconstitutional and motivated in bad faith, an order of protection in favor of Plaintiff that Defendant Hinkle stay away from him, and compensatory damages for the lodging in hotels and disruption of his life. (Dkt. No. 1 at 10-12.)
Attached to the Complaint are the following six documents: (1) a family offense information that accuses Plaintiff of committing strangulation in the second degree on September 22, 2023, against Defendant Hinkle signed by Defendant Riegel; (2) a notice from the Broome County Public Defender's Office; (3) a form from Plaintiffs centralized arraignment dated September 22, 2023; (4) a form titled "DEFENDANT STAT SHEET" with information regarding Plaintiff; (5) pictures that appear to depict injuries to Plaintiffs body; (6) an e-mail from "Deny Sykes" to the same e-mail address with, what appears to be, an attached image discussing the lease for the apartment that Plaintiff shared (or shares) with Defendant Hinkle. (See generally Dkt. No. 1, Attach. 1.)
Construing Plaintiffs motion for submission of a supplemental affidavit (Dkt. No. 7) and letter motion (Dkt. No. 8) liberally, the undersigned considered the additional allegations contained therein when considering his Complaint.
Plaintiffs supplemental submission appears to allege that on June 19, 2021, Plaintiff called 911 in attempt to have Defendant Hinkle "peacefully and lawfully . . . removed from his" apartment. (Dkt. No. 7, Attach. 1 at 2.) Plaintiff alleges that the responding police officers concluded that because Defendant Hinkle receives mail at the apartment she is "entitle[d] to some sort of misconception of squatters rights." (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that on June 28, 2021, he submitted a lease amendment form and letter to his landlord, Michael Fata, seeking to remove Defendant Hinkle from the lease, but that Mr. Fata ignored Plaintiffs correspondence. (Dkt. No. 7, Attach. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff alleges that on September 30, 2023, he again attempted to have Defendant Hinkle removed from the lease by corresponding with Mr. Fata. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that he has "audio and video evidence to demonstrate [Defendant Hinkle's] violent and abusive behavior and criminal acts of mischief and vandalism." (Dkt. No. 7, Attach. 1 at 4.)
Plaintiff alleges that on August 1, 2021, he "sustained hideous scratches and [bruises] on [his] face and body again illustrating a disturbing pattern for [Defendant Hinkle's] lust for blood and penchant for violen[t] conduct." (Dkt. No. 7, Attach. 1 at 4-5.)
Plaintiff "apologize[s] to this Court for asking this Court voke [sic] relief outside the scope of this Court's authority in [ask]ing this Court [to] annul the criminal proceeding" in violation of the Younger doctrine and Heck v. Humphrey. (Dkt. No. 7, Attach. 1 at 5-6.) As a result, Plaintiff requests that his motion be granted and "any further relief deemed just and equitable." (Dkt. No. 7, Attach. 1 at 6.)
Plaintiffs letter motion requesting ex parte relief pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(d), "urge[s]" the Court to carefully weigh and examine Plaintiffs "liberty interest in potential conviction of the erroneous deprivations of the state actions in charging [P]laintiff with false domestic abuse charges." (Dkt. No. 8 at 2.) Plaintiff appears to assert a procedural due process claim in this filing. (See generally Dkt. No. 8.)
Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed IFP. (Dkt. No. 2.)
II. PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
"When a civil action is commenced in a federal district court, the statutory filing fee, currently set at $402, must ordinarily be paid. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). A court is authorized, however, to permit a litigant to proceed in forma pauperis status if a party "is unable to pay" the standard fee for commencing an action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). After reviewing Plaintiffs in forma pauperis application (Dkt. No. 2), the Court finds that Plaintiff meets this standard.Therefore, Plaintiffs application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.
The language of that section is ambiguous because it suggests an intent to limit availability of in forma pauperis status to prison inmates. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (authorizing the commencement of an action without prepayment of fees "by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such prisoner possesses"). The courts have construed that section, however, as making in forma pauperis status available to any litigant who can meet the governing financial criteria. Hayes v. United States, 71 Fed. CI. 366, 367 (Fed. CI. 2006); Fridman v. City of N.Y., 195 F.Supp.2d 534, 536 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
The Court notes that Section 1915(a)(1) does not set financial guideposts as standards for determining IFP eligibility. Although Plaintiffs income appears to be above the federal poverty guidelines (Dkt. No. 2 at ¶ 2), based on his current additional expenses, I find that he has established-albeit barely-that he is "unable" to pay the filing fee, or that paying the filing fee would pose a "serious hardship."
Plaintiff is reminded that, although his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted, he is still required to pay fees that he may incur in this action, including copying and/or witness fees.
III. LEGAL STANDARD FOR INITIAL REVIEW OF THE COMPLAINT
"Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that... the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
In addition, the Court shall dismiss any action where the Complaint fails to allege facts plausibly suggesting subject matter jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3); see Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 88-89 (1988) (holding that subject matter jurisdiction is a "threshold question that must be resolved . . . before proceeding to the merits."); Humphrey v. Syracuse Police Dep't 758 Fed.Appx. 205, 205-06 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing United States v. Bond, 762 F.3d 255, 263 (2d Cir. 2014)) ("[b]efore deciding any case on the merits, a district court must determine that it has subject matter jurisdiction over the matter."); Koziel v. City of Yonkers, 352 Fed.Appx. 470, 471 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint on initial review for lack of subject matter); Talley v. LoanCare Serv., Div. of FNF, 15-CV-5017, 2018 WL 4185705, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2018) (dismissing on initial review, action challenging state court mortgage foreclosure judgment because the court lacked jurisdiction); Eckert v. Schroeder, Joseph & Assoc, 364 F.Supp.2d 326, 327 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing Hughes v. Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass h of the City of N.Y., Inc., 850 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1988), cert, denied, 488 U.S. 967 (1988)) ("[a] court shall, sua sponte, dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as soon as it is apparent that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction.").
"In reviewing a complaint... the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor." Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). However, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Courts are "obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally." Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (reading the plaintiff's pro se complaint "broadly, as we must" and holding that the complaint sufficiently raised a cognizable claim). "[E]xtreme caution should be exercised in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint before the adverse party has been served and [the] parties . . . have had an opportunity to respond." Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1983).
IV. ANALYSIS
In addressing the sufficiency of a plaintiff s complaint, the court must construe his pleadings liberally. Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008). Having reviewed Plaintiffs Complaint with this principle in mind, I recommend that all causes of action be dismissed.
A. Defendant Hinkle
Generally, private parties are not state actors, and are not liable under § 1983. Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 406 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass 'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)); see also Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir. 2002) ("[T]he United States Constitution regulates only the Government, not private parties . . . .") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "Because the United States Constitution regulates only the Government, not private parties, a litigant claiming that his constitutional rights have been violated must first establish that the challenged conduct constitutes 'state action.'" United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., 941 F.2d 1292, 1295-96 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing Blum v. Yartsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002 (1982)). A private defendant may be held liable only as "a willing participant in joint activity with the State or its agents." Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966)). Claims under § 1983 can be brought against private entities by "showing that a person acting under color of state law . . . collaborated with a private person ... to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right." Fries v. Barns, 618 F.2d 988, 990 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing Adickes, 398 U.S. at 144).
However, "mere use, and even misuse, of state courts does not turn private parties into state actors." Koziol v. King, 14-CV-0946, 2015 WL 2453481, at *11 (N.D.N.Y. May 22, 2015) (Sharpe, C.J.) (citing Cramer v. Englert, 93 Fed.Appx. 263, 264 (2d Cir. 2004) ("[T]he mere invocation of New York legal procedures does not satisfy the state actor requirement under § 1983."); Dahlberg v. Becker, 748 F.2d 85, 89-90 (2d Cir. 1984) (dismissing § 1983 action because allegations of "misuse of a state statute" did not give rise to § 1983 action)). In addition, "providing false information to the police does not make a private individual a state actor and liable under § 1983" Baez v. JetBlue Airways, 745 F.Supp.2d 214, 221 (E.D.N.Y.2010).
Here, the Complaint fails to allege facts plausibly suggesting that Defendant Hinkle, who appears to have been in a relationship with Plaintiff, was a state actor for purposes of liability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Miller Ex v. Primo, 22-CV-0680, 2022 WL 16556060, at *7 (N.D.N.Y.Sept. 29, 2022) (Lovric, M.J.) (recommending dismissal of the plaintiffs claims against the defendant mother of his child because her alleged misuse of the state court system did not turn her into a state actor), report and recommendation adopted by 2022 WL 16551700 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2022) (Sannes, C.J.); Koziol, 2015 WL 2453481, at *11-12 (dismissing the plaintiffs claims against his ex-wife based on the plaintiffs allegations that she "abuse[d] joint custody rights" and filed "false claims" and "specious petitions"). As a result, I recommend that Plaintiffs claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Hinkle be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
B. Claims Against Defendant Endicott Police Department
"Although a municipality is subject to suit pursuant to section 1983, see Monell v. Dep 't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978), a municipal police department does not have the capacity to be sued as an entity separate from the municipality in which it is located." White v. Syracuse Police Dep't 18-CV-1471, 2019 WL 981850, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2019) (Peebles, M.J.) (citing Krug v. Cnty. of Rennselaer, 559 F.Supp.2d 223, 247 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (McAvoy, J.); Turczyn ex rel. McGregor v. City of Utica, 13-CV-1357, 2014 WL 6685476, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2014) (Sharpe, J.); Hoisington v. Cnty. of Sullivan, 55 F.Supp.2d 212, 214 (S.D.N.Y.1999) ("Under New York law, a department of a municipal entity is merely a subdivision of the municipality and has no separate legal existence. Therefore, municipal departments like the Department of Social Services are not amenable to suit and no claims lie directly against the Department.")), report and recommendation adopted by, 2019 WL 974824 (N.D.N.Y.Feb. 28, 2019) (Suddaby, C.J.). Thus, Defendant Endicott Police Department is not a proper party which would be amenable to suit.
Moreover, even if the Complaint is construed liberally as alleging claims against the Village of Endicott, I recommend that they be dismissed for the reasons set forth below in Part IV.C. of this Order and Report-Recommendation.
C. Claims Against Defendants Riegel and Jackson
Federal courts have "no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given." Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821). In Younger, the Supreme Court recognized a limited exception to this general rule, holding that federal courts should abstain from exercising jurisdiction over suits to enjoin pending state criminal proceedings, absent a showing of bad faith, harassment, or a patently invalid state statute. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53-54 (1971) (citation omitted).
Younger is not based on an Article III requirement, but instead is a "prudential limitation on the court's exercise of jurisdiction grounded in equitable considerations of comity." Spargo v. New York State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 351 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). The rationale behind Younger was set forth by the Second Circuit in Spargo:
Our Federalism in its ideal form, as the Supreme Court explained in Younger, strives towards a system in which there is sensitivity to the
legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States. In recognition of this balance of interests, Younger generally prohibits courts from taking jurisdiction over federal constitutional claims that involve or call into question ongoing state proceedings so as to avoid unnecessary friction. Giving states the first opportunity ... to correct their own mistakes when there is an ongoing state proceeding serves the vital purpose of reaffirm[ing] the competence of the state courts, and acknowledging the dignity of states as co-equal sovereigns in our federal system.Spargo, 351 F.3d at 75 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
To determine whether abstention is appropriate under Younger, district courts must conduct a three-pronged inquiry: "[a]bstention is mandatory where: (1) 'there is an ongoing state proceeding; (2) an important state interest is implicated; and (3) the plaintiff has an avenue open for review of constitutional claims in the state court.'" Glatzer v. Barone, 394 Fed.Appx. 763, 764 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Hurlbut, 585 F.3d 639, 647 (2d Cir. 2009)). The Supreme Court, however, has stressed that "[circumstances fitting within the Younger doctrine ... are 'exceptional'" and include only '"state criminal prosecutions,' 'civil enforcement proceedings,' and 'civil proceedings involving certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts' ability to perform their judicial functions.'" Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 73 (2013) (quoting New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 367-68 (1989)).
1. First Prong
Under Younger's first prong, "[n]ot only must state proceedings be pending[,] ... the proceedings must have been initiated 'before any proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place in the federal court.'" Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hurlbut, 585 F.3d 639, 647 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff 467 U.S. 229, 238 (1984)). Additionally, "a party . . . must exhaust his state appellate remedies before seeking relief in the District Court[.]" Glatzer v. Barone, 394 Fed.Appx. 763, 765 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 608, 610(1975)).
Here, based on the allegations contained in the Complaint and the supplemental filings, there is presently an ongoing state criminal proceeding against Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 8 at 2 [alleging that Plaintiff is currently facing "potential conviction" after being "erroneously . . . charg[ed] . . . with false domestic abuse"].) Thus, since Plaintiff "face[s a] pending proceeding[] before the state court, [that] proceeding[] . . . qualifies] as ongoing under Younger regardless of whether Plaintiff[] decide[s] to file an appeal." Pervu v. City of Oneonta, 19-CV-0861, 2020 WL 1643392, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2020) (D'Agostino, J.).
2. Second Prong
Younger's second prong, requiring that "an important state interest is implicated in that proceeding[,]" has also been met in the present matter. Diamond "D" Const. Corp. v. McGowan, 282 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Grieve v. Tamerin, 269 F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2001)). "[Determining whether a state interest is 'important' turns not on the narrow outcome of the particular state court proceeding at hand, but rather on the importance of the generic proceedings to the state." Homere v. Inc. Vill. of Hempstead, 322 F.Supp.3d 353, 367 (E.D.N.Y.2018) (citing New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 365 (1989); Grieve, 269 F.3d at 152).
"There is no question that [an] ongoing prosecution implicates important state interests." Davis v. Lansing, 851 F.2d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 1988).
3. Third Prong
Younger's third and final prong requires that "the state proceeding afford[ ] the federal plaintiff an adequate opportunity for judicial review of the federal constitutional claims." Diamond "D" Const. Corp., 282 F.3d at 198 (citing Grieve v. Tamerin, 269 F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2001)).
Here, should Plaintiff be convicted, he may raise his constitutional claims on direct appeal or through collateral review of his conviction in state court. See Tyson v. Clifford, 18-CV-1600, 2018 WL 6727538, at *4 (D. Conn. Dec. 21, 2018) (plaintiff "not precluded from challenging any subsequent conviction or sentence on appeal to the Connecticut Appellate and Supreme Courts, filing a habeas petition in the Connecticut Superior Court, and following that, a habeas petition in federal court"); Robinson v. Sposato, 11-CV-0191, 2012 WL 1965631, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.May 29, 2012) (direct appeal or collateral review provide "ample opportunity for review of petitioner's constitutional claim in state court"); Miller v. County of Nassau, 467 F.Supp.2d 308, 317 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (plaintiff can raise arguments on appeal once state court judgment enters).
4. Bad Faith Exceptions
Even when a case has met all three of Younger's prongs, "federal relief is obtainable[,] . . . where [] there is a showing of bad faith or harassment in bringing the or conducting the state proceeding." Wandyful Stadium, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, 959 F.Supp. 585, 591 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 50). "[F]or such a showing to be made, generally 'the party bringing the state action must have no reasonable expectation of obtaining a favorable outcome.'" Homere, 322 F.Supp.3d at 368 (quoting Cullen v. Fliegner, 18 F.3d 96, 103 (2d Cir. 1994)) (citation omitted); see also Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 126 n.6 (1975) (noting that bad faith under Younger "generally means a prosecution has been brought without a reasonable expectation of obtaining a valid conviction"). Furthermore, "[a] pattern of harassment both before and after institution of the state prosecution would be probative of the animus that attended the decision to prosecute." Colonial First Properties, LLC v. Henrico Cnty. Virginia, 166 F.Supp.2d 1070, 1087 n.12 (E.D. Va. 2001).
Here, Plaintiff fails to allege facts plausibly suggesting that Defendants brought the state proceedings in bath faith, i.e., with "no reasonable expectation of obtaining a favorable outcome." Cullen v. Fliegner, 18 F.3d 96, 103 (2d Cir. 1994).
Plaintiff appears to allege that he was not the aggressor during the domestic dispute with Defendant Hinkle on September 22, 2023, and that Defendant Riegel should have known that based on the injuries that Plaintiff sustained. (Dkt. No. 1 at 1-2.) Plaintiff also alleges that the criminal charges pending against him are based "on the false statements [o]f [D]efendant. . . Hinkle." (Dkt. No. 1 at 2.) However, these "allegations [of bad faith and harassment] are too conclusory and barebones to serve as the factual predicate for a plausible finding of bad faith." DeMartino v. New York State Dep 't of Labor, 167 F.Supp.3d 342, 355-56 (E.D.N.Y.2016); see Pervu, 2020 WL 1643392, at *7 (finding that the plaintiffs allegations that the defendants submitted misleading photographs to establish code violations in state court and the plaintiffs allegation that the state court judgment was jurisdictionally defective, were too conclusory to plausibly suggest bad faith for purposes of Younger abstention).
As a result, I recommend that the Court "abstain from exercising subject matter jurisdiction" over Plaintiffs claims. Wilson v. Emond, 373 Fed.Appx. 98, 100 (2d Cir. 2010).
Moreover, Plaintiffs request for compensatory damages may be barred by the doctrine set forth in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Supreme Court held that a Section 1983 action seeking money damages is not cognizable if a decision in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily invalidate a criminal conviction, unless that "conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal . . ., or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus[.]" Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 (internal citation omitted).
V. OPPORTUNITY TO AMEND
Generally, a court should not dismiss claims contained in a complaint filed by a pro se litigant without granting leave to amend at least once "when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated." Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 704-05 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) ("The court should freely give leave when justice so requires."). An opportunity to amend is not required, however, where "the problem with [the plaintiffs] causes of action is substantive" such that "better pleading will not cure it." Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Cortec Indus. Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1991) ("Of course, where a plaintiff is unable to allege any fact sufficient to support its claim, a complaint should be dismissed with prejudice."). Stated differently, "[w]here it appears that granting leave to amend is unlikely to be productive, ... it is not an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend." Ruffolo v. Oppenheimer & Co., 987 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1993); accord, Brown v. Peters, 95-CV-1641, 1997 WL 599355, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1997) (Pooler, J.).
See also Carris v. First Student, Inc., 132 F.Supp.3d 321, 340-41 n.1 (N.D.N.Y. 2015) (Suddaby, C.J.) (explaining that the standard set forth in Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1999)-that the Court should grant leave to amend "unless the court can rule out any possibility, however unlikely it might be, that an amended complaint would be successful in stating a claim"-is likely not an accurate recitation of the governing law after Bell All Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)), rev'd on other grounds, 682 Fed.Appx. 30.
Although I have serious doubts about whether Plaintiff can amend to assert an actionable claim, given that this is Plaintiffs initial complaint and out of an abundance of caution, I recommend that Plaintiff be permitted to amend his Complaint.
If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, he should note that the law in this circuit clearly provides that '"complaints relying on the civil rights statutes are insufficient unless they contain some specific allegations of fact indicating a deprivation of rights, instead of a litany of general conclusions that shock but have no meaning.'" Hunt v. Budd, 895 F.Supp. 35, 38 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (McAvoy, J.) (quoting Barr v. Abrams, 810 F.2d 358, 363 (2d Cir. 1987)); accord Pourzancvakil v. Humphry, 94-CV-1594, 1995 WL 316935, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. May 22, 1995) (Pooler, J.). Therefore, in any amended complaint, Plaintiff must clearly set forth facts that give rise to the claims, including the dates, times, and places of the alleged underlying acts, and each individual who committed each alleged wrongful act. In addition, the revised pleading should allege facts demonstrating the specific involvement of any of the named defendants in the constitutional deprivations alleged in sufficient detail to establish that they were tangibly connected to those deprivations. Bass v. Jackson, 790 F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 1986). Finally, Plaintiff is informed that any such amended complaint will replace the existing Complaint, and must be a wholly integrated and complete pleading that does not rely upon or incorporate by reference any pleading or document previously filed with the Court. See Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994) ("It is well established that an amended complaint ordinarily supersedes the original and renders it of no legal effect.").
VI. MOTION FOR AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Based on the recommendations set forth above that Plaintiffs Complaint be dismissed in its entirety, I recommend that Plaintiffs motion for an order to show cause for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction (Dkt. No. 4) be denied because Plaintiff is unable to demonstrate "(1) either (a) a likelihood of success on the merits or (b) sufficiently serious question going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of the hardships tipping decidedly in the movant's favor, and (2) irreparable harm in the absence of the injunction." Faiveley Transport Mahno AB v. Wabtec Corp., 559 F.3d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
VII. MOTION FOR SUBMISSION OF SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT AND LETTER MOTION
As set forth above, the undersigned liberally construed Plaintiffs Complaint as including the factual allegations set forth in Dkt. Nos. 7 and 8. To the extent that those submissions seek additional relief, those requests are denied for the reasons set forth herein.
VIII. MOTION TO OBTAIN ECF LOGIN
Although Plaintiff filed a pro se motion to obtain an ECF login and password, he failed to sign the Pro Se CM/ECF registration form. (Dkt. No. 9 at 4.) As a result, Plaintiffs motion is denied without prejudice. (Dkt. No. 9.)
ACCORDINGLY, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiffs application to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. No. 2) is GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiffs motion to obtain an ECF login (Dkt. No. 9) is DENIED without prejudice; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiffs motion for submission of a supplemental affidavit (Dkt. No. 7) and letter motion (Dkt. No. 8) are GRANTED to the extent that the undersigned considered the factual allegations contained therein but DENIED to the extent that those submissions sought any additional relief; and it is further respectfully
RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD Plaintiffs Complaint (Dkt. No. 1); and it is further respectfully
RECOMMENDED that the Court DENY Plaintiffs motion for an order to show cause for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction (Dkt. No. 4); and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall file a copy of this order, report, and recommendation on the docket of this case and serve a copy upon the parties in accordance with the local rules.
The Clerk shall also provide Plaintiff with copies of all unreported decisions cited herein in accordance with Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
NOTICE: Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (Supp 2013); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), 6(d), 72; Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec 'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)).
If you are proceeding pro se and served with this report, recommendation, and order by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date that the report, recommendation, and order was mailed to you to serve and file objections. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a)(1)(C).