Opinion
No. FA06 4006029-S
February 11, 2009
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
On December 9, 2008, the court ordered the parties to submit briefs addressing whether Judge Petroni's order of May 29, 2008, opening the earlier default judgment entered against the defendant allows a new trial as to all financial issues and whether Judge Petroni may preside over the new trial.
The parties submitted briefs as requested. The court finds a new trial shall involve all financial issues and Judge Petroni shall not preside over the new trial pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 51-183c.
An examination of the relevant statutory and Practice Book provisions belies the plaintiff's contention that the order was only intended to open the default judgment for the purpose of determining whether the plaintiff committed fraud by misrepresenting to the court the value of one of the parties' properties subject to distribution in this proceeding. General Statutes § 52-212 provides in relevant part: "Opening judgment upon default or nonsuit. (a) Any judgment rendered or decree passed upon a default or nonsuit in the Superior Court may be set aside, within four months following the date on which it was rendered or passed, and the case reinstated on the docket . . . upon the complaint or written motion of any party or person prejudiced thereby, showing reasonable cause, or that a good cause of action or defense in whole or in part existed at the time of the rendition of the judgment or the passage of the decree, and that the plaintiff or defendant was prevented by mistake, accident or other reasonable cause from prosecuting the action or making the defense . . ."
Similarly, Practice Book § 17-43 provides in relevant part: "Opening Judgment upon Default or Nonsuit. (a) Any judgment rendered or decree passed upon a default or nonsuit may be set aside within four months succeeding the date on which notice was sent, and the case reinstated on the docket . . . upon the written motion of any party or person prejudiced thereby, showing reasonable cause, or that a good cause of action or defense in whole or in part existed at the time of the rendition of such judgment or the passage of such decree, and that the plaintiff or the defendant was prevented by mistake, accident or other reasonable cause from prosecuting or appearing to make the same . . ."
These provisions have been interpreted to mean that in order for a party "to obtain relief from a judgment rendered after a default, two things must concur. There must be a showing that (1) a good defense, the nature of which must be set forth, existed at the time judgment was rendered, and (2) the party seeking to set aside the judgment was prevented from making that defense because of mistake, accident or other reasonable cause . . . Since the conjunctive `and' meaning `in addition to' is employed between the parts of the two-prong test, both tests must be met." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Berzins v. Berzins, 105 Conn.App. 648, 653-54, 938 A.2d 1281, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 932, 958 A.2d 156 (2008).
Thus, simply put, the order in the present case could not have opened the default judgment merely for the purpose of determining whether the plaintiff was guilty of fraud, because the finding of a valid defense in the previous action — in this instance, the misrepresentation of the value of one of the marital properties, either attributable to fraud or mistake — was a prerequisite to the opening of the judgment. In other words, if Judge Petroni questioned whether fraud (or mistake) had contributed to the outcome of the default judgment entered against the defendant, he could not have opened judgment at all, because prong one of the test stated in Berzins would not have been satisfied.
The actual language of the order bolsters this conclusion. It makes clear that Judge Petroni determined that the two-part test articulated in Berzins was satisfied. The court found that part one of the test — the existence of a good defense at the time judgment was entered — was satisfied: "The defendant has proved by clear and convincing evidence that the plaintiff's value of $443,000 on his 17 Hemingway Street property and the $220,000 for his Pine Orchard property in Branford, shown on his sworn financial affidavit to be worth $443,000 and $220,000 respectively, and confirmed in his testimony at the July 25, 2007 hearing, was either a misrepresentation of fact or a mistake, and there is a substantial likelihood that a new trial would produce a different result." Elsewhere, and also relevant, the order states: "The court finds the plaintiff has misrepresented to the court the value of the 17 Hemingway [Street] property to be $443,000, basing it on the assessed value of this property rather than the current market value.
Nothing in the order suggests the default judgment was opened merely for the purpose of determining whether the plaintiff committed fraud by misrepresenting the value of the 17 Hemingway Street property. Rather, the order simply concludes by stating that "the defendant's motion to open and vacate the default judgment is granted and a new hearing is ordered," and the parties were instructed to obtain appraisals of all four marital properties within ninety days. The defendant was ordered to obtain them for the Florida properties and the plaintiff for the Connecticut properties.
The Court's Property Distribution Power In Dissolution Proceedings And The Mosaic Doctrine
The defendant argues that because of what has become known as the mosaic doctrine, the court must address all financial orders once again, now that the original default judgment has been opened and vacated. Again, the plaintiff maintains that the only question that needs to be answered at this stage is whether his submission of the appraisal of the 17 Hemingway Street property at the July 25, 2007 hearing constituted fraud.
"The Superior Court derives its jurisdiction or authority to hear family cases from General Statutes § 46b-1. It is within the context of General Statutes § 46b-81 that it enters orders regarding the division of property or assets, which is commonly referred to as `equitable division.' The model for exercising this jurisdiction is called the `all property' method, that is, it is within the power of the court to award property to either or both spouses, irrespective of title, regardless of type. Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn. 783, 792, [ 663 A.2d 365] (1995). In the exercise of its jurisdiction, the court must consider certain factors, including age, health, income, estate, etc. of each party, although it is not necessary that the court accord equal weight to each factor. Valente v. Valente, 180 Conn. 528, 530-31, [ 429 A.2d 964] (1980). `The purpose of a property division pursuant to a dissolution proceeding is to unscramble existing marital property in order to give each spouse his or her equitable share at the time of dissolution.' Smith v. Smith, 249 Conn. 265, 275, [ 752 A.2d 1023] (1999). ([E]mphasis added.) In fact, `the court's authority to divide the . . . property of the parties, pursuant to § 46b-81, must be exercised, if at all, at the time that it renders judgment dissolving the marriage.' Rathblott v. Rathblott, 79 Conn.App. 812, 819-20, [ 832 A.2d 90] (2003). The court's decision is considered an integrated whole as far as income and assets are concerned, and it has often been referred to as a `carefully crafted mosaic.' Ehrenkranz v. Ehrenkranz, 2 Conn.App. 416, 424, [ 479 A.2d 826] (1984). Thus in order for the court to carry out an equitable division, it is essential that there be a full and fair disclosure of the kind and value of all of their property by each of the parties. Billington v. Billington, 220 Conn. 212, 220, [ 595 A.2d 1377] (1991)." Reville v. Reville, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford, Docket No. FA 00 0176333 (June 10, 2008, Shay, J.) (45 Conn. L. Rptr 742, 745).
Generally, because "[t]he rendering of a judgment in a complicated dissolution case is a carefully crafted mosaic, each element of which may be dependent on the other;" Ehrenkranz v. Ehrenkranz, supra, 2 Conn.App. 424; when a portion of a trial court's financial order in a dissolution proceeding is overturned on appeal, all aspects of the financial order must be readdressed by the trial court. See, e.g., Sunbury v. Sunbury, 210 Conn. 170, 173-75, 553 A.2d 612 (1989). This rule has, understandably, been applied by several trial courts in dissolution proceedings when an earlier judgment has been opened to adjust some aspect of the financial order. See, e.g., Tavers-Doram v. Doram, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. FA 04 4002471 (October 3, 2006, Frazzini, J.); Deciantis v. Deciantis, Superior Court, judicial district of New London at Norwich, Docket No. 97331 (May 17, 1993, Teller, J.).
The court finds that the new trial shall involve all financial issues of the parties. The parties are instructed to contact caseflow to schedule a new hearing date.