Opinion
Civil Action 92-cv-00055-NYW-MEH
08-11-2022
AKEEM ABDUL MAKIN, and JAHAD ALI, Plaintiffs, v. FRANK O. GUNTER, Colorado Department of Corrections, Executive Director, in his official capacity, FRUNK GUNTER, individually, JIM BRITTAIN, in his official and individual capacities, and REX WORLEY, in his official and individual capacities, Defendants.
RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
MICHAEL E. HEGARTY, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Jahad Ali (“Plaintiff”) filed a letter to the “Hon. Craig Shaffer” which has been construed as a motion (“Motion”). ECF 95. In the Motion, Plaintiff essentially asks “Judge Shaffer” to enforce the settlement agreement reached in this case and “penalize DOC $10,000 per day that they have violated [his] rights.” Id. at 2. District Judge Nina Y. Wang referred the Motion to the undersigned for a recommendation. ECF 98. Although no response has been filed, the Court finds that further briefing would not materially assist in the Motion's adjudication. See D.C.Colo.LCivR 7.1(d) (“Nothing in this rule precludes a judicial officer from ruling on a motion at any time after it is filed.'). Further, the Court finds that oral argument would not materially assist in its adjudication. For the following reasons, the Court respectfully recommends denying Plaintiff's Motion.
I. Background
This is an old case. Plaintiffs initiated it on January 13, 1992. ECF 1. As relevant here, on February 16, 1993, District Judge Edward W. Nottingham granted a motion to dismiss and dismissed the case with prejudice. ECF 69. Although the docket does not fully explain why, on June 6, 1993, District Judge Nottingham granted another motion to dismiss based on a notice of settlement. ECF 74. Over the next several years, Plaintiffs filed various motions to reopen the case, including one attempt to reopen so as to find Defendants “in breach of contract.” ECF 79. All motions to reopen were denied. ECF 78; ECF 81. Then, nine years later, Plaintiff filed a “Motion of Enforcement of Release and Settlement.” ECF 82. District Judge Nottingham referred the motion to Magistrate Judge O. E. Schlatter (ECF 83), but upon his retirement, the motion was referred to the undersigned (ECF 86). This Court issued an order to show cause returnable by Plaintiff for why the motion should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. ECF 88. Plaintiff filed a response to order to show cause. ECF 91.
The Court ultimately issued a recommendation to deny the motion. ECF 93. The brief discussion section of that recommendation provides helpful context for this Court's analysis:
In the Motion, the Plaintiff indicates that he entered into a release and settlement agreement with the Defendants on May 7, 1993. The docket indicates that dismissal was granted on or about June 6, 1993 (Docket #74). Plaintiff has failed to indicate in the Motion an intent by the parties that this Court retain jurisdiction in this matter, and there is no evidence in the record that the Court has done so. In fact, the record evidences that co-Plaintiff Akeem Abdul Makin attempted to reopen this case to enforce the settlement as it concerned him, and the request was denied based on a lack of jurisdiction (Dockets #80 and #81). Accordingly, on March 10, 2006, the Plaintiff was ordered to show cause why the Motion should not be dismissed (Docket #88). The Plaintiff filed his response on March 20, 2006 (Docket #91), but in the response he fails to establish that jurisdiction was in any way retained by this Court.
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A district court does not have ancillary jurisdiction to enforce settlement agreements once the case has been dismissed and absent any contrary language in
the order dismissing the case. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 380-82 (1994) (once parties have settled and the district court has dismissed the case, the district court does not have ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the parties' settlement agreement) (cited in Morris v. City of Hobart, 39 F.3d 1105, 1110 (10th Cir. 1994)).ECF 93 at 2-3. Following that analysis, the Court found that it did not have jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement and recommended denying the motion. Id. at 3. Plaintiff filed no objection. District Judge Nottingham accepted the recommendation. ECF 94.
After a twelve-year hibernation, this case has come back to life with the filing of Plaintiff's current Motion. ECF 95. He begins his Motion by explaining that his request “pertains to a settlement agreement that was over [sic] First Amendment rights to freedom of religion and legal name change.” Id. at 1. He claims that he “has experienced violations of the settlement agreement by DOC by not allowing his mail to be delivered to him.” Id. As the Court already mentioned, Plaintiff asks the Court to “find[] that DOC is in the wrong and in violation of the settlement agreement.” Id. at 2. He requests an award of $10,000 per day. Id. The Court construes the Motion as a request to enforce the settlement agreement in this case.
II. Analysis
Through multiple, formal rulings, Plaintiff has been advised that this Court lacks jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement. This most recently occurred in 2006. The legal analysis underpinning that decision has not changed. Generally, “once the parties to a lawsuit have settled and the district court has dismissed the case, the district court does not have ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the parties' settlement agreement.” Morris v. City of Hobart, 39 F.3d 1105, 1110 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (1994)). However, a court can “retain jurisdiction over a settlement agreement if the order of dismissal shows an intent to retain jurisdiction or incorporates the settlement agreement.” Id. Also, a court “retains jurisdiction to enforce consent decrees.” Floyd v. Ortiz, 300 F.3d 1223, 1226 (2002). Here, the parties did not enter into a consent decree, and no order of dismissal incorporated the parties' settlement agreement. ECF 93 at 2 (“[T]here is no evidence in the record that the Court has [retained jurisdiction].”). Further, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the order of dismissal “conditioned] the dismissal on compliance with the settlement agreement.” Morris, 39 F.3d at 1110. Therefore, the Court does not have continuing jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement.
The Court also notes that the docket indicates that District Judge Nottingham dismissed this case with prejudice. ECF 69. To the extent Plaintiff seeks to reassert claims in this case (as opposed to enforce the settlement agreement), Plaintiff likely is precluded from doing so. Cf. Carbajal v. Keefer, 51 F.Supp.3d 1065, 1069 n.3 (D. Colo. 2014) (“[A] dismissal without prejudice does not have preclusive effect because it is not a determination on the merits.”) (emphasis added).
III. Conclusion
Judges presiding over Plaintiff's case have repeatedly informed him that the court does not have jurisdiction to enforce his settlement agreement. Although many years have passed, that legal analysis has not changed. For the reasons explained in this Recommendation, the Court respectfully recommends that Plaintiff's Motion [filed August 1, 2022; ECF 95] be denied.[
Be advised that all parties shall have fourteen (14) days after service hereof to serve and file any written objections in order to obtain reconsideration by the District Judge to whom this case is assigned. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72. The party filing objections must specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which the objections are being made. The District Court need not consider frivolous, conclusive or general objections. A party's failure to file such written objections to proposed findings and recommendations contained in this report may bar the party from a de novo determination by the District Judge of the proposed findings and recommendations. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676-83 (1980); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Additionally, the failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy may bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge that are accepted or adopted by the District Court. Duffield v. Jackson, 545 F.3d 1234, 1237 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991)).
Respectfully submitted this 11th day of August, 2022, at Denver, Colorado.