Opinion
No. K09-CP06-010409-A
May 5, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
On Friday, May 2, 2008, the assistant attorney general, the current department of children and families ("DCF") worker assigned to the family and the attorney for the child appeared before the court. The father, who previously had been defaulted at the regional Superior Court for Juvenile Matters, did not appear for the trial. The guardian ad litem also did not appear, but such guardian communicated her position in favor of termination and adoption through the attorney for Makenzie M. ("Makenzie").
Prior to May 2, 2008, the mother had decided to offer her written consent to the termination of her parental rights. On Friday, May 2, 2008, the mother in fact offered her consent at the Child Protection Session at Middletown to the termination of her parental rights to Makenzie, and after she was canvassed, the court (Bear, J.), found such consent to be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made by the mother, and the court accepted such consent. With respect to the mother, upon the motion of the assistant attorney general, the court permitted the ("DCF") to amend its petition to add the ground of consent, and also permitted DCF to withdraw the non-consensual TPR grounds set forth in its petition.
The court also finds that the mother's consent was made with the adequate advice and the effective assistance of her counsel.
The trial then proceeded with respect to the issue of whether the father's parental rights should or should not be terminated and to the question of whether termination of each parent's parental rights was in the best interest of Makenzie.
FACTS
Each of the following facts is found by clear and convincing evidence.
1. On July 17, 2006, DCF filed a petition alleging that Makenzie was neglected and obtained an ex parte order of temporary custody of Makenzie. On that date the mother was the sole custodial parent of Makenzie.
2. On July 21, 2006, the court sustained the order of temporary custody in favor of DCF.
3. Rather than work toward reunification, the mother then went to reside in Michigan for several months. The father also remained outside the state of Connecticut.
4. On May 21, 2007, the neglect trial was scheduled.
5. The father told the current DCF worker that he would be present for the trial and that he wanted to visit with Makenzie. DCF arranged for accommodations for the father in a hotel across from the court. However, the father did not appear for the neglect trial. The mother also did not appear.
6. On May 21, 2007, the court adjudicated Makenzie neglected and committed her to the care, custody and guardianship of DCF.
7. On May 21, 2007, the court determined that further reunification efforts by DCF with each parent were no longer required.
8. On July 23, 2007, DCF filed its petition for the termination of each parent's parental rights.
9. In its TPR petition DCF alleged that
A. in violation of General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(A) the father abandoned Makenzie in the sense that he failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to her welfare; and
B. in violation of General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(D) there was no ongoing parent-child relationship, which means the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of Makenzie.
CT Page 7525
10. The father is thirty years old.
11. The father reported the following.
[The father] stated he attended school through tenth grade, and then began working. He also reported he was permanently disabled while working. [The father] reported he has several children with different women, and he first became a father at age sixteen. He stated he does not have relationships with some of his children, and he blamed their mother. [The father] had child protective services involvement in Connecticut in regard to his older children. [The father] admitted to having child protective services involvement in Maine when he was married to his wife, L___.
[The father] reported he was only involved with [the mother] for one month. When Makenzie was in foster care from age four to five, Maine documents indicated that [the father] had only seen Makenzie twice since she was born, on a Thanksgiving day and a Christmas day. The record also states he was inconsistent with visitation. Maine records did confirm paternity in regard to [the father] and Makenzie.
(Exhibit 1, 6.)12. The child protective services records concerning the father included the following.
In regard to [the father], records from services indicate concerns regarding neglect substantiations, inadequate supervision and living environment, emotional abuse, physical abuse, alcohol abuse, domestic violence, impulse control, and transience. Maine records note he has at least one assault conviction. [The mother] reported he has had problems with substance abuse, physical aggression, and Bipolar Disorder. Connecticut DCP records indicate [the father] had a problem with substance abuse. [The mother] stated her relationship with father was verbally abusive, but she denied any domestic violence. [The mother] reported [the father] had been incarcerated for domestic violence incidents that involved other women with whom he has had children.
Id., 6-7.
13. The current worker set forth her contacts with the father prior to July 19, 2007.
This worker spoke with [the father] via telephone on three occasions from March to May 2007. The last conversation I had with [the father] took place on May 17, 2007. He stated he was coming to Connecticut on 5/20/07, and he intended to begin participation in the Court process and visit with Makenzie. We had discussed an Interstate Compact Assessment, mental health and substance abuse evaluations, as well as parenting classes and a home evaluation. [The father] did not arrive at Court on 5/21/07, and he has not communicated with this worker to date.
Id., 7.
14. The paternal grandparents stated to the current DCF worker that they were unable to care for Makenzie, and that they supported placement of Makenzie with an adoptive family. Id., 10.
15. Because the father had not maintained contact with DCF, it has been unable to provide him with services or to learn what services he has provided for himself. Id., 11.
16. Additional facts are set forth on pages 6-12, infra. Unless otherwise specified, all facts set forth in this decision are found by clear and convincing evidence.
LAW APPLICABLE TO TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS CASES
The law applicable to this case is generally set forth in In re Marcus S., 2008 Ct.Sup. 3329, No. H12-CP07-012714-B, Superior Court, Judicial District of Middlesex, Child Protection Session at Middletown (Bear, J., February 29, 2008); in such recent cases as In re Davonta V., 285 Conn. 483 (2008) and In re Joseph L., 105 Conn.App. 515, 939 A.2d 16 (2008); and in In re Jessica M., 217 Conn. 459, 467-70, 586 A.2d 597 (1991).
CT Page 7527
GENERAL STATUTES § 17A-112(k) FINDINGS
The court has made findings earlier in this decision, some of which relate to the seven statutory factors applicable to the father. See pages 1-4, supra. In addition to those findings, the court makes the following findings applicable to the father.1. The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and each child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of each child with the parent.
A. The father
The father has made it impossible for DCF to determine whether to offer services to him, and, if so, what services should have been offered.
B. Makenzie has been offered and has received the following services from or facilitated by DCF, inter alia
medical and dental services plus an MDE;
reunification services; transportation;
foster care services;
educational, evaluative and therapeutic services; and
administrative and case management services.
2. Whether DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended.
DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family.
Given the father's lack of interest in and effort to become involved with Makenzie, DCF was unable to provide services to the father. The reasonable efforts made and facilitated by DCF with respect to services for Makenzie were timely and adequate to address the issues that led to DCF involvement with her and continued or arose after such DCF involvement.
3. The terms of an applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order(s).
On May 21, 2007, the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters made the finding that it was not appropriate to reunify the child with father. See General Statutes § 17a-111b.
(a) The Commissioner of Children and Families shall make reasonable efforts to reunify a parent with a child unless the court (1) determines that such efforts are not required pursuant to subsection (b) of this section or subsection (j) of section 17a-112, or (2) has approved a permanency plan other than reunification pursuant to subsection (k) of section 46b-129.
(b) The Commissioner of Children and Families or any other party may, at any time, file a motion with the court for a determination that reasonable efforts to reunify the parent with the child are not required. The court shall hold an evidentiary hearing on the motion not later than thirty days after the filing of the motion or may consolidate the hearing with a trial on a petition to terminate parental rights pursuant to section 17a-112. The court may determine that such efforts are not required if the court finds upon clear and convincing evidence has subjected the child to the following aggravated circumstances: (A) The child has been abandoned, as defined in subsection (j) of section 17a-112 . . .4. The feelings and emotional ties of each child with respect to his or her parents, any guardian of the person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties.
Makenzie has no positive memories of her father. Id., 22. Because of her past experience with her father, Makenzie initially wished to be placed with a one-parent family without a father. (Testimony of current worker.)
Such worker stated that Makenzie has made great progress in the at risk pre-adoptive home in which she was placed approximately four one-half months prior to the trial, but work is continuing with respect to Makenzie's issues and needs.
5. The age of each child.
Makenzie is eight (but almost nine) years old.
6. The efforts each parent has made to adjust his or her circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interests of the children to return home in the foreseeable future.
Unfortunately, as set forth throughout this memorandum of decision and in the evidence, the father has been able to adjust his circumstances, conduct or conditions to enable him to have contact with Makenzie and to make it in the best interest of Makenzie to have contact with him in the foreseeable future.
7. The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the children by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the children, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.
There was no evidence presented that the father has been prevented from maintaining a relationship with Makenzie for any reasons other than his personal choice.
The father did not provide specific information concerning his current or past economic circumstances.
WITH RESPECT TO THE FATHER OF MAKENZIE, DCF HAS PROVED, BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, THE GROUND A AND D ALLEGATIONS OF ITS TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS PETITIONS.
The court finds that DCF has alleged and proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that
(1) this court has jurisdiction over the matter and the parties;
(2) on May 21, 2007, Makenzie was previously adjudicated neglected and she was committed to the care, custody and guardianship of DCF;
(3) prior to filing its termination petition, DCF made reasonable efforts to reunify the mother with Makenzie through offers of and provision of services, but the father did not make himself available for the provision of services;
(4) on May 21, 2007, the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters found that it was not appropriate for DCF to continue to make reasonable efforts to reunify Makenzie with the father or the mother;
See General Statutes § 17a-112(j).
The Superior Court, upon notice and hearing as provided in sections 45a-716 and 45a-717, may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent in accordance with subsection (a) of section 17a-111b, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, except that such finding is not required if the court has determined at a hearing pursuant to section 17a-111b, or determines at trial on the petition, that such efforts are not required . . .
(5) Makenzie has been abandoned by the father in the sense that he has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to her welfare;
(6) there is no ongoing parent-child relationship between the father and Makenzie, which means the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of Makenzie.
General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3) sets forth grounds A and D as follows.
. . . (A) the child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child . . . (D) there is no ongoing parent-child relationship, which means the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child . . .
THE BEST INTEREST OF MAKENZIE
The court has considered the best interest of Makenzie. The court has considered whether it is in the best interest of Makenzie to be returned to the mother or to begin contact with the father, including whether the mother or the father reasonably could be expected and relied upon to provide the safe, secure, nurturing, stable and permanent environment idealized in the statutes and case law, and the court has considered Makenzie's ". . . interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, and continuity and stability of its environment . . ." In re Ryan R., 102 Conn.App. 608, 625-26 (2007). Unfortunately for Makenzie, each parent has been and currently is unable to provide her such safe, secure, nurturing, stable and permanent environment. On the other hand, in the care of the pre-adoptive parents, Makenzie has made progress in school and in addressing the issues that have arisen because of the multiple placements and other chaotic and negative aspects of her prior life.
The court has considered, inter alia, the evidence presented concerning Makenzie's past situation and circumstances; the mother's and the father's situations and circumstances at the time of and prior to Makenzie's removal by DCF on July 17, 2006, and then prior to the filing of the TPR petition on July 23, 2007; the length of time Makenzie has been out of the mother's care, custody and control and in foster care; the father's lack of contact with or demonstrated interest in Makenzie; the father's and the mother's general lack of provision for Makenzie's care or support for her at any recent material period; Makenzie's current situation, needs and circumstances; and the reports of Makenzie's growth, progress, stability, continuity and development in foster care and with the services provided by DCF. Although Makenzie's guardian ad litem was not present, she reported through the attorney for Makenzie that she supported the DCF plan of TPR and adoption.
The court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of Makenzie and that it is necessary for her well-being, growth, development, safety, security, stability, continuity, consistency and permanency, that the rights of the father and the mother be terminated.
CONCLUSION AND ORDERS
Having considered the evidence and the statutory, Practice Book and case law requirements, the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence.
(a) the mother, with adequate advice from and effective assistance of counsel, consented to the termination of her parental rights;
(b) DCF proved by clear and convincing evidence that (a) Makenzie has been abandoned by the father in the sense that he has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to her welfare; and (b) there is no ongoing parent-child relationship between the father and Makenzie, which means the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of Makenzie; and
(c) it is in the best interest of Makenzie to terminate the parental rights of the mother and the father.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the parental rights of the mother and the father to Makenzie are hereby terminated.
The commissioner of the department of children and families is appointed as the statutory parent of Makenzie. The initial status report concerning Makenzie shall be submitted, as required, within thirty days hereof. Quarterly reports and annual permanency plans shall be submitted as required in accordance with statutory requirements.
General Statutes 17a-112(o) provides
(o) In the case where termination of parental rights is granted, the guardian of the person or statutory parent shall report to the court not later than thirty days after the date judgment is entered on a case plan, as defined by the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, for the child which shall include measurable objectives and time schedules. At least every three months thereafter, such guardian or statutory parent shall make a report to the court on the progress made on implementation of the plan. The court may convene a hearing upon the filing of a report and shall convene and conduct a permanency hearing pursuant to subsection (k) of section 46b-129 for the purpose of reviewing the permanency plan for the child no more than twelve months from the date judgment is entered or from the date of the last permanency hearing held pursuant to subsection (k) of section 46b-129, whichever is earlier, and at least once a year thereafter while the child remains in the custody of the Commissioner of Children and Families. For children where the commissioner has determined that adoption is appropriate, the report on the implementation of the plan shall include a description of the reasonable efforts the department is taking to promote and expedite the adoptive placement and to finalize the adoption of the child, including documentation of child specific recruitment efforts. At such hearing, the court shall determine whether the department has made reasonable efforts to achieve the permanency plan. If the court determines that the department has not made reasonable efforts to place a child in an adoptive placement or that reasonable efforts have not resulted in the placement of the child, the court may order the Department of Children and Families, within available appropriations, to contract with a child-placing agency to arrange for the adoption of the child. The department, as statutory parent, shall continue to provide care and services for the child while a child-placing agency is arranging for the adoption of the child.
Judgment shall enter accordingly.