Major v. General Motors Corporation

6 Citing cases

  1. Bossone v. General Electric Company

    185 A.D.2d 504 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992)   Cited 3 times

    There should be an affirmance. Initially, we note our agreement with defendant that certain responses contained in the bill of particulars served by plaintiffs were overly vague and conclusory (see, Major v. General Motors Corp., 126 A.D.2d 521, 522). It is undisputed, however, that plaintiffs included with their papers in opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment a supplemental bill of particulars which, in our view, adequately cured the deficiencies claimed by defendant (cf., Greystone in Westchester Coop. No. 1 v. All Boro Paving Corp., 108 A.D.2d 720, 722). The brief delay in furnishing the supplemental bill of particulars until approximately one month after the deadline set by Supreme Court was within the court's discretion to excuse in consideration of the attempt by plaintiffs' counsel to comply with the court's conditional order, the absence of any showing by defendant of prejudice and the public policy in favor of resolving cases on their merits (see, Caggiano v. Ross, 130 A.D.2d 538, 539; Knapek v. MV Southwest Cape, 110 A.D.2d 928, 931).

  2. Downing v. Snowbird Ski Shop, Inc.

    175 A.D.2d 233 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)

    In opposition to the defendants' motion, the plaintiff argued, inter alia, that she did not have the knowledge needed to frame a proper response to several of these items. On the other hand, the defendants concede that the amended response to item 25 is adequate. Under these and all the circumstances of this case, we believe that no prejudice would be suffered by the defendants if the plaintiff were allowed to postpone serving a more detailed response to items 5, 18, 19 and 21, until after the completion of discovery (cf., Major v General Motors Corp., 126 A.D.2d 521; Pole v Frame Chevrolet, 126 A.D.2d 531). We also direct that the plaintiff not be permitted to place her action on the trial calendar until at least 60 days following the service of a further bill of particulars, in order to permit the defendants, if they deem it appropriate, to make a renewed motion to preclude.

  3. Valentine v. Armor Elevator Company, Inc.

    155 A.D.2d 597 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989)   Cited 9 times

    or Elevator Company, Inc., payable by the plaintiff. It is well settled that a bill of particulars has as its purpose the amplification of the pleadings, the limitation of proof and the prevention of surprise at trial (see, Hyman Gilbert v Greenstein, 138 A.D.2d 678; Paldino v E.J. Korvettes, Inc., 65 A.D.2d 617). The record in the instant case reveals that, despite numerous orders directing the plaintiff to serve specific responses to the demands of the defendant Armor Elevator Company, Inc. (hereinafter Armor), the plaintiff repeatedly served bills of particulars which failed to specify and limit the particular acts of Armor's alleged negligence and failed to identify the elevator in which the plaintiff was injured as well as the specific mechanisms of the elevator which she alleged to be defective. Under these circumstances, the bills of particulars were vague, conclusory and overbroad (see, Ferrigno v General Motors Corp., 134 A.D.2d 479; Pole v Frame Chevrolet, 126 A.D.2d 531; Major v General Motors Corp., 126 A.D.2d 521). Moreover, while the plaintiff gave some indication that she would rely upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the pleadings clearly demonstrate that she did not intend to rely solely on that theory of liability.

  4. Ferrigno v. General Motors Corporation

    134 A.D.2d 479 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987)   Cited 16 times

    Additionally, with respect to the "braking system", the plaintiffs listed various parts of the wheel which were purportedly defective. These responses are "`overly broad and conclusory and fail to adequately inform [GM] of the alleged defects in the subject automobile'" (Major v. General Motors Corp., 126 A.D.2d 521, 522, quoting from Scottv General Motors Corp., supra, at 662; see, Pole v. Frame Chevrolet, 126 A.D.2d 531, 532; Gausney v. General Motors Corp., supra; Moore v. Chrysler Corp., supra). Moreover, the plaintiffs' general statements as to GM's alleged negligence "do not adequately particularize the specific acts of negligence which precipitated the purported defective condition" (Major v. General Motors Corp., supra, at 522; see, Pole v. Frame Chevrolet, supra, at 532; Scott v. General Motors Corp., supra; Moore v Chrysler Corp., supra; Paldino v. E.J. Korvettes, Inc., supra).

  5. Pole v. Frame Chevrolet, Inc.

    126 A.D.2d 531 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987)   Cited 8 times

    In response to GM's demand for specification of the allegedly defective parts of the plaintiff's automobile, the plaintiff and Frame each averred that the "[d]ifferential housing flange, axle housing, axle tubing and axle shaft" were defective. We find that this response is "overly broad and conclusory and fail[s] to adequately inform [GM] of the alleged defects in the subject automobile" (Scott v. General Motors Corp., 117 A.D.2d 662; see, Major v. General Motors Corp., 126 A.D.2d 521 [decided herewith]; Gausney v. General Motors Corp., 115 A.D.2d 455, 456; Moore v Chrysler Corp., 100 A.D.2d 955). Moreover, the plaintiff's allegation as to the alleged negligent acts which precipitated the foregoing defects, to wit, that "[the] axle should have been designed to carry bending loads", does not sufficiently "particularize the specific acts of negligence which precipitated the purported defective condition" (Major v. General Motors Corp., supra, p 522; see, Scott v. General Motors Corp., supra; Moore v. Chrysler Corp., supra; Paldino v. E.J. Korvettes, Inc., 65 A.D.2d 617). If the plaintiff and Frame do not possess "sufficient knowledge to respond to those items of G.M.'s demand [they] must so state, under oath, and [they] must properly serve a further bill upon G.M. if and when the requisite knowledge to answer them is acquired" (Gausney v. General Motors Corp., supra, at p 456; see, Major v. General Motors Corp., supra; Moore v Chrysler Corp., supra; Paldino v. E.J.

  6. RICHMAN v. ILAN PROPERTIES, INC.

    2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 31059 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009)

    However, plaintiff should have explicitly stated that she currently lacked knowledge of the exact identities of the agents, servants or employees which were given actual notice of the dangerous condition, and the place(s) and date(s) when notice was allegedly given. Jaiman v Hock, 178 AD2d 508,509,577 ( 2 Dept 1991); Major v General Motors Corp., 126 Ad2d 521 (2d Dept 1987). These specifics can be alleged in a supplemental bill if, after discovery, the plaintiff acquires the information.