[7] In 1983, Rule 50 was amended and we stated: "Rule 50 will no longer allow the sufficiency of the evidence to be challenged by a motion for a new trial, only by a motion for a directed verdict and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict." In re Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure, 279 Ark. 470, 471, 651 S.W.2d 63 (1983); see also Majewski v. Cantrell, 293 Ark. 360, 737 S.W.2d 649 (1987) ("[A] party must test the sufficiency of the evidence by motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, not by a motion for new trial."). In Yeager v. Roberts, 288 Ark. 156, 702 S.W.2d 793 (1986), we enunciated the subtle distinction between a sufficiency challenge under Rule 50 and a motion for new trial under Rule 59.
[1, 2] We have followed the common-law rule that a lessor owes no duty to the lessee to repair the premises. Majewski v. Cantrell, 293 Ark. 360, 737 S.W.2d 649 (1987). However, we have elaborated that a lessor can be held liable where he agrees to undertake the repairs.
In Bartley v. Sweetser , 319 Ark. 117, 890 S.W.2d 250 (1994), our supreme court noted that since 1932, we have adhered to the rule that a landlord is under no legal obligation to a tenant for injuries sustained in common areas, absent a statute or agreement. Similarly, in Majewski v. Cantrell , 293 Ark. 360, 362, 737 S.W.2d 649, 651 (1987), our supreme court stated that Majewski was correct that a lessor, under the common-law rule that Arkansas follows, owes no duty of repair of the premises to the lessee; but it is also true that a landlord who agrees to such repairs can be held liable for making those repairs in a negligent fashion. Majewski expanded the discussion, holding that a landlord is subject to liability for physical harm caused to the tenant and others, upon the leased property with the consent of the tenant or his subtenant, by a condition of disrepair existing before or arising after the tenant has taken possession if (1) the landlord has contracted by a promise in the lease or otherwise to keep the leased property in repair; (2) the disrepair creates an unreasonable risk to persons upon the leased property, which the performance of the landlord's agreement would have prevented; and (3) the landlord fails to exercise reasonable care to perform his contract. Id. at 362โ63, 737 S.W.2d at 651 ; see alsoStewar
Id. , 486 S.W.3d at 243. Hurd's first point on appeal is that the circuit court erroneously entered summary judgment in favor of the Hurts based on its finding that they owed no duty to Hurd. Arkansas has recognized the common-law doctrine of caveat lessee for almost a century, and under that rule, unless a landlord agrees with his tenant to repair leased premises, he cannot, in the absence of statute, be compelled to do so or be held liable for repairs. Propst v. McNeill , 326 Ark. 623, 624, 932 S.W.2d 766, 767 (1996) ; see alsoMajewski v. Cantrell , 293 Ark. 360, 362, 737 S.W.2d 649, 651 (1987) (stating that a lessor under common law owes no duty of repair of the premises to the lessee but that a landlord who agrees to such repairs can be held liable for them). Caveat lessee is also known as "tenant beware."
In Bartley v. Sweetser, 319 Ark. 117, 890 S.W.2d 250 (1994), our supreme court noted that since 1932, we have adhered to the rule that a landlord is under no legal obligation to a tenant for injuries sustained in common areas, absent a statute or agreement. Similarly, in Majewski v. Cantrell, 293 Ark. 360, 362, 737 S.W.2d 649, 651 (1987), our supreme court stated that Majewski was correct that a lessor, under the common-law rule that Arkansas follows, owes no duty of repair of the premises to the lessee; but it is also true that a landlord, who agrees to such repairs, can be held liable for making those repairs in a negligent fashion. Majewski expanded the discussion, holding that a landlord is subject to liability for physical harm caused to the tenant and others, upon the leased property with the consent of the tenant or his subtenant, by a condition of disrepair existing before or arising after the tenant has taken possession if: (1) the landlord has contracted by a promise in the lease or otherwise to keep the leased property in repair; 2) the disrepair creates an unreasonable risk to persons upon the leased property, which the performance of the landlord's agreement would have prevented; and (3) the landlord fails to exercise reasonable care to perform his contract.
In Bartley v. Sweetser, 319 Ark. 117, 890 S.W.2d 250 (1994), our supreme court noted that since 1932, we have adhered to the rule that a landlord is under no legal obligation to a tenant for injuries sustained in common areas, absent a statute or agreement. Similarly, in Majewski v. Cantrell, 293 Ark. 360, 362, 737 S.W.2d 649, 651 (1987), our supreme court stated that Majewski was correct that a lessor, under the common-law rule that Arkansas follows, owes no duty of repair of the premises to the lessee; but it is also true that a landlord, who agrees to such repairs, can be held liable for making those repairs in a negligent fashion. Majewski expanded the discussion, holding that a landlord is subject to liability for physical harm caused to the tenant and others, upon the leased property with the consent of the tenant or his subtenant, by a condition of disrepair existing before or arising after the tenant has taken possession if: (1) the landlord has contracted by a promise in the lease or otherwise to keep the leased property in repair; 2) the disrepair creates an unreasonable risk to persons upon the leased property, which the performance of the landlord's agreement would have prevented; and (3) the landlord fails to exercise reasonable care to perform his contract.
Furthermore, the Arkansas Supreme Court generally follows the Restatement (Second) of Property. See Smith v. Wright , 300 Ark. 416, 779 S.W.2d 177 (1989) ; Motes/Henes Trust, Bank of Bentonville v. Motes , 297 Ark. 380, 761 S.W.2d 938 (1988) ; Majewski v. Cantrell , 293 Ark. 360, 737 S.W.2d 649 (1987) ; Warmack v. Merch. Nat'l Bank of Fort Smith , 272 Ark. 166, 612 S.W.2d 733 (1981) ; Rice v. King , 214 Ark. 813, 218 S.W.2d 91 (1949)But see Kidwell v. Rhew , 371 Ark. 490, 494, 268 S.W.3d 309, 312 (2007) (declining to adopt the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, DONATIVE TRANSFERS ยง 34.2 (1992) where the issue was governed by a clear and unambiguous statute).The plaintiffs argue that Coley v. Westbrook mandates the conclusion that the lease at issue here is for an indefinite term and, therefore, is terminable at will.
In 1983, Rule 50 was amended and we stated: "Rule 50 will no longer allow the sufficiency of the evidence to be challenged by a motion for a new trial, only by a motion for a directed verdict and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict." In re Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure, 279 Ark. 470, 471, 651 S.W.2d 63 (1983); see also Majewski v. Cantrell, 293 Ark. 360, 737 S.W.2d 649 (1987) ("[A] party must test the sufficiency of the evidence by motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, not by a motion for new trial"). In Yeager v. Roberts, 288 Ark. 156, 702 S.W.2d 793 (1986), we enunciated the subtle distinction between a sufficiency challenge under Rule 50 and a motion for new trial under Rule 59.
(Emphasis added.)Id. at 108; see also Majewski v. Cantrell, 293 Ark. 360, 737 S.W.2d 649 (1987) (court held there was an agreement to repair where lessor admitted having sent a worker out to repair roof on numerous occasions). Here, Thomas asserts that a similar situation exists.
The Arkansas Supreme Court has held that an oral agreement for repairs was sufficient to support such liability. Majewski v. Cantrell, 293 Ark. 360, 737 S.W.2d 649, 651 (1987). In that case, as part of an oral lease, the lessor and lessee agreed that the lessor would maintain the roof of the building.