In this regard, we note that one state court has interpreted the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act to cover any property that has value, Marsh v Galbraith, 31 Tenn. App. 482, 486; 216 S.W.2d 968 (1948), and another has held the contrapositive: that the act does not cover property that has no value. Boone v Burden, 259 Or. 402, 404-405; 487 P.2d 74 (1971). We further note that the Michigan Supreme Court in Maitland v Slutsky, 281 Mich. 669, 675; 275 N.W. 726 (1937), has held that goodwill, by itself, "was not a property right subject to the claims of creditors." More recently in Christner v Anderson, Nietzke Co, PC, 433 Mich. 1; 444 N.W.2d 779 (1989), a case brought under § 851(1) of the Business Corporation Act, MCL 450.
Good will may be attached to the particular place where the business is conducted; it is not, however, necessarily dependent upon locality, and it may adhere to some other principal thing, such as the reputation acquired by an established business, the tangible assets of a trade, the right to use a particular name, trade mark, or valuable trade secret.'" Maitland v. Slutsky, 281 Mich. 669, 673. This case involves not merely the good will of a dissolved corporation and the use of a registered trade name but also the transferability of the right to use that trade name.
See generally, 37 Am.Jur.2d, Fraudulent Conveyances, § 100 (1968). The premise upon which this view is based is that good will alone is not a proper subject of attachment. National Surety Co. v. Fowler, 217 Ala. 25, 27, 114 So. 408 (1927); Maitland v. Slutsky, 281 Mich. 669, 675, 275 N.W. 726 (1937). We think this interpretation is too narrow for several reasons.