Maiden v. Carter

11 Citing cases

  1. Davis v. Bay Cnty. Jail

    155 So. 3d 1173 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)   Cited 5 times

    Under Florida procedural law, a complaint that simply strings together a series of sentences and paragraphs containing legal conclusions and theories does not establish a claim for relief. See Rule 1.110, Fla. R. Civ. P.; see e.g., Barrett v. City of Margate, 743 So.2d 1160, 1162–63 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (“It is insufficient to plead opinions, theories, legal conclusions or argument.”); Maiden v. Carter, 234 So.2d 168, 170 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970) (“It is a fundamental principle of pleading that the complaint, to be sufficient, must allege ultimate facts as distinguished from legal conclusions which, if proved, would establish a cause of action for which relief may be granted.”). Pro se litigants get leniency in amending their complaints, but in the end they must meet pleading requirements to allege ultimate facts holding the defendants liable. Barrett, 743 So.2d at 1162–63 (“The complaint, whether filed by an attorney or pro se litigant, must set forth factual assertions that can be supported by evidence which gives rise to legal liability.”).

  2. Williams v. Howard

    329 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 1976)   Cited 35 times
    Noting that a "bare assertion" that one's legal rights will be affected, without alleging how or why, is not sufficient to establish standing to file a declaratory judgment action

    The allegations fall short of constituting the sort of ultimate facts required by the rule to sustain appellees' standing to attack the Act. Fla. R.Civ.P. 1.110, Maiden v. Carter, 234 So.2d 168 (Fla.App.1st 1970). As was aptly stated in Miller v. Miller, 151 So.2d 869 (Fla.App.2d 1963):

  3. Foerman v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company

    279 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1973)   Cited 5 times
    Noting that FELA imposes duty upon railroad to furnish its employees with safe workplace and to provide both safe and sufficient tools with which to perform that work

    The numerous authorities holding that the complaint must be sufficiently pleaded so as to apprise both the court and the defendant of the nature of the claim asserted, draw a distinction between the purpose of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action and a motion for more definite statement (the latter being directed to vagueness and ambiguity). Ellison v. City of Fort Lauderdale, Fla. 1965, 175 So.2d 198; Fontainebleau Hotel Corporation v. Walters, Fla. 1971, 246 So.2d 563; Maiden v. Carter, Fla.App. 1970, 234 So.2d 168; Ocala Loan Company v. Smith, Fla.App. 1963, 155 So.2d 711; Pizzi v. Central Bank and Trust Company, Fla. 1971, 250 So.2d 895. Fontainebleau Hotel Corporation, supra, footnote 1; F.R.C.P. 1.140(e).

  4. AGROFOLLAJES v. PONT DE NEMOURS

    Nos. 3D07-2322, 3D07-2318, 3D07-1036 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2009)

    Arky, 527 So. 2d 211 at 213. See Woodcock v. Wilcox, 98 Fla. 14, 122 So. 789 (Fla. 1929) (pleadings must contain ultimate facts supporting each element of the cause of action); Clark v. Boeing Co., 395 So. 2d 1226, 1229 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (affirming dismissal of strict liability count charging defendant with selling aircraft "in an unsafe, defective condition" where plaintiff failed to plead ultimate facts); Rice v. Walker, 359 So. 2d 891, 892 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (affirming dismissal where plaintiff alleged various components were unsafe but the facts of such defects were not stated); Maiden v. Carter, 234 So. 2d 168, 169 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970) (complaints must allege ultimate facts as distinguished from legal conclusions which are insufficient). Second, "Florida uses what is commonly considered as a notice pleading concept and it is a fundamental rule that the claims and ultimate facts supporting same must be alleged.

  5. Snyder v. the City of Delray Beach

    736 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

    The pleading of legal conclusions is thus unnecessary and, by itself, even insufficient. See Clark v. Boeing Co., 395 So.2d 1226 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); and Maiden v. Carter, 234 So.2d 168, 170 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970) ("It is a fundamental principle of pleading that the complaint, to be sufficient, must allege ultimate facts as distinguished from legal conclusions which, if proved, would establish a cause of action for which relief may be granted."). Consequently legal conclusions in a pleading are not deemed admitted for purposes of determining a motion that attacks the legal sufficiency of a pleading.

  6. Clark v. Boeing Company

    395 So. 2d 1226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)   Cited 51 times
    Affirming dismissal of strict liability count charging defendant with selling aircraft "in an unsafe, defective condition" where plaintiff failed to plead ultimate facts

    Woodcock v. Wilcox, 98 Fla. 14, 122 So. 789 (1929). Mere conclusions are insufficient. Maiden v. Carter, 234 So.2d 168 (Fla.1st DCA 1970). The amended complaint fails to plead ultimate facts establishing the elements of strict liability, that is, that the product was defectively designed or unreasonably unsafe for its intended use when it left the manufacturer.

  7. Warriner v. James Archer Smith Hosp

    252 So. 2d 859 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971)

    Over two years later, she moved to try a new and different cause which would have necessitated the bringing in of new parties. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying the motion to further amend the counterclaim. See Olin's Miami Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Jorgenson, Fla.App. 1970, 239 So.2d 518; Maiden v. Carter, Fla.App. 1970, 234 So.2d 168; 2765 South Bayshore Drive Corp. v. Fred Howland, Inc., Fla. App. 1968, 212 So.2d 911. In her brief appellant next discusses her points on appeal numbered 7 and 8. They are as follows:

  8. Brown v. Montgomery Ward Company

    252 So. 2d 817 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971)   Cited 27 times
    Holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant right to file amended complaint two weeks before scheduled trial pending several years in the court

    Rule 1.190, F.R.C.P., 30 F.S.A. Maiden v. Carter (Fla.App. 1970), 234 So.2d 168; Richards v. West (Fla.App. 1959), 110 So.2d 698. Appellant earnestly contends that the trial court abused its discretion in the case sub judice when it denied his motion to file an amended complaint. He urges that the court's action in this respect constituted an arbitrary sic volo sic jubeo, stat pro ratione voluntas.

  9. Carter Fruit Co. v. Mead Johnson Co.

    247 So. 2d 330 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971)

    PER CURIAM. Affirmed on the authority of Maiden v. Carter, Fla.App. 1970, 234 So.2d 168. LILES, Acting C.J., and HOBSON and MANN, JJ., concur.

  10. Cohen v. Landow

    242 So. 2d 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971)   Cited 4 times

    First, the motion to amend the answer to allege the affirmative defense was not made until the trial court had announced its ruling, and we find no abuse of discretion in the trial judge's denial of the proposed amendment at this stage of the trial proceedings. Demko v. Judge, Fla. 1952, 58 So.2d 692; Parker v. Parker, Fla.App. 1959, 109 So.2d 893; Maiden v. Carter, Fla.App. 1970, 234 So.2d 168. Further, the evidence is clear that there was a misrepresentation as to a material fact which was relied on [to his detriment] by the appellee, Landow, to wit: the transaction did not earn him a minimum of 7% on his investment.