Opinion
24A-CR-1715
11-18-2024
Robert Houston Mahoy, Jr., Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT R. Patrick Magrath Alcorn Sage Schwartz & Magrath, LLP Madison, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General Megan M. Smith Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Decatur Superior Court The Honorable Matthew D. Bailey, Judge Trial Court Cause Nos. 16D01-2401-CM-3 16D01-2209-F6-871
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT R. Patrick Magrath Alcorn Sage Schwartz & Magrath, LLP Madison, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General Megan M. Smith Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
VAIDIK, JUDGE
Case Summary
[¶1] Robert Houston Mahoy, Jr., was on probation when he committed a new offense. He now appeals the sentence he received for the new offense and the sanction he received for his violation of probation. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] In November 2023, Mahoy pled guilty to Class A misdemeanor possession of methamphetamine, Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia, and Class A infraction operating a vehicle without financial responsibility. The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 365 days, with 363 days suspended to probation.
[¶3] Two months later, the State charged Mahoy with Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle with an ACE of .08 or more. The State also alleged that Mahoy was a habitual vehicular substance offender (HVSO) based on operating-while-intoxicated convictions from 1997, 1998, and 2003. In addition, the probation department petitioned to revoke Mahoy's probation for consuming alcohol and committing the new offense.
[¶4] Mahoy pled guilty to the Class C misdemeanor operating offense and being an HVSO and admitted violating the terms of his probation. At the combined sentencing hearing, the State presented evidence that in addition to the three OWI convictions used to establish that Mahoy was an HVSO, he had convictions for Class B felony possession of cocaine, Class D felony operating while intoxicated (his fourth), Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, and Class A misdemeanor domestic battery. Mahoy's pastor testified that Mahoy had recently completed a nine-month treatment program for meth in Ohio and that he would be a good candidate to return there for alcohol treatment. The pastor also testified that Mahoy was a good worker.
[¶5] The trial court found two aggravators: (1) Mahoy was on probation when he committed the operating offense and (2) he has a criminal history. The court found one mitigator: Mahoy pled guilty "open, with no agreement, to a significant amount of exposure to jail." Tr. p. 25. The court sentenced Mahoy to 60 days for the operating offense, enhanced by 730 days for being an HVSO, for a total of 790 days. For his violation of probation, the court ordered Mahoy to serve 120 days of his previously suspended 363-day sentence. The court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively, as required by Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2(e).
[¶6] Mahoy now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Mahoy's 790-day sentence is not inappropriate
[¶7] Mahoy contends his 790-day sentence for Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle with an ACE of .08 or more and being an HVSO is inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which provides that an appellate court "may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender." The appellate court's role under Rule 7(B) is to "leaven the outliers," and "we reserve our 7(B) authority for exceptional cases." Faith v. State, 131 N.E.3d 158, 160 (Ind. 2019) (quotation omitted). "Whether a sentence is inappropriate ultimately turns on the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and a myriad of other factors that come to light in a given case." Thompson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 383, 391 (Ind.Ct.App. 2014) (citing Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008)). Because we generally defer to the judgment of trial courts in sentencing matters, defendants must persuade us that their sentences are inappropriate. Schaaf v. State, 54 N.E.3d 1041, 1044-45 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016).
[¶8] A defendant convicted of a Class C misdemeanor faces a sentence of up to sixty days. I.C. § 35-50-3-4. In addition, the sentencing range for an HVSO enhancement is one to eight years. I.C. § 9-30-15.5-2(d). Thus, Mahoy faced a maximum sentence of eight years and sixty days. The trial court sentenced him to two years and sixty days.
[¶9] We agree with Mahoy that there is nothing particularly egregious about the nature of his operating offense. But his character supports his well-below-maximum sentence. Two months after being placed on probation for possessing meth, Mahoy operated a vehicle with an ACE of 0.08 or more. Notably, this was his fifth OWI-related conviction. Mahoy had other convictions as well, including felony possession of cocaine and misdemeanor resisting and domestic battery. We acknowledge that Mahoy pled guilty and appeared committed to overcoming his alcohol problem and becoming a productive member of society again. However, given his criminal history and the fact that he was on probation when he committed the operating offense, Mahoy has failed to persuade us that his 790-day sentence-which, as the trial court highlighted, falls on the "low end" of the sentencing range, Tr. p. 25-is inappropriate.
II. Mahoy's sanction for violating his probation is not an abuse of discretion
[¶10] Mahoy also challenges the sanction imposed for his violation of probation. Trial courts enjoy broad discretion in determining the appropriate sanction for a probation violation, and we review only for an abuse of that discretion. Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007).
[¶11] Mahoy contends the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to serve 120 days of his previously suspended 363-day sentence. Mahoy acknowledges the trial court "revoked less than one-half (1/2) of [his] suspended sentence." Appellant's Br. p. 14. Nevertheless, he claims that because his violation was "not motivated by ill will, spite, or violence," the court should have returned him to probation. Id. Even accepting that Mahoy's violation was not motivated by ill will, spite, or violence, it occurred only two months after being placed on probation for a substance-related offense and after numerous prior convictions. Mahoy has not shown that the trial court abused its broad discretion by ordering him to serve only a third of his suspended time.
[¶12] Affirmed.
Altice, C.J., and Crone, Sr. J., concur.