Mahon-Evans Realty, Inc. v. Spike

17 Citing cases

  1. Cyril Bath Co. v. Winters Industries

    892 F.2d 465 (6th Cir. 1989)   Cited 19 times
    Holding that under Ohio law, " promise to purchase exclusively from one supplier may be either implicit or explicit" and can be inferred from relevant competent evidence, such as the seller's "awareness of [the buyer's] needs" and the agreement's terms

    ' (citation omitted) In Mahon-Evans Realty, Inc. v. Spike, 33 Ohio App.3d 268, 515 N.E.2d 953, 956 (1986), the Ohio appellate court reversed the trial court's award of prejudgment interest because the amount due under the contract was not ascertainable from the contract itself. The court noted that "[w]here the trial testimony amply demonstrated that both parties to the contract held different views as to the amount owing, and where the amount could not be determined by reference to the parties' agreement, the debt is unliquidated."

  2. Chaney v. East

    97 Ohio App. 3d 431 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994)   Cited 28 times

    Civ.R. 53(E)(6) expressly provides that without an affidavit or transcript describing all relevant evidence presented at the hearing or other adequate record, the municipal court may summarily overrule the party's unsupported objections. Pappenhagen v. Payne, supra; accord Frank Lerner Assoc., Inc. v. Vassy (1991), 74 Ohio App.3d 537, 542-543, 599 N.E.2d 734, 736-738; Mahon-Evans Realty, Inc. v. Spike (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 268, 270, 515 N.E.2d 953, 955-956. The record demonstrates plaintiff failed to file an affidavit or other adequate record of the evidence presented to the referee to support her objections in the case sub judice.

  3. Northbrook Excess v. Procter Gamble

    924 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1991)   Cited 354 times
    Holding that the party seeking costs is "required to provide the best breakdown obtainable from retained records"

    Accord Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 829 F.2d 227, 248-49 (1st Cir. 1987) (applying Ohio law) (The court rejected a prejudgment interest argument in a case involving insurance coverage for asbestos-related liability because, "[w]hat has not been settled until our decision today, however, is which of those claims properly belong within AMICO's policy coverage. It can not reasonably be argued that AMICO's obligation could be determined by `mere computation' or reasonably certain calculations' until we ruled on how one is to determined when a disease is reasonably capable of medical diagnosis. Until now, it was unclear which claims would become AMICO's responsibility."); Mahon-Evans Realty Inc. v. Spike, 33 Ohio App.3d 268, 515 N.E.2d 953, 956 (Ohio Ct.App. 1986) ("Until, and only until, the trial court finally resolved the existing ambiguity, did the amount of the debt become known. The amount of the debt was not ascertainable by reference to the language of the contract.

  4. Worrell v. Multipress, Inc.

    45 Ohio St. 3d 241 (Ohio 1989)   Cited 59 times
    In Worrell, we noted in passing that "front pay is an equitable remedy designed to financially compensate employees where ‘reinstatement’ of the employee would be impractical or inadequate.

    Prejudgment interest is not available pursuant to R.C. 1343.03(A) unless there is an amount due and payable, or a claimed amount due is capable of ascertainment by computation or reference to well-established market values at the time the cause of action arose. See Mahon-Evans Realty, Inc. v. Spike (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 268, 515 N.E.2d 953; Shaker Savings Assn. v. Greenwood Village (1982), 7 Ohio App.3d 141, 7 OBR 184, 454 N.E.2d 984. At the time settlement offers were exchanged between the parties, there was no sum certain due on any of the breach-of-contract claims.

  5. RPM, Inc. v. Oatey Co.

    2005 Ohio 1280 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005)   Cited 5 times

    {¶ 67} Prior to Royal Electric, there had been disagreement in this state as to whether a court has authority to award prejudgment interest under R.C. 1343.03(A) when the amount of the debt due under the contract was not ascertainable or liquidated prior to judgment. See, e.g., United States Playing Card Co. v. The Bicycle Club (1997), 119 Ohio App.3d 597, 608-609; Mahon-Evans Realty, Inc. v. Spike (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 268, 270-271. Royal Electric ended that debate.

  6. Pearlman v. Taylor

    683 N.E.2d 427 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996)

    Royal Elec. Constr. Corp., supra. In Mahon-Evans Realty, Inc. v. Spike (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 268, 515 N.E.2d 953, the court stated that where trial testimony demonstrates that both parties to the contract hold different views as to the amount owing and where the amount cannot be determined by reference to the parties' agreement, the debt is unliquidated. The compensatory theory of prejudgment interest requires that if the amount is determined to be unliquidated, the statutory interest should accrue from the day of the trial court's judgment.

  7. Young v. Internatl. Bhd. of Engineers

    114 Ohio App. 3d 499 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 17 times
    Concluding the employee was not a policymaking or confidential employee, but appearing to recognize that if the employee was, the cause of action would be preempted by the LMRDA

    Appellant asserts that the parties were in dispute as to the amount of the contract, so the damages were not "liquidated" and prejudgment interest was not proper. See Mahon-Evans Realty, Inc. v. Spike (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 268, 515 N.E.2d 953. Appellant argued at trial that the liquidated damages clause was invalid, that mitigation of damages should be considered and that the contract said $50,000 was payable each year, not as a lump sum. We believe the amount of damages was capable of ascertainment by the clear language of the contract, so prejudgment interest was proper.

  8. Dayton Securities Assoc. v. Avutu

    105 Ohio App. 3d 559 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995)   Cited 19 times

    A debt is liquidated if the amount due is certain and ascertainable. Mahon-Evans Realty, Inc. v. Spike (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 268, 271, 515 N.E.2d 953, 956. Where the dispute is over liability itself but the amount due is not in dispute or it is easily ascertainable, then the running of prejudgment interest is not delayed because the debtor denies owing the debt, and thus the interest accrues as of the date the debt became due and payable.

  9. Yaroma v. Griffiths

    104 Ohio App. 3d 545 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995)   Cited 9 times

    Absent a contrary contractual arrangement, a brokerage commission was due upon consummation of the sale of property. Mahon-Evans Realty, Inc. v. Spike (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 268, 270, 515 N.E.2d 953, 955-956; Ballard v. Thompson (1965), 5 Ohio App.2d 92, 34 O.O.2d 197, 214 N.E.2d 102, paragraph one of syllabus. Therefore, interest began to run on August 1, 1988 on the unpaid balance of plaintiff's commission fee.

  10. Thirty Four Corp. v. Sixty Seven Corp.

    91 Ohio App. 3d 818 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993)   Cited 10 times

    As such, no interest accrued on money loaned prior to the November 1966 round robin. Mahon-Evans Realty, Inc. v. Spike (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 268, 515 N.E.2d 953. 34 Corp. also challenges the trial court's calculation of interest for the years 1966 through 1972.