' (citation omitted) In Mahon-Evans Realty, Inc. v. Spike, 33 Ohio App.3d 268, 515 N.E.2d 953, 956 (1986), the Ohio appellate court reversed the trial court's award of prejudgment interest because the amount due under the contract was not ascertainable from the contract itself. The court noted that "[w]here the trial testimony amply demonstrated that both parties to the contract held different views as to the amount owing, and where the amount could not be determined by reference to the parties' agreement, the debt is unliquidated."
Civ.R. 53(E)(6) expressly provides that without an affidavit or transcript describing all relevant evidence presented at the hearing or other adequate record, the municipal court may summarily overrule the party's unsupported objections. Pappenhagen v. Payne, supra; accord Frank Lerner Assoc., Inc. v. Vassy (1991), 74 Ohio App.3d 537, 542-543, 599 N.E.2d 734, 736-738; Mahon-Evans Realty, Inc. v. Spike (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 268, 270, 515 N.E.2d 953, 955-956. The record demonstrates plaintiff failed to file an affidavit or other adequate record of the evidence presented to the referee to support her objections in the case sub judice.
Accord Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 829 F.2d 227, 248-49 (1st Cir. 1987) (applying Ohio law) (The court rejected a prejudgment interest argument in a case involving insurance coverage for asbestos-related liability because, "[w]hat has not been settled until our decision today, however, is which of those claims properly belong within AMICO's policy coverage. It can not reasonably be argued that AMICO's obligation could be determined by `mere computation' or reasonably certain calculations' until we ruled on how one is to determined when a disease is reasonably capable of medical diagnosis. Until now, it was unclear which claims would become AMICO's responsibility."); Mahon-Evans Realty Inc. v. Spike, 33 Ohio App.3d 268, 515 N.E.2d 953, 956 (Ohio Ct.App. 1986) ("Until, and only until, the trial court finally resolved the existing ambiguity, did the amount of the debt become known. The amount of the debt was not ascertainable by reference to the language of the contract.
Prejudgment interest is not available pursuant to R.C. 1343.03(A) unless there is an amount due and payable, or a claimed amount due is capable of ascertainment by computation or reference to well-established market values at the time the cause of action arose. See Mahon-Evans Realty, Inc. v. Spike (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 268, 515 N.E.2d 953; Shaker Savings Assn. v. Greenwood Village (1982), 7 Ohio App.3d 141, 7 OBR 184, 454 N.E.2d 984. At the time settlement offers were exchanged between the parties, there was no sum certain due on any of the breach-of-contract claims.
{¶ 67} Prior to Royal Electric, there had been disagreement in this state as to whether a court has authority to award prejudgment interest under R.C. 1343.03(A) when the amount of the debt due under the contract was not ascertainable or liquidated prior to judgment. See, e.g., United States Playing Card Co. v. The Bicycle Club (1997), 119 Ohio App.3d 597, 608-609; Mahon-Evans Realty, Inc. v. Spike (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 268, 270-271. Royal Electric ended that debate.
Royal Elec. Constr. Corp., supra. In Mahon-Evans Realty, Inc. v. Spike (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 268, 515 N.E.2d 953, the court stated that where trial testimony demonstrates that both parties to the contract hold different views as to the amount owing and where the amount cannot be determined by reference to the parties' agreement, the debt is unliquidated. The compensatory theory of prejudgment interest requires that if the amount is determined to be unliquidated, the statutory interest should accrue from the day of the trial court's judgment.
Appellant asserts that the parties were in dispute as to the amount of the contract, so the damages were not "liquidated" and prejudgment interest was not proper. See Mahon-Evans Realty, Inc. v. Spike (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 268, 515 N.E.2d 953. Appellant argued at trial that the liquidated damages clause was invalid, that mitigation of damages should be considered and that the contract said $50,000 was payable each year, not as a lump sum. We believe the amount of damages was capable of ascertainment by the clear language of the contract, so prejudgment interest was proper.
A debt is liquidated if the amount due is certain and ascertainable. Mahon-Evans Realty, Inc. v. Spike (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 268, 271, 515 N.E.2d 953, 956. Where the dispute is over liability itself but the amount due is not in dispute or it is easily ascertainable, then the running of prejudgment interest is not delayed because the debtor denies owing the debt, and thus the interest accrues as of the date the debt became due and payable.
Absent a contrary contractual arrangement, a brokerage commission was due upon consummation of the sale of property. Mahon-Evans Realty, Inc. v. Spike (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 268, 270, 515 N.E.2d 953, 955-956; Ballard v. Thompson (1965), 5 Ohio App.2d 92, 34 O.O.2d 197, 214 N.E.2d 102, paragraph one of syllabus. Therefore, interest began to run on August 1, 1988 on the unpaid balance of plaintiff's commission fee.
As such, no interest accrued on money loaned prior to the November 1966 round robin. Mahon-Evans Realty, Inc. v. Spike (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 268, 515 N.E.2d 953. 34 Corp. also challenges the trial court's calculation of interest for the years 1966 through 1972.