"`Wages' mean the average daily wages received by the employee at the time of the injury for the usual hours of employment in a day, and overtime is not to be considered." We considered the term "average daily wage" in Mahlum v. Broeder (1966), 147 Mont. 386, 412 P.2d 572, where we stated: ". . . [T]hat the first step in the formula for compensation is to determine the average daily wage.
¶118 From original enactment in 1915, the Act has been a delicate public policy compromise, with the essential quid pro quo purposes and effects of (1) depriving workers of otherwise available tort remedies (which previously afforded them opportunity for full compensation), in return for some lesser form of guaranteed no-fault compensation for work-related injury, and (2) depriving employers of advantageous common law defenses in tort, in return for limited and predictable liability for employee injuries. See §§ 39-71-105(1), -124, and -411, MCA (2011); Royal Ins. Co. v. Roadarmel , 2000 MT 259, ¶ 29, 301 Mont. 508, 11 P.3d 105 ; Henry v. State Comp. Ins. Fund , 1999 MT 126, ¶ 12, 294 Mont. 449, 982 P.2d 456 ; Sitzman v. Shumaker , 221 Mont. 304, 307, 718 P.2d 657, 659 (1986) ; Madison v. Pierce , 156 Mont. 209, 213-14, 478 P.2d 860, 863 (1970) ; Mahlum v. Broeder , 147 Mont. 386, 392-95, 412 P.2d 572, 575-77 (1966) ; State ex rel. Morgan v. Indus. Accident Bd. of Mont. , 130 Mont. 272, 278-79, 300 P.2d 954, 958 (1956) ; Chisholm v. Vocational Sch. for Girls , 103 Mont. 503, 512-13, 64 P.2d 838, 844 (1936) ; Shea v.North-Butte Mining Co. , 55 Mont. 522, 528-29, 179 P. 499, 501 (1919) ; Lewis & Clark County v. Industrial Accident Bd. , 52 Mont. 6, 9-13, 155 P. 268, 270-71 (1916).
Wight states: "It should be beyond cavil, therefore, that the fundamental basis of workers' compensation laws is to accommodate the public interest in placing economic loss caused by employment accidents not upon the public, but upon the industry in which the accident occurred, Williams v. Industrial Accident Board (1939), 109 Mont. 235, 97 P.2d 1115; and that the principal aim of workers' compensation coverage is to provide social insurance which protects the injured workman against disability from a work-connected injury, again placing the cost of the injury on the industry employing him. Mahlum v. Broeder (1966), 147 Mont. 386, 412 P.2d 572." Obviously, the purpose of workers' compensation is to protect the worker against economic loss.
Betor v. National Biscuit Company (1929), 85 Mont. 481, 280 P. 641; Kerns v. Anaconda Copper Mining Company (1930), 87 Mont. 546, 289 P. 563. It should be beyond cavil therefore that the fundamental basis of worker's compensation laws is to accommodate the public interest in placing economic loss caused by employment accidents not upon the public, but upon the industry in which the accident occurred, Williams v. Industrial Accident Board (1939), 109 Mont. 235, 97 P.2d 1115; and that the principal aim of workers' compensation coverage is to provide social insurance which protects the injured workman against disability from a work-connected injury, again placing the cost of the injury on the industry employing him. Mehlum v. Broeder (1966), 147 Mont. 386, 412 P.2d 572. If therefore, the social purpose of Workers' Compensation Acts is to provide for the injured worker a fund which replaces his lost earnings or his lost earning capacity, the reasonable cost of effectuating such social purpose where litigation is necessary ought also be the burden of the industry.
"* * * of the difference between the wages received at the time of the injury and the wages that such injured employee is able to earn thereafter * * *". (Emphasis added) Olson relies on cases decided by this Court applying section 92-703, in which the terms "loss of earning capacity" and "loss of ability to earn in the open market" were used: Shaffer v. Midland Empire Packing Co., 127 Mont. 211, 259 P.2d 340; Mahlum v. Broeder, 147 Mont. 386, 412 P.2d 572. He also cites section 92-838, R.C.M. 1947, which states: "Whenever this act or any part or section thereof is interpreted by a court, it shall be liberally construed by such court."