Second, Mr. Syme's failure to comply with Section 39-71-401, MCA, does not constitute negligence per se. Workers' compensation statutes were enacted as social insurance rather than to provide for damages in tort-connected liability cases. Mahlum v. Broeder (1966), 147 Mont. 386, 394, 412 P.2d 572, 576. Mr. Syme's failure to comply with Section 39-71-401 is not the proximate cause of Ms. Hunnewell's injuries because: "To constitute negligence per se, a statutory violation must also be the proximate cause of the injuries sustained." Kudrna v. Comet Corp. (1977), 175 Mont. 29, 39, 572 P.2d 183, 189.
The principle of enterprise liability was recognized by this Court long before enactment of the co-employee statutory protection. Madison v. Pierce (1970), 156 Mont. 209, 478 P.2d 860; Mahlum v. Broeder (1966), 147 Mont. 386, 412 P.2d 572; State ex rel Morgan v. Indus. Accident Bd. (1956), 130 Mont. 272, 300 P.2d 954. Co-employee protection is a natural extension of enterprise liability and relieves the employee of justifiable apprehension about the possibility of a suit against him. Co-employee immunity is essential to the integrity of the Act. Our previous decision required only that the District Court focus on Selensky's status at the time of the alleged negligence.
The foregoing purposes of the Montana Workmen's Compensation Act have been expressed and reiterated by this Court ad infinitum for over 50 years. Shea v. North-Butte Min. Co., 55 Mont. 522, 179 P. 499; Bruce v. McAdoo, 65 Mont. 275, 211 P. 772; Kerns v. Anaconda Copper Min. Co., 87 Mont. 546, 289 P. 563; Moffett v. Bozeman Canning Co., 95 Mont. 347, 26 P.2d 973; Clark v. Olson, 96 Mont. 417, 31 P.2d 283; State ex rel. Morgan v. Indus. Accident Bd., 130 Mont. 272, 300 P.2d 954; Mahlum v. Broeder, 147 Mont. 386, 412 P.2d 572. To accomplish these purposes, the Act makes the employer liable for payment of compensation to his injured employee.