See Mahler v. Paquin, 142 Ga. App. 582 ( 236 S.E.2d 512) (1977), vacated on other grounds, 239 Ga. 645 ( 238 S.E.2d 692) (1977), reaffd. 143 Ga. App. 773 ( 240 S.E.2d 185) (1977). Appellant's claims for damages are predicated on the default judgment entered in favor of appellee, and must necessarily fail since the default judgment will not be set aside for fraud under the circumstances of this case.

Alexander v. Boston Old Colony Ins. Co., 127 Ga. App. 783, 784 (2) ( 195 S.E.2d 277) (1972); Mahler v. Paquin, 142 Ga. App. 582, 583 ( 236 S.E.2d 512) (1977), reaffd. 143 Ga. App. 773 ( 240 S.E.2d 185) (1977). When the reasonableness of a sale of repossessed collateral is challenged, the burden of showing that the disposition of collateral pursuant to Code Ann. § 109A-9-504 was commercially reasonable rests with the secured party.

Phillips v. Abel, 141 Ga. App. 291 ( 233 S.E.2d 384) (1977). The cases cited by the appellant, Stallings v. Chance, 239 Ga. 567 ( 238 S.E.2d 327) (1977); Mahler v. Paquin, 143 Ga. App. 773 ( 240 S.E.2d 185) (1977), are inapposite, as they apply to appeals from grants of summary judgment rather than to appeals from judgments following trial. 3. The appellant contends that the issue of voluntary payments was not raised by the appellee's answer, that the case was not tried on this issue, and that the trial court accordingly erred in basing its judgment on this issue.

Mullinax v. Singleton, 139 Ga. App. 704 ( 229 S.E.2d 518). Although there has been some confusion about the timing and procedure for appealing the denial of summary judgment (see Mahler v. Paquin, 143 Ga. App. 773 ( 240 S.E.2d 185)), the rule set forth in Mullinax has been followed since it was announced by the Supreme Court in Hill v. Willis, 224 Ga. 263 (2) ( 161 S.E.2d 281). "A motion for a summary judgment is somewhat analogous to a motion for a nonsuit, for if, after being overruled, even if done improperly, all the evidence shows that a verdict for the opposing party is authorized, the error is harmless.