Opinion
C.A. No. 97C-10-139
Date Submitted: August 9, 2001
Date Decided: September 21, 2001
Order Upon Plaintiffs' Motion For Judgment Notwithstanding The Verdict, or in the alternative, for a New Trial Denied In Part, Granted In Part.
On this 21st day of September, 2001, upon consideration of the Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or in the alternative, for a New Trial filed by Parviz Mahani and Mariam Saleh ("Plaintiffs"), the Response filed by Jennifer Walls, as the Administratix of the Estate of John F. Field, ("Defendant"), and the record, it appears to the Court that:
(1) This is a personal injury claim arising out of an automobile accident that occurred on December 15, 1995. Neither negligence nor proximate cause was conceded by Defendant. On July 20, 2001, a jury rendered a verdict that Defendant was not negligent.
(2) The accident occurred on Old Capital Trail and Stanton Road. The Defendant stipulated that Defendant crossed over a double yellow line and the collision took place in Plaintiff's lane of travel. A dispute existed as to whether Defendant was driving carelessly or whether he slipped on a patch of ice and lost control of his vehicle.
(3) Plaintiffs presented evidence that other cars traveling in Defendants lane of travel did not lose control, slip, slide or spin wheels. Plaintiff Mahani also testified that he did not see any icy patches on the road; however, he did perceive the conditions as dangerous enough to drive slower than the speed limit. In addition, Plaintiff Saleh testified that she remembered telling the doctor that the conditions outside were icy. Unfortunately Defendant died, from unrelated causes, prior to trial and no testimony of his version of the events exists. An interrogatory answer was admitted into evidence stating that Defendant received a ticket for Careless Driving which he mailed to Dover.
(4) In deciding a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, the trial judge does not weigh the evidence. Only if all facts and inferences could compel a reasonable person to reach only one conclusion, then the movant is entitled to judgment.
McClosky v. McKelvey, Del. Supr., 174 A.2d 691, 693 (1961).
Eustice v. Rupert, Del. Supr., 460 A.2d 507, 508-09 (1983).
If the jury verdict is supported by palpable evidence, then judgment as a matter of law should be denied.
Gannett Co., Inc. v. Re, Del. Supr., 496 A.2d 553, 557 (1985).
(5) Plaintiffs' argue that there was no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find that Defendant was not negligent and thus judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be granted in their favor. Plaintiff contend that all evidence supports their proposition that Defendant was negligent. Plaintiffs' strongest contention in this regard is that Defendant paid his ticket for careless driving. Defendant argues there is sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. Specifically, Defendant contends that he was not negligent but rather lost control of the car due to ice and snow on the ground.
(6) In addition, Plaintiff argues that the jury disregarded the Court's instructions in finding the Defendant not negligent when Plaintiffs' claim he violated a statute. It is well established that the violation of a Delaware statute enacted for the safety of others is evidence of negligence per se. In this case there was a causal connection between the injury alleged by Plaintiffs and the violation of the statute, thus the Court should have taken notice of Defendant's negligence. It has been held that payment of the voluntary assessment is the entry of a guilty plea by Defendant. However, this admission by the Defendant is simply evidence of negligence and not conclusive proof of negligence.
Wright v. Moffitt, Del. Supr., 437 A.2d 554, 557 (1981).
Culver v. Bennett, Del. Supr., 588 A.2d 1094 (1991).
Merkins v. Nichols, Del. Super., C.A. No. 89C-SE-201, Balick, J. (Feb. 6, 1991)(ORDER); White v. Clark, Del. Super., C.A. No. 95C-01-107, Herlihy, J. (Dec. 16, 1998) (Mem. Op.).
(7) In considering all the evidence, the Court finds that a reasonable person could conclude that there was palpable evidence to find the Defendant not negligent. Plaintiff Mahani testified himself that the conditions were dangerous enough for him to drive below the speed limit and Plaintiff Saleh testified she remembered saying the conditions were icy. There was also evidence that there was ice and snow on the ground.
From this testimony and from the Defendant's interrogatory answer that he slipped on a patch of ice, a reasonable person could conclude that Defendant was not negligent.
For the aforementioned reasons, the Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict is DENIED.
(8) The Court's standard of review for a new trial is well-settled, the trial judge should not set aside a jury verdict unless the verdict was against the great weight of evidence. A jury's verdict should not be disturbed unless "the evidence preponderates so heavily against the jury verdict that a reasonable jury could not have reached the result. Credibility issues are to be exclusively resolved by the jury. The jury is free to accept or reject Plaintiffs' representations. When the subject matter is within the normal comprehension of the jury, the Court should not disrupt the verdict unless moving counsel can draw the Court to specific error. A new trial may also be ordered when the jury has misunderstood the applicable law or legal error was committed by the trial court tainting the jury's verdict.
Storey, 401 A.2d at 465.
Id.
Guthridge v. Pen-Mod, Inc., Del. Supr., 239 A.2d 709, 711 (1967); Debernard v. Reed, Del. Supr., 277 A.2d 684, 685-86 (1971); Storey, 401 A.2d at 465; Ellingsworth v. Hudson, Del. Supr., No. 361, 1992, Walsh, J. (Mar. 8, 1993) (ORDER).
Debernard, 277 A.2d at 685-86.
Storey, 401 A.2d at 466-467.
DuPhilly v. Delaware Electric Cooperative, Inc., Del. Supr., 662 A.2d 821, 833-34 (1995).
(9) Plaintiffs argue that a new trial should be granted because the jury verdict is against the weight of evidence due to the Defendant's admission of careless driving, lack of evidence that Defendant was not negligent, and Defendant's counsel's closing remark that Defendant paid the careless driving ticket for convenience. Plaintiffs persistently argue that Defendant's paying the careless driving ticket is an admission of his guilt. Plaintiffs contend that the evidence that other cars did not lose control and Defendant stipulated to crossing the double yellow line sufficiently shows that the Defendant was negligent. In addition, Plaintiffs argue that defense counsel's closing remarks that Defendant paid the careless driving ticket for convenience was improper and prejudicial.
(10) Defendant argues that the jury was free to make an inference that Defendant's crossing the double yellow line was due to sliding on an icy patch, which was not visible to Defendant. In addition, Defendant argues that Defendant did not admit guilt to the careless driving citation, rather Defendant only admitting to paying the $42.50 fine. Due to Defendant's untimely death, he was not able to explain his reasons for paying the ticket and not trying to contest it. Moreover, Defendant contends that defense counsel's contention that Defendant paid the ticket for convenience was proper as an inference from the facts. Defendant also points out that this Court did instruct the jury the statement was only speculative and no curative instruction was given as Plaintiffs' counsel did not ask for one. Further, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs' counsel cannot object to the use of the interrogatory answer read in court as Plaintiffs' counsel never objected to such during trial. In addition, such use of an interrogatory is permitted by this Court under Superior Court Civil Rule 33 and Delaware Rules of Evidence 804.
(11) As stated above, the violation of a Delaware statute enacted for the safety of others is evidence of negligence per se, thus this Court should have taken notice of the fact that Defendant pled guilty to careless driving by paying the voluntary assessment. This admission by the Defendant is evidence of negligence and not conclusive proof of negligence, but should have been submitted to the jury for consideration. This jury verdict is partially based on the jury's misunderstanding of the applicable law. The jury was not informed that Defendant's paying of the careless driving ticket was an admission of guilt. As such, the interests of justice warrant a new trial in this case.
Merkins at 1; White at 2.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial is hereby GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ORDER
Upon Defendant's Motion For Costs Denied Without Prejudice.On this 21st day of September, 2001, upon consideration of Defendant's Motion for Costs filed by Jennifer Walls, as Administratrix of the Estate of John F. Field, ("Defendant"), the Opposition filed by Parviz Mahani and Mariam Saleh ("Plaintiffs"), and the record, it appears to the Court that:
(1) This is a personal injury claim arising out of an automobile accident that occurred on December 15, 1995. Neither negligence nor proximate cause was conceded by Defendant. On July 20, 2001, a jury rendered a verdict that Defendant was not negligent. On September 21, 2001, this Court granted Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial.
(2) Delaware Courts have held that an order granting a new trial is an interlocutory order. A interlocutory order or decree is one which does not finally determine a cause of action but only decides some intervening matter pertaining to the cause, and which requires further steps to be taken in order to enable the court to adjudicate the cause on the merits." Whereas no final judgment has been entered in this case, Defendant's Motion for Costs is premature and is hereby DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
5.97752 Acres of Land in New Castle County v. State, Del. Supr., 202 A.2d 924, 925-26 (1964); Miller v. Suburban Propane Gas Corp., Del. Supr., 565 A.2d 913, 914 (1989); Katcher v. Martin, Del. Supr., 597 A.2d 352, 353 (1991).
Black's Law Dictionary 815 (6th ed. 1990).
IT IS SO ORDERED.