Opinion
No. 12-08-00430-CR
Opinion delivered November 3, 2010. DO NOT PUBLISH.
Appeal from the County Court at Law #2, Henderson County, Texas.
Panel consisted of WORTHEN, C.J., GRIFFITH, J., and HOYLE, J.
OPINION ON REMAND
Wilton Larron Mahaffey appeals his conviction for driving while intoxicated, for which he was sentenced to confinement for three days and fined five hundred dollars. On original submission, in one issue, Appellant argued that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress because the traffic stop preceding his arrest was unlawful. See Mahaffey v. State , No. 12-08-00430-CR, 2009 WL 2517121, at *1 (Tex. App.-Tyler Jun. 30, 2010) (mem. op., not designated for publication). We determined that, by his failure to signal his intent to turn when steering his car leftward as the righthand lane in which he was driving merged into the lefthand lane, Appellant committed a traffic violation. See id. , at *4. Consequently, we held that Appellant's motion to suppress was properly overruled because the traffic stop was lawful and affirmed the trial court's judgment. Id. Appellant filed a petition for discretionary review, which was granted. Concluding that Appellant's leftward "merge" was not a turn under the transportation code, and thus, did not require Appellant to use a turn signal, the court of criminal appeals reversed our judgment and remanded the cause for our further consideration of Appellant's sole issue. See Mahaffey v. State , 316 S.W.3d, 633, 639-40 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Appellant was charged by information with driving while intoxicated. Thereafter, Appellant filed a motion to suppress any evidence seized as a result of what he alleged was an illegal detention. The trial court subsequently conducted a hearing on Appellant's motion. At the hearing, Gun Barrel City Police Sergeant Billy Sparks testified concerning his stop of Appellant's vehicle. Sparks testified that he stopped Appellant's vehicle for violating Texas Transportation Code, section 545.104. Sparks elaborated that Appellant was traveling southbound on Texas Highway 198. Sparks stated that the southbound side of the highway had two lanes. Sparks further stated that Appellant passed a traffic sign that stated, "Lane ends, merge left." Sparks testified that when Appellant reached the point in the roadway where the broken dividing lines between the two lanes ceased and the line dividing the righthand lane with the shoulder angled inward, he merged his vehicle leftward without using a turn signal. Sparks further testified that Appellant's actions amounted to a traffic violation. Following the hearing, the trial court entered a written order denying Appellant's motion to suppress. Thereafter, the trial court made the following written findings of fact and conclusions of law:On September 27, 2006, the Defendant was stopped for a traffic violation under Section 545.104 of the Texas Transportation Code § 545.104. SIGNALING TURNS; USE OF TURN SIGNALS. (a) An operator shall use the signal authorized by Section 545.106 to indicate an intention to turn, change lanes, or start from a parked position.
The Court finds that the defendant did not cross over lane markings[,] but rather failed to use a turn signal after the lane markings ended as the two lanes merged into one. The Court finds that this conduct is a traffic violation as contemplated by Section 545.104(a) and as such the traffic stop was justified.
The Court finds that the sole valid basis for the traffic stop and detention of the Defendant was the violation of Section 545.104(a).Subsequently, Appellant pleaded "guilty" as charged. The court sentenced Appellant to confinement for three days and fined Appellant five hundred dollars. This appeal followed.
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
In his sole issue on remand, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Specifically, Appellant argues that Sparks's traffic stop was baseless because Appellant's failure to signal was not a violation of section 545.104(a).Standard of Review
A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress is generally reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Oles v. State , 993 S.W.2d 103, 106 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Villarreal v. State , 935 S.W.2d 134, 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Maysonet v. State , 91 S.W.3d 365, 369 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. ref'd). We will review de novo the legal question involving interpretation of the Texas Transportation Code. Wehring v. State , 276 S.W.3d 666, 669 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2008, no pet.) (citing Hernandez v. State , 957 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) and Maysonet , 91 S.W.3d at 369). Since all evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, we are obligated to uphold it on a motion to suppress if that ruling was supported by the record and was correct under any theory of law applicable to the case. State v. Ross , 32 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Carmouche v. State , 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); State v. Ballard , 987 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Maysonet , 91 S.W.3d at 369.Governing Law
A routine traffic stop closely resembles an investigative detention. Powell v. State , 5 S.W.3d 369, 375 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1999, pet. ref'd). Because an investigative detention is a seizure that implicates the United States and Texas constitutions, the traffic stop must be reasonable. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 9; Francis v. State , 922 S.W.2d 176, 178 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). To determine the reasonableness of an investigative detention, we conduct the inquiry set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio : (1) whether the officer's action was justified at its inception; and (2) whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that initially justified the interference. Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968); Davis v. State , 947 S.W.2d 240, 242 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Under the first guideline, an officer's reasonable suspicion justifies an investigative detention. Davis , 947 S.W.2d at 242-43. Specifically, the officer must have a reasonable suspicion that some activity out of the ordinary is occurring or has occurred. Id. at 244 (citing Garza v. State , 771 S.W.2d 549, 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)). To determine whether an officer was reasonable in his initial action, we ask whether, in light of the officer's experience and knowledge, there existed specific, articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warranted an intrusion. Id. at 242. "If an officer has a reasonable basis for suspecting that a person has committed a traffic offense, the officer may legally initiate a traffic stop." Zervos v. State , 15 S.W.3d 146, 151 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, pet. ref'd).Merging Lanes and Required Use of a Turn Signal Under Section 545.104(a)
In the case at hand, Sparks believed Appellant's failure to signal an intent to turn prior to initiating his leftward merge was a violation of section 545.104(a). The question we must resolve is whether it was reasonable for Sparks to conclude that a traffic violation had been committed even though Appellant's vehicle did not cross any lane dividing lines. When interpreting statutes, we seek to effectuate the intent or purpose of the legislators who enacted them. Omaha Healthcare Ctr., L.L.C. v. Johnson , 246 S.W.3d 278, 282 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2008, pet. filed) (citing Fitzgerald v. Advanced Spine Fixation Sys., Inc. , 996 S.W.2d 864, 865 (Tex. 1999)). If the statute is clear and unambiguous, the plain meaning of the words should be applied. Hines v. State , 75 S.W.3d 444, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Boykin v. State , 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Johnson , 246 S.W.3d at 282. However, if application of the plain language would lead to absurd consequences the legislature could not have intended, we may look to extracontextual factors to arrive at a sensible interpretation of the statute. Hines , 75 S.W.3d at 447; Boykin , 818 S.W.2d at 785-86. Section 545.104(a) of the Texas Transportation Code provides in pertinent part as follows:An operator shall use the signal authorized by Section 545.106 to indicate an intention to turn, change lanes, or start from a parked position.TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.104(a) (Vernon 1999). In response to Appellant's sole issue on remand, the State argues that Appellant's "merging" constituted a lane change. The plain language of the statute requires a driver to signal to "change lanes." See id. It is clear that Appellant would have been required to signal had he steered his vehicle across a lane dividing line. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 541.302(7) (Vernon 1999) (defining "laned roadway" as roadway divided into at least two clearly marked lanes for vehicular travel); see, e.g., Castro v. State , 227 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (stating that determination of whether driver signaled a lane change is a simple one). But the facts in the case at hand do not support this traditional notion of a lane change. Sparks testified that both he and Appellant passed a traffic sign that stated, "Lane ends, merge left." Sparks further acknowledged that Appellant did not cross any lane dividing lines at the point when he steered his vehicle to the left. Yet, even though Appellant's vehicle did not cross a marked lane dividing line, the righthand lane in which Appellant was traveling did end. When the righthand lane ended, Appellant continued driving in the other southbound lane, previously the lane to his left, that had not ended. Thus, Appellant changed lanes and did not signal his intent to do so. When a traffic offense is committed in the presence of a peace officer, the detention is reasonable. See Garcia v. State , 827 S.W.2d 937, 944 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Sparks was, therefore, authorized to detain Appellant for his failure to signal a lane change, and the evidence related to the DWI gathered in conjunction with a lawful traffic stop was not required to be suppressed. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying Appellant's motion to suppress. Appellant's sole issue is overruled.