Summary
holding that Plaintiff failed to aver that he signed the release, therefore he failed to allege a violation of the waiver provisions of the OWBPA and had no standing to assert a claim
Summary of this case from Merritt v. Wellpoint, Inc.Opinion
Civil Action No. 04-2496.
February 16, 2005
MEMORANDUM
Presently before the Court are Defendants' Motion Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to Dismiss Count II of Plaintiff's Complaint for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can be Granted (Docket No. 7) and Plaintiff's response thereto (Docket 12). For the reasons set forth below, the Court, sua sponte, dismisses Count II of Plaintiff's Complaint for lack of standing and denies Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as moot.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Brian Maguire, III ("Plaintiff"), who is fifty-three years old, filed his Complaint against Defendants on June 8, 2004, bringing claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") (Count I), Older Workers Benefit Protection Act ("OWBPA") (Count II) and Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA") (Count III). In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleged the following facts.
On January 19, 1999, Plaintiff was hired by Commonwealth Bancorp as Vice President of Marketing. In September 2002, Citizens Financial Group, Inc. and Citizens Bank of Pennsylvania (collectively "Defendants") acquired Commonwealth Bankcorp in its entirety. After the acquisition, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants treated him less favorably than younger workers and rebuffed Plaintiff's efforts to continue his employment with Defendants.
Citizens Financial Group, Inc. is a commercial bank holding company with corporate headquarters located in Providence, Rhode Island. Citizens Financial Group, Inc. operates in Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode Island and Delaware, and it is the parent company of Citizens Bank of Pennsylvania.
On December 18, 2002, Plaintiff received a letter from Defendants by which he was terminated. According to the letter, Defendants terminated Plaintiff because it was anticipated that his position would be eliminated. Defendants' Director of Marketing told Plaintiff that his termination was the result of his high salary. Defendants did not offer a position to Plaintiff even though Plaintiff was qualified for other positions, including a Senior Deposit Manager position. Plaintiff believed the reasons proffered by Defendants for his termination were pretextual as the real reason for his termination was his age.
Upon his termination, Defendants presented Plaintiff with an allegedly invalid release agreement which purportedly violated the OWBPA. This release agreement was also presented to a group of terminated employees. Allegedly, Defendants knowingly failed to provide the group and Plaintiff with comparative age data as required by the OWBPA.
On May 1, 2003, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). The Charge was also filed with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission. On April 6, 2004, the EEOC issued Plaintiff a notice of dismissal of his Charge.
As mentioned above, Plaintiff filed his Complaint against Defendants on June 8, 2004. Count I of Plaintiff's Complaint consisted of a claim based on the ADEA, while under Count III, Plaintiff brought a claim under the PHRA. In Count II, Plaintiff asserted a cause of action under the OWBPA, separate from the ADEA claim asserted in Count I. Count II is the subject of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Courts are obliged to examine issues of standing, sua sponte, under the case-or-controversy requirement associated with Article III of the Constitution. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 331 (1977) (citations omitted). To establish standing under Article III, the litigant must satisfy three criteria. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (citations omitted). "First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact — an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Id. at 560 (citations omitted). Second, a casual connection must exist between the injury and the conduct complained of; the injury must be traceable to the action of the defendant, not the result of a third party not before the court. Id. at 560-561 (citation omitted). Third, "it must be likely . . . that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." Id. at 561 (citation omitted).
The party invoking federal jurisdiction must establish the three elements. Id. at 561 (citation omitted). "[E]ach element must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation." Id. at 561 (citations omitted). With respect to the pleading stage, "general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss [the court] presume[s] that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support their claim." Id. at 561 (citation omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
In Count II of his Complaint, Plaintiff asserted a claim under the OWBPA. Plaintiff brought this OWBPA claim separate from the ADEA claim which made up Count I of his Complaint. Because Plaintiff failed to allege that he suffered an injury-in-fact under the OWBPA, the Court must dismiss Count II of Plaintiff's Complaint for lack of standing.
Congress enacted the OWBPA in 1990 as an amendment to the ADEA. Pursuant to the OWBPA, "[a]n individual may not waive any right or claim under [ADEA] unless the waiver is knowing and voluntary. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(2005).
The Court will not address the issue of whether the OWBPA creates a private right of action.
As to Plaintiff's Count II, the Court is bound by the Third Circuit's decision in Lawrence v. National Westminster Bank, 98 F.3d 61 (3d Cir. 1996). In Lawrence, which involved allegations of age and handicap discrimination as well as unlawful denial of benefits, the plaintiff argued his employer's "request that he sign a purportedly illegal termination agreement constituted a violation" of the OWBPA. Lawrence, 98 F.3d at 72. Because the plaintiff never signed the termination agreement, the Circuit found that the plaintiff "never `waived' his rights under the Act and [could not] establish a violation of 626(f)." Id. at 72. The Circuit wrote that "[t]he alleged effort to induce [plaintiff] to sign the agreement could not result in a violation of OWBPA's waiver provisions." Id. at 72. Finally, the Court concluded that the plaintiff "suffered no injury cognizable under the OWBPA. . . ." Id. at 72.
In the instant action, Plaintiff sought damages for harm caused by Defendants' presentation of a release which violated the OWBPA. In his Complaint and Reply, Plaintiff never averred that he signed the purportedly illegal release. As the Third Circuit ruled in Lawrence, an employer's attempt to have an employee sign a release is not a violation of the OWBPA. Id. at 72. Because Plaintiff did not aver that he signed the release in his Complaint, Plaintiff failed to allege a violation of the waiver provisions of the OWBPA. Therefore, Plaintiff failed to aver an injury, and Plaintiff has no standing with respect to Count II. The Court dismisses Count II without prejudice for lack of standing.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court dismisses Count II of Plaintiff's Complaint for lack of standing and denies Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as moot. An appropriate order follows.