Opinion
Record No. 1597-94-4
Decided: March 7, 1995
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
(Robert C. Baker, Jr.; Mell Brownell, on brief), for appellants.
(Alan J. Ackerman; Benson, Stien Braunstein, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Willis
Pursuant to Code Sec. 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.
Magic Pan International, Inc. and its insurer (hereinafter collectively referred to as "employer") contend that the Workers' Compensation Commission erred in finding that (1) various medical treatments rendered to Dorothy Lucille Robertson were causally related to her January 18, 1985 compensable back injury; (2) such treatment was reasonable and necessary; and (3) the treatment rendered at a hospital by two physicians was emergency care and was, therefore, not unauthorized treatment. Upon reviewing the record and the briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the commission's decision. Rule 5A:27.
Causal Connection, and Reasonableness and Necessity of Medical Treatment
On appellate review, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing below. R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v. Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990). We do not disturb the commission's factual findings if credible evidence supports them. James v. Capitol Steel Constr. Co., 8 Va. App. 512, 515, 382 S.E.2d 487, 488 (1989). Questions raised by conflicting medical opinions are factual issues to be resolved by the commission. Penley v. Island Creek Coal Co., 8 Va. App. 310, 318, 381 S.E.2d 231, 236 (1989).
The commission made the following findings regarding the medical evidence:
The claimant has the burden of showing that the contested medical expenses are causally related to her January 18, 1985 compensable injury. The medical record reveals that Robertson has had continuing problems with lower back pain since her industrial injury necessitating four surgeries. According to claimant, "It doesn't take a whole lot to get my back." A comparison of medical treatment after August 29, 1991 to that rendered before that date does not show any change in the diagnosis, frequency of care, or level of services required. The claimant's treating physician, Dr. Ammerman, relates all care in the latter part of 1991, through 1992 and 1993, to the January 18, 1985 injury. Dr. Ammerman has an historical perspective since he has treated the claimant for an extended period of time and is intimately familiar with her case. Therefore, we accord greater weight to his opinion [than that of Dr. Leonard Green] and find that treatment rendered by City Hospital, Dr. Estigoy, Dr. DeBoard and MRI charges from Holy Cross Hospital are related to the January 18, 1985 injury and thus compensable.
Robertson's testimony, her medical records, and the opinions of Dr. Ammerman provide substantial credible evidence to support the commission's finding that the medical treatment in question was causally related to the January 18, 1985 injury. By according greater weight to Dr. Ammerman's opinions, the commission implicitly rejected the view that the treatment was unreasonable and unnecessary. That Dr. Green rendered a contrary opinion is of no consequence because credible evidence supports the commission's decision. See Wagner Enters., Inc. v. Brooks, 12 Va. App. 890, 894, 407 S.E.2d 32, 35 (1991).
Unauthorized Treatment
The commission found that Drs. Estigoy and DeBoard treated Robertson when she was admitted to the hospital emergency room for acute lower back pain. The commission also found that each admission was the result of a medical emergency. These findings are supported by the medical records.
Credible evidence also proved that each hospital stay was causally related to Robertson's January 18, 1985 compensable injury. Thus, the commission did not err in finding that the treatment rendered by the doctors was the responsibility of employer. See Code Sec. 65.2-603(C) (formerly Code Sec. 65.1-88). Employer's reliance on Payne v. Master Roofing Siding, Inc., 1 Va. App. 413, 415, 339 S.E.2d 559 (1986) is misplaced. In Payne, we held that a claimant faced with an emergency situation has a duty to contact his physician, the employer, or the insurance carrier after the emergency crisis has ended. Id. at 415, 339 S.E.2d at 560. In this case, credible evidence exists to show that Robertson consistently sought treatment from Dr. Ammerman, her treating physician, after the emergency hospital visits.
For the reasons stated, we affirm the commission's decision.
Affirmed.