Opinion
2020-00201AD
10-20-2020
MICHAEL MAGGY Plaintiff v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION Defendant
Sent to S.C. Reporter 10/21/21
MEMORANDUM DECISION
FINDINGS OF FACT
{¶1} Michael Maggy ("plaintiff"), an inmate, filed a complaint against defendant, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction ("ODRC"). Plaintiff related on August 16, 2019, while incarcerated at Marion Correctional Institution ("MCI"), an ODRC employee allegedly defamed his character in a report about photographs that plaintiff ordered. Plaintiffs complaint does not contain a short plain statement of the facts but appears to complain of defamation as well as several times where he claims ODRC has violated its own policies. Plaintiff states that in a report defendant's employee defamed him by stating that he ordered photographs of "young boys" when in fact all photographs were of men aged eighteen or older who had a boyish appearance. Plaintiff asserts that this defamation could add time to his sentence, has caused harassment, and has caused him to lose his job. Plaintiff requests the following remedies: lost wages from August 2019 to the date of filing at a rate of $70.00 per month, removal of the conduct report and all related conduct reports from his record; being reinstated at his job; continuation of his job training; $9,000.00 for pain, suffering, and mental anguish; $50.00 for destroyed photos; and that the institution not retaliate against him. Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of $9,890.00. Plaintiff was not required to submit the $25.00 filing fee.
{¶2} Defendant submitted an Investigation Report denying liability in this matter. Defendant asserts that this court does not have jurisdiction over this matter because the report that contains the alleged defamation is from the Rules Infraction Board and in order to find defamation, the court would have to contradict the Board. Defendant further states that plaintiff has not provided any proof of defamation.
{¶3} Plaintiff submitted a response to defendant's Investigation Report reasserting his claim.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
{¶4} "In Ohio, defamation occurs when a publication contains a false statement 'made with some degree of fault, reflecting injuriously on a person's reputation, or exposing a person to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, shame or disgrace, or affecting a person adversely in his or her trade, business or profession.'" Jackson v. Columbus, 117 Ohio St.3d 328, 2008-Ohio-1041, ¶ 9, quoting A & B-Abell Elevator Co., Inc. v. Columbus/Cent. Ohio Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 73 Ohio St.3d 1, 7, 651 N.E.2d 1283 (1995). "To succeed on a defamation claim, a plaintiff must establish: (1) a false statement, (2) about the plaintiff, (3) published without privilege to a third party, (4) with fault of at least negligence on the part of the defendant, and (5) the statement was either defamatory per se or caused special harm to the plaintiff." Watley v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 07AP-902, 2008-Ohio-3691, ¶ 26. "'Slander' refers to spoken defamatory words, while 'libel' refers to written or printed defamatory words." Schmidt v. Northcoast Behavioral Healthcare, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-565, 2011-Ohio-777, ¶ 8. "Under Ohio common law, actionable defamation falls into one of two categories: defamation per se or defamation per quod." Am. Chem. Soc. V. Leadscope, Inc., 10th Dist. No. 08AP-1026, 2010-Ohio-2725, ¶ 49. "In order to be actionable per se, the alleged defamatory statement must fit within one of four classes: (1) the words import a charge of an indictable offense involving moral turpitude or infamous punishment; (2) the words impute some offensive or contagious disease calculated to deprive a person of society; (3) the words tend to injure a person in his trade or occupation; and (4) in cases of libel only, the words tend to subject a person to public hatred, ridicule, or contempt." Woods v. Capital Univ., 10th Dist. No. 09AP-166, 2009-Ohio-5672, ¶ 28. "On the other hand, a statement is defamatory per quod if it can reasonably have two meanings, one innocent and one defamatory. Therefore, when the words of a statement are not themselves, or per se, defamatory, but they are susceptible to a defamatory meaning, then they are defamatory per quod. Whether an unambiguous statement constitutes defamation per se is a question of law." (Citations omitted.) Woods at ¶ 29. "When a statement is found to be defamation per se, both damages and actual malice are presumed to exist." Knowles v. Ohio State Univ., 10th Dist. No. 02AP-527, 2002-Ohio-6962, ¶ 24. "When, however, a statement is only defamatory per quod, a plaintiff must plead and prove special damages." Am. Chem. Soc. at ¶ 51.
{¶5} In order to recover against a defendant in a tort action, plaintiff must produce evidence which furnishes a reasonable basis for sustaining his claim. If his evidence furnishes a basis for only a guess, among different possibilities, as to any essential issue in the case, he fails to sustain the burden as to such issue. Landon v. Lee Motors, Inc., 161 Ohio St. 82, 118 N.E.2d 147 (1954). Plaintiff has presented evidence only of the statements made in the report. Plaintiff claims that because ODRC's employee states that plaintiff was trying to buy pornographic pictures of "young boys," he has been defamed. However, the report specifically states that plaintiff was looking to purchase pictures of men aged 18 to 30 in the same paragraph that it says "young boys." Plaintiff does not dispute that he wanted to purchase photographs of men aged 18 to 30. Therefore, plaintiff has failed to prove that defendant's employee made a false statement.
{¶6} In addition, prison regulations, including those contained in the Ohio Administrative Code, "are primarily designed to guide correctional officials in prison administration rather than to confer rights on inmates." State ex rel. Larkins v. Wilkinson, 79 Ohio St.3d 477, 479, 1997-Ohio-139, 683 N.E.2d 1139, citing Sandlin v. Conner 515 U.S. 472, 481-482, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995). Additionally, this court has held that "even if defendant had violated the Ohio Administrative Code, no cause of action would exist in this court. A breach of internal regulations in itself does not constitute negligence." Williams v. Ohio Dept of Rehab. and Corr., 67 Ohio Misc.2d 1, 3, 643 N.E.2d 1182 (10th Dist. 1993). Accordingly, to the extent that plaintiff alleges that DRC somehow violated internal prison regulations and the Ohio Administrative Code, he fails to state a claim for relief. See Sharp v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., Ct. of Cl. No. 2008- 02410-AD, 2008-Ohio-7064, ¶ 5.
{¶7} The credibility of witnesses and the weight attributable to their testimony are primarily matters for the trier of fact. State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus. The court is free to believe or disbelieve, all or any part of each witness's testimony. State v. Antill, 176 Ohio St. 61, 197 N.E.2d 548 (1964). The court finds plaintiffs statement not particularly persuasive.
{¶8} Furthermore, ODRC's investigation revealed this issue: the Conduct Report was presented to the RIB on August 28, 2019. Plaintiff plead guilty to a Rule 45 violation, dealing, conducting, facilitating, or participating in any transaction occurring in whole or in part, within an institution or involving an inmate, staff member, or another for which payment of any kind is made, promised, or excepted; and was found guilty of a Rule 51 violation, possession of contraband.
{¶9} An inmate appeal to a Rules Infraction Board ("RIB") decision does not relate to civil law, a proper subject for adjudication pursuant to Chapter 2743 of the Ohio Revised Code. Instead, the appeal relates to private rights and remedies involving criminal proceedings and penalties imposed by a disciplinary board. Since the RIB dealt with the same issue plaintiff presented to this court and the RIB found against plaintiff, it falls outside this court's jurisdiction. Maynard v. Jago, 76-0581AD (1977).
{¶10} The Court of Claims does not have jurisdiction over decisions of the RIB. Chatman v. Dept. of Rehabilitation and Correction, 84-06323AD (1985), Ryan v. Chillicothe Institution, 81-05181 AD (1981), Rierson v. Department of Rehabilitation, 80-00860AD (1981).
{¶11} Therefore, judgment is rendered in favor of defendant.
ENTRY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION
{¶12} Having considered all the evidence in the claim file, and for the reasons set forth in the memorandum decision filed concurrently herewith, judgment is rendered in favor of defendant. Court costs are assessed against plaintiff.