Opinion
11-P-791
03-28-2012
RICHARD MAGGIO, trustee, [FN1] v. PLANNING BOARD OF WOBURN.
NOTICE: Decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28 are primarily addressed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, rule 1:28 decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28, issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
After the planning board of Woburn (the board) denied a site plan special permit proposing an expanded parking lot, Richard Maggio, as trustee of the Lorraine Realty Trust, appealed the denial to the Land Court. After a trial, the Land Court judge issued a decision and order finding that the board had acted beyond the scope of its authority in denying the application. The judge remanded the matter to the board with orders to approve the application for the special permit and to impose reasonable conditions on the site plan consistent with his decision. After the board imposed conditions, Maggio filed a second appeal, claiming that certain of the twenty conditions were unreasonable. After consolidating the appeals, the same judge found the contested conditions to be unreasonable and allowed Maggio's motion to strike seven of the conditions and to amend one of the conditions. The board now appeals from the findings of unreasonableness. We affirm.
Discussion. In this case, where the proposed parking lot is an as-of-right use, the board is restricted to imposing reasonable terms and conditions. See Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Board of Appeals of Westwood, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 278, 281-282 (1986). As such, in his first decision, the judge gave the board leeway to impose 'reasonable conditions' on the proposed parking lot, ordering that 'such conditions may only relate to [the board's] traffic concerns about Holton Street, the intersection of Nashua Street and Green Street, and the Bucci Way entrance to the existing parking lot located at 17-34 Holton Street.'
In reviewing whether the conditions imposed by a board are reasonable, a judge hears the evidence de novo, and gives no deference to the findings of the board. See id. at 283. The judge must determine whether there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the conditions are reasonable in light of the proposal's specific impacts. See Y.D. Dugout, Inc. v. Board of Appeals of Canton, 357 Mass. 25, 31-32 (1970). In a de novo review, the judge 'makes his own findings of fact, independent of any findings of the board, and determines the legal validity of the decision of the board upon the facts found by the court, or if the decision of the board is invalid in whole or in part, the court determines what decision the law requires upon the facts found.' Bicknell Realty Co. v. Board of Appeal of Boston, 330 Mass. 676, 679 (1953). See 39 Joy St. Condominium Assn. v. Board of Appeal of Boston, 426 Mass. 485, 488 (1998).
To determine the reasonableness of a board's conditions, a judge must undertake a 'careful factual analysis.' Muldoon v. Planning Bd. of Marblehead, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 372, 376 (2008). After conducting this careful factual analysis, the judge's findings cannot 'be set aside unless clearly erroneous.' Mass.R.Civ.P. 52(a), as amended, 423 Mass. 1402 (1996). A finding 'is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.' Kenner v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Chatham, 459 Mass. 115, 119 n.3 (2011), quoting from Building Inspector of Lancaster v. Sanderson, 372 Mass. 157, 160-161 (1977). Here, the judge's rulings on the reasonableness of the conditions were made in the context of the detailed factual analysis in his first decision. With respect to each of the contested conditions, the judge's rulings have evidentiary support and are not clearly erroneous. See Shirley Wayside Ltd. Partnership v. Board of Appeals of Shirley, 461 Mass. 469, 483 (2012). We therefore decline to set them aside. See ibid.
Condition 1. The judge determined that a condition limiting the use of the new parking lot to Winchester Hospital employees was unreasonable because (1) the parties previously agreed that the parking lot use would not be so restricted; (2) construction of a parking lot was an as-of-right use; and (3) the condition did not relate to traffic concerns, as required by the first decision. We conclude that the finding of unreasonableness was not clearly erroneous.
Condition 2. The judge found that a condition requiring a gate to prevent parking lot traffic from exiting onto Bucci Way was unreasonable where (1) there are currently signs specifying that traffic may not exit onto Bucci Way, and (2) experts from both sides testified that the risk that Bucci Way would be used as an exit was minimal where people already were complying with the signs. The judge's determination was not clearly erroneous.
Conditions 3, 4, 7, and 8. The judge found that the conditions forbidding right-hand turns onto Holton Street were unreasonable because the issue of traffic on Holton Street had been addressed at trial with the proposal of a four-way stop. Furthermore, he noted that Maggio 'did not cause the problems with the status of the road, that the City zoned the industrial and residential zones so they abut one another, and that the proposed traffic from the Proposed Parking Lot would not significantly exacerbate the existing traffic issues on Holton Street.' The judge also considered the fact that vehicles exiting an existing lot at 17-34 Holton Street have always been permitted to take right-hand turns, and that forbidding such turns would impact the existing parking lot, which, he found, was an issue beyond the scope of the case at bar. We conclude that the judge had ample factual evidence to support his findings that conditions 3, 4, 7, and 8 were unreasonable. The decision to strike the conditions was not clearly erroneous.
Condition 5. The judge found that the condition requiring Maggio to 'provide a police detail at peak . . . hours (3 pm-7 pm or other time periods as determined by hospital shift hours and/or demand) for a trial period of six (6) months' was unreasonable. He further found that the condition was not reasonably related to any of the traffic concerns outlined in the first decision, and that '[t]here is no stated basis for this condition, and no explanation [of] what benefit this police detail would [provide].' The judge's determination was not clearly erroneous.
In sum, the judge conducted a detailed factual analysis, and found that the conditions proposed by the board were unreasonable. His findings were not clearly erroneous, and we will not disturb them or his determination that the challenged conditions be struck.
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Rapoza, C.J., Katzmann & Wolohojian, JJ.),