Opinion
No. 30773.
November 6, 1933. Suggestion of Error Overruled January 1, 1934.
1. COUNTIES.
County supervisors' order, allowing damages for laying out road through claimant's land, without specifying page and section of law under which made, is void (Code 1930, section 255, as amended by Laws 1932, chapter 202).
2. COUNTIES.
Statute requiring county supervisors to specify page and section of law, under which "all demands and accounts against county" are allowed, applies to special claims under other statutes, as for damages from laying out road through claimant's land, as well as general claims (Code 1930, section 255, as amended by Laws 1932, chapter 202).
APPEAL from Circuit Court of Madison County.
Ross R. Barnett, of Jackson, for appellant.
The proposition is too well settled to be controverted that a valid order of the board of supervisors duly entered on the minutes of the board is a judgment against the county which must be paid unless appealed from and reversed.
Arthur v. Adam Speed, 49 Miss. 404; Campbell v. Humphreys County, 133 Miss. 410, 97 So. 722; George County v. Bufkin, 117 Miss. 884, 78 So. 841; Haley v. State ex rel. Mortimer, 108 Miss. 899, 67 So. 498; Crump v. Board of Supervisors, 52 Miss. 107; Carroll v. Board of Tishomingo County, 28 Miss. 38.
The order of the board of supervisors of Madison county, Mississippi, is not void because page and section of law not cited therein.
Sections 4400, 4401, and 4402, Code of 1906; Chapter 155, Laws of 1928; Sections 6340, 6341, 6342 and 6345, Code of 1930.
All of the proceedings of the board of supervisors of Madison county, Mississippi, in laying out this new road, were made and done in conformity with the sections of the code under the chapter on Roads and Bridges, supra, and all jurisdictional facts affirmatively found adjudicated and recited, and the allowance made Mrs. Mamie Magee was according to section 4402, Code of 1906, section 6342, Code of 1930.
It is the contention of the appellant that section 341, Code of 1906, being section 255, Code of 1930, pertains only to general claims against the county, and does not apply to the special statutory procedure and remedy allowed for taking of land under the chapter of the Code on Roads and Bridges.
The court has recognized the distinction between general claims against the county under chapter on boards of supervisors, and claims for damages for laying out, altering or changing a public road according to the chapter of the code on Roads and Bridges.
Ferguson v. Wilkinson County, 149 Miss. 623, 115 So. 779.
H.B. Greaves, of Canton, for appellees.
The order of the board of supervisors was void and no warrant should issue, because the section of the code, the book and page where found were not set out in the Order or Warrant.
Beck v. Allen, 58 Miss. 143; Clerk v. Allen McCool, 65 Miss. 455; Bank v. Perry Co., 135 Miss. 129; American Oil Co. v. Bishop et al., 163 Miss. 249, 141 So. 271.
Argued orally by H.B. Greaves, for appellee.
This is an appeal from a judgment dismissing a petition for a writ of mandamus. The board of supervisors of Madison county made an order allowing the appellant damages sustained by her because of the laying out of a public road through her land. She failed to obtain the payment of the damages awarded her and filed this petition against the members of the board of supervisors, alleging, among other things, the county was without funds with which to pay, and prayed for a writ of mandamus directing the board of supervisors to levy a special tax for that purpose.
The record presents several interesting questions; but there is one at the threshold which, if decided against the appellant, renders unnecessary a consideration of the others.
The order allowing appellant's claim for damages fails to specify "the page and particular section of the law under which" the allowance was made, as required by section 255, Code 1930, as amended by Laws 1932, chapter 202; consequently the order making the allowance is void. Beck v. Allen, 58 Miss. 143; Newton County Bank v. Perry County, 135 Miss. 129, 99 So. 513.
Counsel for the appellant say that this section of the Code applies only to general claims against the county, and not to such as are specially provided for by other statutes setting forth the procedure to be followed by the board in allowing the claims thereunder. The statute covers "all demands and accounts against the county," and we are not at liberty to restrict this all-inclusive language by construing it as if written "all demands and accounts against the county except such as arise under statutes setting forth the procedure to be followed by the board in passing thereon."
Affirmed.