We rejected the Court of Appeals' contrary conclusion that the plaintiff's cause of action accrued on the last day the plaintiff worked, a date that preceded her termination.By contrast, in Magee v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. , 472 Mich. 108, 693 N.W.2d 166 (2005), and Joliet v. Pitoniak , 475 Mich. 30, 715 N.W.2d 60 (2006), also CRA cases, this Court distinguished Collins and held that the plaintiffs' discrimination claims were untimely because the last date of the alleged discriminatory treatment, and not the employee's separation from employment, started the limitations period. Critical to our rulings in both of those decisions was the fact that neither plaintiff asserted a claim of discriminatory discharge.
Because both MCL 600.5827 and MCL 15.363(1) tie the running of the statutory limitations period to the actionable wrong, CRA cases interpreting when the limitations period commences running are instructive in resolving the same issue in the WPA context. By contrast, in Magee v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 472 Mich 108; 693 NW2d 166 (2005), and Joliet v Pitoniak, 475 Mich 30; 715 NW2d 60 (2006), also CRA cases, this Court distinguished Collins and held that the plaintiffs' discrimination claims were untimely because the last date of the alleged discriminatory treatment, and not the employee's separation from employment, started the limitations period. Critical to our rulings in both of those decisions was the fact that neither plaintiff asserted a claim of discriminatory discharge.
[475 Mich. 31] The issue before U.S. is whether plaintiff's claims for violations of the Civil Rights Act (CRA), breach of contract, and misrepresentation accrue on the [475 Mich. 32] dates that the alleged discriminatory acts or misrepresentations occur or on the plaintiff's last day of work. Following our decision in Magee v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 472 Mich. 108, 693 N.W.2d 166 (2005), we hold that a claim of discrimination accrues when the adverse discriminatory acts occur. Thus, if a plaintiff's complaint does not make out a claim of discriminatory discharge, a claim of constructive discharge for a separation from employment occurring after the alleged discriminatory acts cannot serve to extend the period of limitations for discriminatory acts committed before the termination.
"In the absence of disputed facts, whether a cause of action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations is a question of law, which this Court reviews de novo." Magee v Daimler Chrysler Corp, 472 Mich. 108, 111; 693 N.W.2d 166 (2005). III.
Therefore, in an employment context, the statute begins to run when the discriminatory or retaliatory conduct occurred, rather than the date when the plaintiff resigned. Magee v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 472 Mich. 108, 109 (2005); see also Joliet v. Pitoniak, 475 Mich. 30 (2006). Truel filed the present suit March 8, 2011, requiring the claim to have accrued after March 8, 2008.
Such was the case in Joliet, in which we overruled Jacobson v Parda Fed Credit Union, 457 Mich 318; 577 NW2d 881 (1998), a case involving a provision of the Whistleblowers' Protection Act, MCL 15.361 et seq., because its analysis conflicted with that utilized in Magee v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 472 Mich 108; 693 NW2d 166 (2005), a case involving a provision of the Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq. Regarding reliance interests, Hagerman, having been decided just eight years ago, has not become "so embedded, so accepted, so fundamental, to everyone's expectations that to change it would produce not just readjustments, but practical real-world dislocations."
This Court has rejected similar attempts to modify statutes of limitations. See Boyle v Gen Motors Corp, 468 Mich 226, 231-232; 661 NW2d 557 (2003) (rejecting application of the discovery rule to extend the statute of limitations in fraud cases); Secura Ins Co v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 461 Mich 382, 387-388; 605 NW2d 308 (2000) (holding that the doctrine of judicial tolling cannot be applied in the absence of statutory language permitting such tolling); Magee v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 472 Mich 108, 113; 693 NW2d 166 (2005) (noting that the "continuing violations" doctrine "renders nugatory the period of limitations established by the Legislature in MCL 600.5805[10]"). While the judicial temptation to relax a statute of limitations may be understandable in the context of a lawsuit in which a plaintiff, alleging that he or she has suffered a serious wrong, has been denied his or her day in court, the costs involved in terms of undermining the clarity and predictability of the law, allowing stale complaints to proceed, and injecting uncertainty into a myriad of legal relationships, are considerable, not to mention that a court that does so would be exercising "legislative," not "judicial," power.
"In the absence of disputed facts, whether a cause of action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations is a question of law, which this Court reviews de novo." Magee v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 472 Mich. 108, 111; 693 N.W.2d 166 (2005).
When disputed facts are lacking, whether a cause of action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations is a question of law, which the appellate court reviews de novo. Magee v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 472 Mich. 108, 111; 693 N.W.2d 166 (2005).
"In the absence of disputed facts, whether a cause of action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations is a question of law, which this Court reviews de novo." Magee v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 472 Mich. 108, 111; 693 N.W.2d 166 (2005).