Magee v. DaimlerChrysler Corporation

37 Citing cases

  1. Millar v. Constr. Code Auth.

    501 Mich. 233 (Mich. 2018)   Cited 25 times
    In Millar v Constr Code Auth, 501 Mich 233, 240; 912 NW2d 521 (2018), for example, the plaintiff was not fired; instead, his "employment responsibilities were merely reduced."

    We rejected the Court of Appeals' contrary conclusion that the plaintiff's cause of action accrued on the last day the plaintiff worked, a date that preceded her termination.By contrast, in Magee v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. , 472 Mich. 108, 693 N.W.2d 166 (2005), and Joliet v. Pitoniak , 475 Mich. 30, 715 N.W.2d 60 (2006), also CRA cases, this Court distinguished Collins and held that the plaintiffs' discrimination claims were untimely because the last date of the alleged discriminatory treatment, and not the employee's separation from employment, started the limitations period. Critical to our rulings in both of those decisions was the fact that neither plaintiff asserted a claim of discriminatory discharge.

  2. Millar v. Constr. Code Auth.

    No. 154437 (Mich. Mar. 29, 2018)

    Because both MCL 600.5827 and MCL 15.363(1) tie the running of the statutory limitations period to the actionable wrong, CRA cases interpreting when the limitations period commences running are instructive in resolving the same issue in the WPA context. By contrast, in Magee v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 472 Mich 108; 693 NW2d 166 (2005), and Joliet v Pitoniak, 475 Mich 30; 715 NW2d 60 (2006), also CRA cases, this Court distinguished Collins and held that the plaintiffs' discrimination claims were untimely because the last date of the alleged discriminatory treatment, and not the employee's separation from employment, started the limitations period. Critical to our rulings in both of those decisions was the fact that neither plaintiff asserted a claim of discriminatory discharge.

  3. Joliet v. Pitoniak

    475 Mich. 30 (Mich. 2006)   Cited 59 times
    Holding that absent an allegation of discriminatory discharge, a claim does not accrue on the last day of employment, but rather on the date the alleged discriminatory act occurred

              [475 Mich. 31] The issue before U.S. is whether plaintiff's claims for violations of the Civil Rights Act (CRA), breach of contract, and misrepresentation accrue on the [475 Mich. 32] dates that the alleged discriminatory acts or misrepresentations occur or on the plaintiff's last day of work. Following our decision in Magee v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 472 Mich. 108, 693 N.W.2d 166 (2005), we hold that a claim of discrimination accrues when the adverse discriminatory acts occur. Thus, if a plaintiff's complaint does not make out a claim of discriminatory discharge, a claim of constructive discharge for a separation from employment occurring after the alleged discriminatory acts cannot serve to extend the period of limitations for discriminatory acts committed before the termination.

  4. Gottleber v. Cnty. of Saginaw

    No. 354965 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2022)

    "In the absence of disputed facts, whether a cause of action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations is a question of law, which this Court reviews de novo." Magee v Daimler Chrysler Corp, 472 Mich. 108, 111; 693 N.W.2d 166 (2005). III.

  5. Truel v. City of Dearborn

    Case No. 11-10921 (E.D. Mich. Sep. 21, 2012)

    Therefore, in an employment context, the statute begins to run when the discriminatory or retaliatory conduct occurred, rather than the date when the plaintiff resigned. Magee v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 472 Mich. 108, 109 (2005); see also Joliet v. Pitoniak, 475 Mich. 30 (2006). Truel filed the present suit March 8, 2011, requiring the claim to have accrued after March 8, 2008.

  6. Paige v. Sterling Heights

    476 Mich. 495 (Mich. 2006)   Cited 87 times
    Holding that the phrase "the proximate cause" in MCL 418.375 means "the sole proximate cause"

    Such was the case in Joliet, in which we overruled Jacobson v Parda Fed Credit Union, 457 Mich 318; 577 NW2d 881 (1998), a case involving a provision of the Whistleblowers' Protection Act, MCL 15.361 et seq., because its analysis conflicted with that utilized in Magee v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 472 Mich 108; 693 NW2d 166 (2005), a case involving a provision of the Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq. Regarding reliance interests, Hagerman, having been decided just eight years ago, has not become "so embedded, so accepted, so fundamental, to everyone's expectations that to change it would produce not just readjustments, but practical real-world dislocations."

  7. Garg v. Macomb County Community Mental Health Services

    472 Mich. 263 (Mich. 2005)   Cited 268 times
    Holding that continuing violations doctrine does not apply in civil rights cases

    This Court has rejected similar attempts to modify statutes of limitations. See Boyle v Gen Motors Corp, 468 Mich 226, 231-232; 661 NW2d 557 (2003) (rejecting application of the discovery rule to extend the statute of limitations in fraud cases); Secura Ins Co v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 461 Mich 382, 387-388; 605 NW2d 308 (2000) (holding that the doctrine of judicial tolling cannot be applied in the absence of statutory language permitting such tolling); Magee v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 472 Mich 108, 113; 693 NW2d 166 (2005) (noting that the "continuing violations" doctrine "renders nugatory the period of limitations established by the Legislature in MCL 600.5805[10]"). While the judicial temptation to relax a statute of limitations may be understandable in the context of a lawsuit in which a plaintiff, alleging that he or she has suffered a serious wrong, has been denied his or her day in court, the costs involved in terms of undermining the clarity and predictability of the law, allowing stale complaints to proceed, and injecting uncertainty into a myriad of legal relationships, are considerable, not to mention that a court that does so would be exercising "legislative," not "judicial," power.

  8. Basrah Custom Design, Inc. v. Huntington Nat'l Bank

    No. 363542 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2024)

    "In the absence of disputed facts, whether a cause of action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations is a question of law, which this Court reviews de novo." Magee v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 472 Mich. 108, 111; 693 N.W.2d 166 (2005).

  9. Vanwasshenova v. Monroe Cnty. Drain Comm'n

    No. 365140 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2024)

    When disputed facts are lacking, whether a cause of action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations is a question of law, which the appellate court reviews de novo. Magee v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 472 Mich. 108, 111; 693 N.W.2d 166 (2005).

  10. Sullivan v. Giarmarco (In re Dec. 23, 2002 Restatement of the Vivian Stolaruk Living Tr.)

    No. 361518 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2024)

    "In the absence of disputed facts, whether a cause of action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations is a question of law, which this Court reviews de novo." Magee v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 472 Mich. 108, 111; 693 N.W.2d 166 (2005).