Magee v. Brown

4 Citing cases

  1. In re Spradlin

    274 B.R. 701 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2002)   Cited 1 times

    See Hubbard, 27 Mich. at 19 (indicating that a promise not to compete could be valid if designed "for the protection of the legitimate interests of the party in whose favor it is imposed" (emphasis added)); Boggs, 115 Mich.App. at 739, 321 N.W.2d 794 ("[A] covenant not to compete ... could be lawful if ... necessary to protect the covenantee in the enjoyment of the legitimate benefits of the contract." (emphasis added)); cf. Magee v. Brown, 347 Mich. 638, 644, 81 N.W.2d 413 (1957) ("[A] seller is not allowed to derogate from his own sale.").         The Creditors do not quarrel with the proposition that goodwill is an important consideration in this context.

  2. Devitt v. Quirk

    306 N.W.2d 405 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981)   Cited 5 times

    They further argue that the proofs at most establish a minimal rather than a material breach of the covenant. The reverse side of the "retail-wholesale" definitional issue was considered by the Michigan Supreme Court in the case of Magee v Brown, 347 Mich. 638; 81 N.W.2d 413 (1957). The Court in that case recognized the principle that a seller is not allowed to derogate from his own sale and is not at liberty to destroy what he transferred or depreciate what he sold. There is evidence in this case that the sale of greenware to other dealers at a discount and without charging sales tax was a common course of conduct on the part of the Quirks.

  3. Stark v. Budwarker, Inc.

    25 Mich. App. 305 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970)   Cited 16 times

    Restatement of Contracts, § 242 (see footnote 11). Michigan cases supporting this rule include New Amsterdam Casualty Company v. Sokolowski (1965), 374 Mich. 340; Magee v. Brown (1957), 347 Mich. 638; Keller v. Paulos Land Company (1968), 381 Mich. 355; Brown v. A.F. Bartlett Co. (1918), 201 Mich. 268; In re Traub Estate (1958), 354 Mich. 263. We take a different view of the documents.

  4. Detroit Edison Company v. Zoner

    163 N.W.2d 496 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968)   Cited 7 times

    urs (1886), 66 Wis. 448 ( 29 N.W. 230) (whether inside plaster walls were to be painted under a contract requiring painting of "the entire walls of the building, inside and outside."); Stoops v. Smith (1868), 100 Mass. 63 (defendant's statements to plaintiff as to kind of chart he would publish received as evidence of meaning of "advertising chart"); Bair v. School District No. 141, Smith County (1915), 94 Kan. 144 ( 146 P. 347) (the understanding of the parties as to what was meant by the provision requiring "the architect to make necessary visits at intervals"); Louisville N R Co. v. Illinois C R Co. (1898), 174 Ill. 448 ( 51 N.E. 824) ("necessary signals and switchmen"); Air Conditioning Corp. v. Honaker (1938), 296 Ill. App. 221 ( 16 N.E.2d 153) (meaning of "air conditioner" in sale contract); Atlantic Northern Air Lines, Inc. v. Schwimmer (1953), 12 N.J. 293 ( 96 A.2d 652) (antecedent negotiations and attendant circumstances to show intended scope of release of "all claims"). In Magee v. Brown (1957), 347 Mich. 638, the term "retail hardware business" was used in a covenant not to compete. After consideration of extensive testimony concerning the pre-closing negotiations of the parties and other matters, it was held that the term was not intended by the parties to cover retail sales made in connection with factory mill supply and manufacturing operations, a separate business of the covenantor.