Accordingly, we conclude that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this claim and should have dismissed the plaintiffs' cause of action to the extent that they sought to enforce this restrictive covenant. The dissenting opinion states that Maganini v. Hodgson , 138 Conn. 188, 192–93, 82 A.2d 801 (1951) ; Mellitz v. Sunfield Co ., 103 Conn. 177, 182, 129 A. 228 (1925) ; Prime Locations of CT, LLC v. Rocky Hill Development, LLC , 167 Conn. App. 786, 796 n.10, 145 A.3d 317, cert. denied, 323 Conn. 935, 150 A.3d 686 (2016) ; and 5011 Community Organization v. Harris , 16 Conn. App. 537, 540, 548 A.2d 9 (1988) ; support the conclusion that because the covenant limiting the use of the property for residential purposes was part of a general development scheme, the plaintiffs had the right to enforce it against the defendant. Respectfully, we believe that the cases cited by the dissent broadly apply to restrictions that are imposed as a uniform scheme of development , the very fact that has not been established by the facts in the present case.

Thompson v. Orcutt, 257 Conn. 301, 310, 777 A.2d 670 (2001). Maganini v. Hodgson, 138 Conn. 188, 82 A.2d 801 (1951), gives context to the court's analysis. In Maganini, the defendant argued that the plaintiffs should be barred from enforcing one restrictive covenant in a general plan of development because the plaintiffs had unclean hands for violating a different restriction.

The conclusion of the court that the restrictive covenants were personal to the common grantor and not enforceable by the plaintiff against the defendants was, however, in error. The contrary was expressly decided by this court in Maganini v. Hodgson, 138 Conn. 188, 82 A.2d 801, where the court held (p. 192) that these restrictive covenants came within the general rule that "`[w]hen, under a general development scheme, the owner of property divides it into building lots to be sold by deeds containing substantially uniform restrictions, any grantee may enforce the restrictions against any other grantee.'" We find, also, that the court did properly conclude that the plaintiff had failed to prove that she had suffered any pecuniary loss or damage.

The granting of injunctive relief in each case is within the sound discretion of the trial court exercised according to recognized principles of equity. Dimmock v. New London, 157 Conn. 9, 18, 245 A.2d 569; Waterford v. Grabner, 155 Conn. 431, 434, 232 A.2d 481; Lebanon v. Woods, 153 Conn. 182, 195, 215 A.2d 112; Holt v. Wissinger, 145 Conn. 106, 113, 139 A.2d 353; Weil v. Poulsen, 142 Conn. 213, 216, 112 A.2d 890; Adams v. Greenwich Water Co., 138 Conn. 205, 218, 83 A.2d 177; Maganini v. Hodgson, 138 Conn. 188, 195, 82 A.2d 801; Farrington v. Klauber, 130 Conn. 170, 173, 32 A.2d 644; Platt Bros. Co. v. Waterbury, 72 Conn. 531, 554, 45 A. 154; Fisk v. Hartford, 70 Conn. 720, 732, 40 A. 906. In exercising its discretion, the court, in a proper case, may consider and balance the injury complained of with that which will result from interference by injunction.

There remains to be considered the portion of the covenant which provides that "all construction plans and specifications of any building to be erected thereon shall be first submitted to and be approved by The Berner Lohne Company, Inc., its successors and assigns." The plaintiffs urge that this is a restrictive covenant running with the land; Stamford v. Vuono, 108 Conn. 359, 143 A.2d 245; that under a general development scheme, where the owner divides the land into building lots to be sold by deeds containing substantially uniform restrictions, any grantee may enforce the restrictions against any other grantee; Hooker v. Alexander, 129 Conn. 433, 436, 29 A.2d 308; Maganini v. Hodgson, 138 Conn. 188, 192, 82 A.2d 801; and that the trial court erred in holding that the restriction in the deed is personal to the company, the original grantor. The trial court based its conclusion on the holding in Rossini v. Freeman, 136 Conn. 321, 71 A.2d 98. The plaintiffs claim that in the Rossini case, the covenant failed to include the successors or assigns of the grantor, whereas in the instant case, approval is required by the company, "its successors and assigns."

PER CURIAM. In 1906, a tract of land in Greenwich known as The Maples was divided into forty lots. All of them were subject to similar building and use restrictions, thereby giving each grantee the right to enforce the restrictions against any other grantee. Maganini v. Hodgson, 138 Conn. 188, 192, 82 A.2d 801. The plaintiffs, who are the present owners of six of these lots, brought this action, seeking to have their lots declared relieved from the deed restrictions.

2 American Law of Property (1952), § 9.30; 5 Restatement, Property, Servitudes (1944), Intr. Note, Ch 46, p. 3244, and § 541, Comment f. If the covenants touch and concern the land previously conveyed out of an area subdivided pursuant to a general building plan, it is ordinarily held that in the absence of evidence of a contrary intent it will be assumed that the parties intended to benefit such land. Maganini v. Hodgson, 138 Conn. 188, 82 A.2d 801, 804-805 (1951); Armstrong v. Leverone, 105 Conn. 464, 471, 136 A. 71 (1927); McLean v. Thurman, 273 S.W.2d 825, 828-829 (Ky 1954); Snow v. Van Dam, 291 Mass. 477, 197 N.E. 224, 228-229 (1935); Hartt v. Rueter, 223 Mass. 207, 111 N.E. 1045, 1046-1047 (1916); Sanborn v. McLean, 233 Mich. 227, 206 N.W. 496, 497 (1925); DeGray v. Monmouth Beach Club House Co., 50 N J Eq 329, 340-342, 24 A. 388 (1892); Tallmadge v. The East River Bank, 26 N.Y. 105, 109, 112 (1862); Johnson v. Mt. Baker Church, 113 Wn. 458, 194 P. 536, 538 (1920); Kramer v. Nelson, 189 Wis. 560, 564, 208 N.W. 252 (1926). See, Vogeler v. Alwyn Improvement Corporation, 247 N.Y. 131, 159 N.E. 886, 887-888 (1928).

Because the plaintiff did not file an action within the limitations period, she is now barred from challenging the 1983 Ford conveyance. Because we concluded in part I of this opinion that the Brush deed contained two covenants and that it is possible to breach one covenant without breaching another; see Maganini v. Hodgson, 138 Conn. 188, 195, 82 A.2d 801 (1951); the running of the statute of limitations with respect to the covenant of unified title does not preclude the plaintiff from enforcing the covenant not to build. Section 52-575a provides that a party seeking to enforce a covenant has three years from the date she has notice, actual or constructive, of the violation of the covenant to file an action.

evidenced by the 1930 deed to Dibble reaffirming the building of one residence each on lots two and three of section E, the 1936 agreement between Whittemore and all the owners of Hop Brook modifying the original deed of section D to Adams providing that each individual lot in section D may have one private residence only, and by the 1934 modification of the minimum cost provision, which was signed by Whittemore and all the lot owners of Hop Brook. The defendants took title with actual notice of the existence of the restrictions contained in each chain of title. In addition, the facts that no new building lot was created in Hop Brook from the time of the first conveyance by Whittemore until the present case arose and that there was no attempt to subdivide until the present time support our interpretation of the covenants and restrictions. It is also clear that, since a common plan of development exists, the plaintiffs have the right to enforce the restrictions against the defendants. Manganini v. Hodgson, 138 Conn. 188, 192-93, 82 A.2d 801 (1951). The trial court's reliance on Whitten v. Clark, supra, 112 Conn. 28, is misplaced. Although there are many factual differences between the two cases, the controlling difference is that in Whitten the right to reenter upon a breach was given to the grantor or his legal representatives.

Violation by a property owner "`of one restriction [will not] estop him to compel the observance of another restriction beneficial to his property.'" Maganini v. Hodgson, 138 Conn. 188, 195, 82 A.2d 801 (1951), quoting 3 H. Tiffany, Real Property (3d Ed.) 873. The defendants also claim that the judgment should be sustained on the alternate grounds of unclean hands and change of circumstances.