Opinion
C. A. NC-2021-0217
01-24-2024
PATRICK W. MAFLIN, PENELOPE A. CHATFIELD, and IAN K. CHATFIELD, Plaintiffs, v. TARA M. MAFLIN Defendant.
For Plaintiff: Michael Resnick, Esq. James P. Murphy, Esq. Evan S. Leviss, Esq. For Defendant: Peter J. Comerford, Esq.
For Plaintiff: Michael Resnick, Esq. James P. Murphy, Esq. Evan S. Leviss, Esq.
For Defendant: Peter J. Comerford, Esq.
DECISION
LICHT, J.
Plaintiffs Patrick W. Maflin, Penelope A. Chatfield, and Ian K. Chatfield (collectively referred to as Plaintiffs) sought a partition by sale of property owned with Defendant Tara M. Maflin (referred to herein as Tara) as well as attorney's fees and other such relief as this Court deems just. Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs Penelope A. Chatfield and Ian K. Chatfield (collectively referred to as the Chatfields) move for summary judgment as to the distribution of the sale proceeds. The Chatfields also move for summary judgment as to all counts alleged against them by Tara in her Counterclaim. Tara objects to the Chatfields' motion. For the reasons stated herein, the Chatfields' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
Because Tara Maflin is a named Defendant and Patrick Maflin is a named Plaintiff, this Court will refer to them by their first names. No disrespect is intended.
I
Facts and Travel
Plaintiff Patrick W. Maflin (referred to herein as Patrick) and Tara wanted to purchase a house located at 22 Channing Street in Newport, Rhode Island (the Property). See Pls.' Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (Pls.' Mem.) Ex. G (Aff. of Ian K. Chatfield). However, they did not have sufficient funds to finance the purchase of the Property and sought financial assistance from Patrick's mother and stepfather, Penelope and Ian Chatfield, who reside in England. See id.
On November 21, 2013, the Chatfields, Patrick, and Tara, all listed as Buyers, executed a Purchase and Sales Agreement (PSA) with counsel present. See Pls.' Mem. Ex. A (Purchase and Sales Agreement). The purchase price of the Property was $320,000, with a balance of $310,400 due on the closing date. Id. at 1. The purchase was scheduled to close on February 1, 2014. Id. However, Patrick and Tara unexpectedly could not cover their one-half share of the balance of the purchase price, which was $155,000. Aff. of Ian K. Chatfield, ¶ 21. The Chatfields loaned Patrick and Tara $77,500, which enabled them to purchase their one-half interest in the Property. Id. ¶ 22. That loan has since been repaid in full and there was no mortgage on the Property. See id. ¶ 21; see also Pls.' Mem. at 2.
At the time of purchase, Patrick and Tara were engaged to be married and had a six-month old daughter. Currently, Patrick and Tara are going through a divorce in England. (Pls.' Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (Pls.' Mem.) Ex. J (Def.'s Resp. to Req. for Admis.), ¶ 12.)
There was a $9,600 deposit paid at the time of executing the Purchase and Sales Agreement (PSA). See Pls.' Mem. Ex. A (Purchase and Sales Agreement). It is unclear who provided the funds for the deposit, but that fact is not relevant to this Court's decision.
The Seller executed and delivered a Warranty Deed dated February 24, 2014. See Pls.' Mem. Ex. E (Warranty Deed). The Warranty Deed states that "Susan R. Mailey, of the City of Newport, County of Newport and State of Rhode Island for consideration of Three Hundred Ten Thousand Dollars ($310,000) grant one half (1/2) interest to Patrick W. Maflin of Whitstable, Kent, United Kingdom and Tara M. Flynn of Newport, Rhode Island, As Joint Tenants and grant the remaining one half (1/2) interest to Penelope A. Chatfield and Ian K. Chatfield, Husband and Wife, of Whitstable, Kent, United Kingdom, As Tenants by the Entirety." Id.
A corrective deed was executed on April 8, 2014, to fix the misspelling of Patrick Maflin's last name, from Malfin to Maflin. See Pls.' Mem. Ex. E (Warranty Deed), at 3.
This Court does not know why the Warranty Deed says the consideration is $310,000 when the Purchase and Sales Agreement listed the purchase price as $320,000. Again, this discrepancy has no bearing on this Court's decision.
After the purchase, Patrick and Tara moved into the Property and lived there until the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, prompting their return to England. See Pls.' Mem. at 3. They rented the Property's spare rooms to Tara's parents, and due to issues surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic, Tara's grandmother moved into the Property and also paid rent. See Pls.' Mem. Ex. J (Def.'s Resp. to Req. for Admis.), ¶¶ 1, 2. In addition, Patrick "intended to run the [Property] as a crew house" by renting out additional spare rooms to individuals in the maritime industry. Aff. of Ian K. Chatfield, ¶ 25; see Pls.' Mem. Ex. I (Def.'s Answers to Interrogs.), ¶ 10. Aside from three or four two-week stays visiting Newport, Rhode Island, the Chatfields never resided at the Property. Aff. of Ian K. Chatfield, ¶ 14. However, Patrick and Tara paid the Chatfields $496.00monthly from a joint account that Patrick and Tara maintained in England. Id. ¶ 24.
The parties dispute whether the rent paid by Tara's family was fair and reasonable or below the fair market price. However, this Court does not find the resolution of that dispute relevant to its decision. See Def.'s Resp. to Req. for Admis., ¶ 1.
In Tara's Answers to Interrogatories, she states that the amount paid each month to the Chatfields was 416 British pounds. See Pls.' Mem. Ex. I (Def.'s Answers to Interrogs.), ¶ 18. This Court assumes that amount is approximately equivalent to $496.
On July 7, 2021, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint for Partition of the Property in Newport County Superior Court. See Pls.' Mem. Ex. B (Complaint (Compl.).) Plaintiffs sought to have the Property sold and the proceeds distributed according to their ownership interest. See id. In Tara's Answer, she expressed that, although the Property is jointly owned, the Chatfields "were placed on the deed as security for having loaned" the funds to purchase the Property. (Pls.' Mem. Ex. C (Answer), ¶ 3.) Plaintiffs sought the appointment of a commissioner to sell the Property and Tara objected. See Docket. On November 15, 2021, the court denied the Motion to Appoint a Commissioner without prejudice. Id.
On September 2, 2022, a Consent Order was entered authorizing the parties to sell the Property for $729,000. See Pls.' Mem. Ex. D (Consent Order), Sept. 2, 2022 (Carnes, J.). Pursuant to the Consent Order, the net proceeds from the sale of the Property were to be held in escrow by Tara's attorney pending further order from the court. Id. On October 24, 2022, Tara filed a Counterclaim against the Chatfields based on unjust enrichment and fraud and/or misrepresentation, and requested the remedy of a constructive trust over the proceeds from the sale. (Pls.' Mem. Ex. F (Amended Counterclaim (Am. Countercl.)), ¶¶ 14-21.)
The Chatfields moved for summary judgment as to the distribution of the sale proceeds and on all counts of Tara's Counterclaim. See Pls.' Mem. at 1. Oral argument occurred on October 23, 2023.
It is important to note that the Chatfields filed a Motion to Strike that was also addressed on October 23, 2023. In sum, the Chatfields moved to strike Tara's Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support of Her Objection to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (referred to herein as Tara's Supplemental Memorandum) and Tara's affidavit. Specifically, the Chatfields moved to strike Tara's affidavit because she relied on and incorporated a mediation memorandum, which was inadmissible pursuant to Rhode Island law. This Court struck only the mediation statement and any related mentions of it in the affidavits.
II
Standard of Review
"Summary judgment is a drastic remedy, and a motion for summary judgment should be dealt with cautiously." Cruz v. DaimlerChrysler Motors Corp., 66 A.3d 446, 451 (R.I. 2013) (internal quotation omitted). "[S]ummary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the Court determines that there are no issues of material fact in dispute, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Quest Diagnostics, LLC v. Pinnacle Consortium of Higher Education, 93 A.3d 949, 951 (R.I. 2014) (internal quotations omitted); see Super. R. Civ. P. 56. The moving party "bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact." McGovern v. Bank of America, N.A., 91 A.3d 853, 858 (R.I. 2014) (citation omitted). Then the burden shifts and as reiterated by the Rhode Island Supreme Court recently:
"The party opposing summary judgment bears the burden of proving, by competent evidence, the existence of facts in dispute. The opposing party will not be allowed to rely upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings but rather, by affidavits or otherwise the opposing party has an affirmative duty to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact." Henry v. Media General Operations, Inc., 254 A.3d 822, 834 (R.I. 2021) (cleaned up, citations omitted).The "purpose of the summary judgment procedure is issue finding, not issue determination." Long v. Dell, Inc., 93 A.3d 988, 995 (R.I. 2014) (internal quotation omitted). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court "views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party[,]" Mruk v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., 82 A.3d 527, 532 (R.I. 2013), and "does not pass upon the weight or the credibility of the evidence[.]" Palmisciano v. Burrillville Racing Association, 603 A.2d 317, 320 (R.I. 1992).
III
Analysis
A
Construction of the Deed
The parties agree that the central issue of this matter pertains to the distribution of proceeds generated from the sale of the Property. See Pls.' Mem. at 1; see also Mem. of Law in Supp. of Def.'s Obj. to Mot. for Summ. J. (Def.'s Obj.) at 1. To summarize the parties' arguments, the Chatfields and Patrick maintain their right to a share of the sale proceeds in accordance with the Warranty Deed, whereas Tara contends that she is entitled to a portion exceeding her 25 percent. See Pls.' Mem.; see also Def.'s Obj.
"'In construing a deed[,] the object sought is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the parties . . . . [T]he intention sought is only that expressed in the deed, and not some secret, unexpressed intention, even though the latter be that actually in mind at the time of execution.'" Horseshoe Falls Preservation, Inc. v. Flynn, No. WC 98-384, 2006 WL 163567, *3 (R.I. Super. Jan. 20, 2006) (quoting Gaddes v. Pawtucket Institution for Savings, 33 R.I. 177, 186, 80 A. 415, 418 (1911)). "'The court, however, seeks only to translate the instrument before it, not to create a new and different one.'" Id. (quoting Gaddes, 33 R.I. at 186, 80 A. at 418). Therefore, the terms of a deed "must be construed according to its plain meaning" as "[t]his is the fundamental rule of all judicial interpretation." Id. at *3-4 (citing Kusiak v. Ucci, 53 R.I. 36, 38 (1932)); see Ciba Specialty Chemicals Corp. v. WP Properties, LLC, No. 980125, 2001 WL 1005855 (R.I. Super. Aug. 2, 2001) (further internal quotations omitted).
Despite the unequivocal written evidence that the Chatfields owned a one-half interest in the Property, it is Tara's position that the Chatfields "were placed on the deed as security for having loaned . . . the funds with which to purchase the house." Answer, ¶ 3. However, this Court disagrees for several reasons. First, the Chatfields, Patrick, and Tara were all listed as "Buyers" on the PSA. See Purchase and Sales Agreement. If the Chatfields were only on the deed as security, why would they have been listed as "Buyers" on the PSA? Even further, if the Chatfields' payment was a loan, for which they wished to have security, there would be a mortgage on the Property securing that loan. However, the Chatfields are grantees, not mortgagees. More importantly, the Warranty Deed explicitly grants Patrick and Tara a one-half interest in the Property as joint tenants and the Chatfields the remaining one-half interest as tenants by the entirety. See Warranty Deed. Holding otherwise would not only create a new and different instrument, but also wholly undermine '"the fundamental rule of all judicial interpretation."' Horseshoe Falls Preservation, Inc., 2006 WL 163567, at *3 (quoting Gaddes, 33 R.I. at 186, 80 A. at 418).
In addition to the plain language of the Warranty Deed, the required formalities associated with tenancy interests make it "less likely that a party would be named as a joint owner on a deed[,] rather than on a bank account[,] 'merely for convenience.'" Flori v. Bolster, No. PC-03-6151, 2006 WL 1073423, *6 (R.I. Super. Apr. 18, 2006). "[T]he very nature of the creation of [tenancy interests] makes it unlikely that such a disposition would result without the intent of the parties." Id. (emphasis added). Several e-mail exchanges preceding the execution of the PSA and Warranty Deed also shed light on the parties' intentions. Within this correspondence, involving all four parties, Penelope Chatfield articulated the Chatfields' intention to acquire "a 50% share" in the Property, providing detailed conditions for assuming the role of "half owners," wherein Patrick agreed to the specified terms and conditions. (Def.'s Obj. (Negotiation E-mails dated Sept. 17-18, 2013), at 1-2.) The Warranty Deed that followed these discussions also stands as testament to the parties' intentions.
The conditions stated are as follows:
"At the time of purchase and into perpetuity the property will be fully and honestly insured [i.e.] you will disclose all pertinent information to the insurers including the fact that you are renting out part of the property. "Any building work that is carried out must be subject to all planning and building regulations. "As half owners we would require a room (ideally one of the front bedrooms and a room big enough to take a large double bed - not sure how big the rooms were) for our sole use - but at our discretion this could be used for family visitors - either our family or Tara's family. ". . . "The last condition is that into perpetuity Patrick is no longer mean or moody to either Tara or his mum and he phones his mum at least once a week." (Def.'s Obj. (Negotiation E-mails dated Sept. 17-18, 2013), at 2.)
Moreover, Tara argues that the Chatfields not only loaned her and Patrick $77,500, but also insists that the Chatfields' $155,000 payment at the closing was a loan. Def.'s Obj. at 3. It is Tara's position that "the final agreement was that [Patrick and Tara] would pay all expenses, pay interest to the Chatfields, and if the house was sold the Chatfields would get their original investment back." (Def.'s Obj. (Aff. of Tara Maflin), ¶ 7.) Tara further contends that the parties agreed that the Chatfields would not enjoy any appreciation in the value of the Property. Def.'s Obj. at 7. Nevertheless, Tara's oral assertions do not legally pass muster.
Tara's memorandum cites the Chatfields' purchase price as $150,000; nevertheless, half of $310,000, due at the closing, equals $155,000.
As emphasized in a recent ruling by the Rhode Island Supreme Court, "the Statute of Frauds is to 'be strictly construed and strictly applied.'" Loffredo v. Shapiro, 274 A.3d 782, 792 (R.I. 2022). The purpose and rationale of the Statute of Frauds is "'to prevent perjured testimony with respect to oral contracts'" and, as in this instance, "'to guard against perjury by one claiming under an alleged agreement.'" Keane v. Mulligan, No. KC 020946, 2005 WL 1530462, *5 (R.I. Super. June 23, 2005) (quoting Smith v. Boyd, 553 A.2d 131, 132 (R.I. 1989)). In pertinent part:
"No action shall be brought:
"(1) Whereby to charge any person upon any contract for the sale of lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or the making of any lease thereof for a longer time than one year;
". . .
"(7) Except in cases to which the uniform commercial code (title 6A) applies, whereby to charge any person upon any contract for the sale of personal property beyond five thousand dollars ($5,000) in an amount or value of remedy, unless the promise or agreement upon which the action shall be brought, or some note or memorandum thereof, shall be in writing, and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or by some other person by him or her thereunto lawfully authorized." G.L. 1956 § 9-1-4(1), (7)."It is well settled that '[t]he [S]tatute of [F]rauds does not require contracts for the sale of land to be in writing[,]' but if such a contract be an oral agreement, it will be enforced only if evidenced by a 'sufficient memorandum.'" Loffredo, 274 A.3d at 790 (quoting UXB Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Rosenfeld Concrete Corp., 641 A.2d 75, 78 (R.I. 1996)) (emphasis added) (internal quotation omitted). "Such memorand[um] must set out who are the seller and the buyer, their respective intention to sell and to purchase, a description of the subject matter of the sale, the purchase price, and terms of payment." MacKnight v. Pansey, 122 R.I. 774, 782, 412 A.2d 236, 241 (1980).
The circumstances of this matter underscore the rationale and purpose of the Statute of Frauds. First, this dispute is based on a real estate transaction that was negotiated over ten years ago. See Negotiation E-mails. Second, Tara lacks any written documentation or a sufficient memorandum that reflects her version of "the final agreement" regarding ownership rights or payment obligations. Def.'s Resp. to Req. for Admis., ¶¶ 3, 6. Third, Patrick has not presented either opposing or supporting evidence for this motion; therefore, this Court must rely on the documentary evidence submitted by the Chatfields and Tara. See Keane, 2005 WL 1530462, at *5. In sum, the alleged oral communications relied on by Tara are barred by the Statute of Frauds as there is no writing, signed by the Chatfields, supporting her version of "the final agreement." Moreover, as discussed above, the only documentary evidence, namely, the PSA, the Warranty Deed, and the e-mails, support an entirely different conclusion.
Tara attempts to avoid the Statute of Frauds by contending that this "alleged agreement has to do with the financing of the purchase of the house and the running of a business therein," which amounts to a partnership and thus not subject to the Statute of Frauds. Def.'s Obj. at 12. This contention not only contradicts Tara's initial assertion that the payments were "loans" but also that the Chatfields would not enjoy any appreciation in the value of the Property. Id. at 3, 7.
A partnership is defined as "an association of two (2) or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit." Alegria v. One Lot of Land Known as 592 Main Street, No. PB 05-0232, 2006 WL 3436046, *5 (R.I. Super. Nov. 27, 2006) (internal quotation omitted). In determining whether a partnership exists, courts must look to: "1) the parties' intent, 2) whether the partnership activity is a 'business,' 3) whether the parties intended to carry on as co-owners, and 4) whether the activity is for profit." Id. However, the most important factor that courts examine in determining whether a partnership exists relates to the sharing of profits. Id. at *6. One source of profit from a real estate transaction is appreciation. Yet, Tara's own arguments concede that no partnership existed. Tara contends that the Chatfields were only to receive monthly "interest" payments and agreed not to share in the appreciation of the Property. Aff. of Tara Maflin, ¶ 7. If that is so, then how could the Chatfields be partners?
Nevertheless, this Court remains unpersuaded that the parties intended to form a partnership. See Negotiation E-mails. In the negotiation e-mails, the underlying intention of the Chatfields expressly prioritizes the establishment of a family home for Patrick and Tara rather than the formation of a partnership. Penelope Chatfield specifically stated that "[the Chatfields] [did] not want the house filled with lodgers" and that their "objective in helping . . . is that this will provide a FAMILY home . . . . Not everything is about making a profit." Negotiation E-mails, at 2. Tara also admitted that Penelope Chatfield had expressed "how happy she was to help [her] and Patrick buy [their] family home . . . ." Def.'s Resp. to Req. for Admis., ¶ 13 (emphasis added).
Therefore, besides the oral assertions that are barred by the Statute of Frauds, Tara failed to set forth, through competent evidence, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact in dispute over the distribution of ownership percentages among the parties. This Court holds that the Warranty Deed governs, and the Chatfields owned 50 percent of the Property and are thus entitled to one-half of the sale proceeds.
B
Accounting of the Costs
Under G.L. 1956 § 34-15-22, relating to partitions, this Court "may adjudge and determine, as to it shall appear equitable and just, relative to the apportionment of costs among the parties, plaintiff and defendant, by dividing the costs equally or subjecting either party to the payment of the whole or any part thereof." Section 34-15-22 (emphasis added). However, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has articulated that there is nothing in this statute that "requires [a] trial justice to assess the costs of all such suits ratably in accordance with the fractional interests of the parties, even though ordinarily that would be equitable. The language of the statute above italicized clearly vests the trial justice with authority, in the exercise of his sound discretion, to make the assessment conform to the special circumstances of a case where it would be equitable and just to do so." Barney v. Barney, 83 R.I. 182, 185, 114 A.2d 399, 401 (1955).
It is Tara's position that an accounting is necessary regarding all funds expended on the maintenance and upkeep of the Property. See Am. Countercl., at 4. Specifically, she argues that Patrick and herself "were the only people who paid any expenses toward the upkeep, maintenance, and improvement of the [Property], including but not limited to taxes and insurance." Aff. of Tara Maflin, ¶ 5.
In Bissonnette v. Ventura, No. PC 02-3437, 2004 WL 2821652 (R.I. Super. Nov. 22, 2004), the court held that the parties, as joint tenants, were entitled to an equal division, each receiving half shares of the property or any proceeds thereof. See Bissonnette, 2004 WL 2821652, at *3. Similar to the case here, Bissonnette asserted that she contributed more than half of all monthly household expenses, gained no rent from the property, and lacked actual possession or use of it; whereas, Ventura claimed that he made all of the payments with respect to the property, including but not limited to the mortgage, insurance, taxes, water, and sewer expenses. Id. However, the court reasoned that because Bissonnette and Ventura each contributed to the down payment on the property, maintained a joint bank account from which expenses were paid, and the deed itself explicitly stated that the parties owned the property as joint tenants, they were entitled to equal, one-half interests in the property. Id.
Although the Chatfields did not participate in the improvement and maintenance of the Property, this Court sees the parties' arrangement as equitable. As the Chatfields resided in England, they were not able to manage the day-to-day of the Property. See Aff. of Ian K. Chatfield, ¶ 25; see also Pls.' Mem. Ex. H. (Aff. of Penelope A. Chatfield), ¶ 25. The Chatfields never instructed Patrick or Tara to make improvements or repairs to the Property. Aff. of Ian K. Chatfield, ¶ 13. Such repairs and improvements "were for the purpose of having extra rooms to rent to other people and to otherwise keep the Property in good condition" which were made by Patrick and paid from accounts located in England. Aff. of Ian K. Chatfield, ¶ 15; see Aff. of Tara Maflin, ¶ 6. Furthermore, Patrick and Tara pocketed the rental income generated by the Property. Although the characterization of the rent is disputed, Tara's parents and grandmother lived on the Property and whatever rent they paid, Tara and Patrick kept. Moreover, Tara and Patrick lived there and instead of paying rent, they paid expenses.
Therefore, given the undisputed nature of these facts, this Court views this arrangement as equitable. To order a precise accounting would require reviewing nearly eight years of income and expenses. With respect to the income, this Court would need expert testimony as to the fair market value for Patrick and Tara, Tara's parents, and Tara's grandmother. With respect to expenses, this Court would also need expert testimony as to which expenses would have been paid by a tenant and which by a landlord. This Court believes it would be wasteful to put the parties and it through such an exercise. It finds that an equitable result is to have the parties share equal, one-half interests in the Property in accordance with their ownership as expressed in the Warranty Deed. As stated in Bissonnette, "[w]hile one party may have paid the mortgage with his income, the other may have purchased food with hers, yet neither party could subsist without either item . . . ." Bissonnette, 2004 WL 2821652, at *3.
1
Costs and Attorney's Fees
It is important to briefly note that the Chatfields request this Court to "order . . . [Tara] to pay the Chatfields reasonable costs and attorneys' fees associated with this unnecessary litigation." Pls.' Mem. at 21.
It is well settled that, under the "American rule," each litigant must pay for its own attorney fees absent statutory authority or contractual liability. See Shine v. Moreau, 119 A.3d 1, 8 (R.I. 2015). Pursuant to § 34-15-22, as it relates to partitions, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has held that the fees and expenses of a commissioner are appropriately considered as costs in a partition proceeding. See Barney, 83 R.I. at 185, 114 A.2d 401. Moreover, "[a]ttorney's fees are part of said costs, in addition to the costs of the actual partition and costs of bringing the suit." Bissonnette, 2004 WL 2821652, at *5 (citing Francis v. Francis, 81 R.I. 346, 102 A.2d 872 (1954)). "The theory underlying the apportionment of attorney's fees in partition actions is the common benefit doctrine, and is predicated upon 'the principle that where a suit for partition was necessary, and its benefit inured to all the parties, the cost of procuring it should not be thrown wholly upon the [plaintiff], but should be borne in part by those who share in the benefit.'" Moore v. Ballard, 914 A.2d 487, 489-90 (R.I. 2007) (quoting Robinson v. Robinson, 24 R.I. 222, 223, 52 A. 982, 993 (1902)). Nevertheless, "a justice of the superior court in his sound discretion may award even counsel fees as a part of the costs assessed in a suit for partition." Barney, 83 R.I. at 185, 114 A.2d at 401 (citing Francis, 81 R.I. at 349-50, 102 A.2d at 873).
Customarily, a commissioner is appointed in these matters to assess property values or to oversee property sales; thus, such costs would be allocated. However, in this instance, no commissioner was appointed, and a Consent Order was entered into by the parties to sell the Property. This Court finds that a justiciable issue was raised by Tara. The sale proceeds remain intact without any deductions for expenses, and the attorney's fees are solely tied to matters concerning the distribution of such proceeds. Consequently, this Court, finding no basis to wield its authority to order Tara to pay for the Chatfields' costs and attorney's fees, deems it equitable for each party to bear their respective attorney fees.
C
Theories of Counterclaim Liability
Tara advances two theories of liability, unjust enrichment and fraud and/or misrepresentation, and seeks the imposition of a constructive trust. See Am. Countercl. ¶¶ 14-21.
1
Unjust Enrichment
"Under Rhode Island law, unjust enrichment is not simply a remedy in contract and tort but can stand alone as a cause of action in its own right." Dellagrotta v. Dellagrotta, 873 A.2d 101, 113 (R.I. 2005) (citing Toupin v. Laverdiere, 729 A.2d 1286 (R.I. 1999)). "To recover for unjust enrichment, a claimant must prove: (1) that he or she conferred a benefit upon the party from whom relief is sought; (2) that the recipient appreciated the benefit; and (3) that the recipient accepted the benefit under such circumstances 'that it would be inequitable for [the recipient] to retain the benefit without paying the value thereof.'" Id. (citing Bouchard v. Price, 694 A.2d 670, 673 (R.I. 1997)). The Rhode Island Supreme Court has held that the third prong of the analysis is the most important because "'[d]etermining what constitutes a just or unjust result requires a trial justice to examine the facts of the particular case and balance the equities.'" Emond Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. BankNewport, 105 A.3d 85, 90 (R.I. 2014) (quoting Dellagrotta, 873 A.2d at 115).
Tara contends that the Chatfields "would be unjustly enriched if they received interest payments, allowed Patrick and [herself] to pay all the carrying charges of the house, and then share equally in the appreciation of the house." Def.'s Obj. at 7. However, she ignores the undisputed fact that for many years she and Patrick lived there, her parents lived there, and ultimately, her grandmother moved in. Tara and Patrick did pay the expenses, but they kept the rents and resided at the Property. Whether those rents were at or below fair market value does not matter because they set the rent. Also, Patrick and Tara retained all sums paid by the crew members who stayed there on occasion.
Tara also claims she and Patrick made improvements to the Property. Aff. of Tara Maflin, ¶¶ 6, 7. However, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has held that "'[w]hen a party makes improvements or confers a benefit upon the land of another with full knowledge that title is vested in another, or subject to dispute, the improver will not be entitled to restitution under the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment.'" Dellagrotta, 873 A.2d at 114 (quoting Eastern Motor Inns, Inc. v. Ricci, 565 A.2d 1265, 1272 (R.I. 1989)) (emphasis added). As discussed in Part III, Section A, supra, Tara did not "make[] improvements or confer[] a benefit upon the land of another," but rather, she made improvements or conferred a benefit upon the Property with full knowledge that it was jointly owned with the Chatfields and Patrick. See Dellagrotta, 873 A.2d at 114. Moreover, she and Patrick retained the rents which those improvements generated.
2
Constructive Trust
"The underlying principle of a constructive trust is the equitable prevention of unjust enrichment of one party at the expense of another in situations in which legal title to property was obtained by fraud or in violation of a fiduciary or confidential relationship." Renaud v. Ewart, 712 A.2d 884, 885 (R.I. 1998) (citing Simpson v. Dailey, 496 A.2d 126, 128 (R.I. 1985)). A party seeking imposition of a constructive trust "bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence (1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship between the parties and (2) either a breach of some promise or an act involving fraud that occurred as a result of this confidential association." Id. (citing Clark v. Bowler, 623 A.2d 27, 29 (R.I. 1993)). "'With respect to real property there must be some element of fraudulent conduct by the person in possession of the property in procuring the conveyance in order for a constructive trust to arise.'" Sousa v. Roy, 243 A.3d 775, 780 (R.I. 2021) (quoting Curato v. Brain, 715 A.2d 631, 634 (R.I. 1998)). "'For fraud to lead to the creation of a constructive trust, the evidence must show that the holder of legal title procured title through fraud. There must be an actual misrepresentation of present intent.'" Nani v. Vanasse, No. PC 05-995, 2006 WL 8089630, at *6 (R.I. Super. Feb. 23, 2006) (quoting J.K. Social Club v. J.K. Realty Corp., 448 A.2d 130, 134 (R.I. 1982)).
Tara argues that she was induced to enter into this agreement based on a representation that the Chatfields would not participate in the appreciation of the Property. Def.'s Obj. at 7. However, if such a representation were made, this claim weighs against Patrick rather than the Chatfields.Tara admitted that the Chatfields never made a statement to her or sent any written communications that indicated they were only on the deed to secure a loan; rather "[t]his is what [she] was told by Patrick." Def.'s Resp. to Req. for Admis., ¶ 6. Tara also admitted that she told Penelope Chatfield that Patrick, not the Chatfields, misrepresented the terms of the agreement to purchase the Property. Id. ¶ 7.
This Motion for Summary Judgment was filed by counsel for the Chatfields and did not include Patrick.
Even so, Tara admitted that she was directly involved with the negotiations regarding the purchase of the Property. Id. ¶ 5. Tara also admitted that she signed the PSA which reflected the Chatfields as "Buyers" of the Property, along with her and Patrick. Id. ¶ 8. Also, at the time of the purchase of the Property, she admitted that she knew that the Chatfields were to be named on the Warranty Deed as 50 percent owners of the Property. Id. ¶ 10. Therefore, Tara has not shown that the Chatfields made a false representation intending to induce her reliance nor that she justifiably relied on the representation to her detriment. See Nani, 2006 WL 8089630, at *6.
Thus, Tara failed to set forth, through competent evidence, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact to support her underlying claims; consequently, Tara does not have a viable claim for unjust enrichment and fraud and/or misrepresentation. Therefore, the imposition of constructive trust is unwarranted.
IV
Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, this Court GRANTS the Chatfields' Motion for Summary Judgment. Counsel shall confer and submit an appropriate order and judgment.