Opinion
2014-02867 Index No. 6391/10.
01-20-2016
Smilowitz & Smilowitz, West Hempstead, N.Y. (Alan Smilowitz of counsel), for appellant. Valerie S. Wolfman, New York, N.Y., for respondent.
Smilowitz & Smilowitz, West Hempstead, N.Y. (Alan Smilowitz of counsel), for appellant.
Valerie S. Wolfman, New York, N.Y., for respondent.
Opinion
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Joseph J. Esposito, J.), dated July 17, 2012. The judgment awarded the plaintiff a distributive award in the sum of $128,890.85.
ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for further proceedings in accordance herewith.
In this matrimonial action, after a trial on the issue of equitable distribution the Supreme Court awarded the plaintiff a distributive award in the sum of $128,890.85.
The distribution of marital property and allocation of marital debt is generally left to the sound discretion of the trial court (see Domestic Relations Law § 236[B]5[e]; Lewis v. Lewis, 118 A.D.3d 958, 959, 989 N.Y.S.2d 64; McLoughlin v. McLoughlin, 74 A.D.3d 911, 914, 903 N.Y.S.2d 467). The factors a court must consider in distributing marital property are set forth in Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(5)(d). “ ‘In fashioning an award of equitable distribution, the Supreme Court is required to discuss the statutory factors it relied upon in distributing marital property’ ” (Morille–Hinds v. Hinds, 87 A.D.3d 526, 527, 928 N.Y.S.2d 727, quoting Spera v. Spera, 71 A.D.3d 661, 662, 898 N.Y.S.2d 548; see Domestic Relations Law § 236[B]5[g]; Milnes v. Milnes, 50 A.D.3d 750, 750, 857 N.Y.S.2d 168). Nevertheless, “ ‘[w]here it is evident that the Supreme Court considered all relevant factors and the reasons for its decision are articulated, the court is not required to specifically cite to and analyze each statutory factor’ ” (Morille–Hinds v. Hinds, 87 A.D.3d at 527, 928 N.Y.S.2d 727, quoting Spera v. Spera, 71 A.D.3d at 662, 898 N.Y.S.2d 548; see Milnes v. Milnes, 50 A.D.3d at 750, 857 N.Y.S.2d 168). Although this Court has the same power to distribute marital property as the trial court (see O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 589, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 489 N.E.2d 712; Kobylack v. Kobylack, 62 N.Y.2d 399, 403, 477 N.Y.S.2d 109, 465 N.E.2d 829; Morille–Hinds v. Hinds, 87 A.D.3d at 527, 928 N.Y.S.2d 727; Spera v. Spera, 71 A.D.3d at 662, 898 N.Y.S.2d 548), “ ‘absent a detailed record of the reasoning employed by the Supreme Court,’ this Court may ‘remit the matter to the Supreme Court for a new determination based on findings of fact in compliance with Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(5)(g)’ ” ( Morille–Hinds v. Hinds, 87 A.D.3d at 527, 928 N.Y.S.2d 727, quoting Rossi v. Rossi, 137 A.D.2d 590, 591, 524 N.Y.S.2d 482; see O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 589, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 489 N.E.2d 712; McLoughlin v. McLoughlin, 74 A.D.3d 911, 915, 903 N.Y.S.2d 467; Gape v. Gape, 110 A.D.2d 621, 622, 487 N.Y.S.2d 111).
Here, the Supreme Court failed to set forth the factors it considered in determining how to allocate the parties' debt and equitably distribute their marital property (see Lewis v. Lewis, 118 A.D.3d 958, 960, 989 N.Y.S.2d 64; Morille–Hinds v. Hinds, 87 A.D.3d at 527, 928 N.Y.S.2d 727; Payne v. Payne, 4 A.D.3d 512, 513–514, 771 N.Y.S.2d 714). Additionally, the facts were not sufficiently developed at trial to enable a reasoned determination of the issue of equitable distribution (see McLoughlin v. McLoughlin, 74 A.D.3d at 915, 903 N.Y.S.2d 467; O'Halloran v. O'Halloran, 58 A.D.3d 704, 705, 873 N.Y.S.2d 87). Accordingly, the matter must be remitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for a new trial and a new determination thereafter of the issue of equitable distribution based on findings of fact in compliance with Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(5)(g) (see McLoughlin v. McLoughlin, 74 A.D.3d at 915, 903 N.Y.S.2d 467; O'Halloran v. O'Halloran, 58 A.D.3d at 705, 873 N.Y.S.2d 87; Rossi v. Rossi, 137 A.D.2d at 590–591, 524 N.Y.S.2d 482).