Opinion
No. 99 C 0344
August 24, 2000
MEMORANDUM, OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Harry B. Madsen, pro Se, brings suit individually and as Trustee of Trust Number 89-1561. Madsen has filed a two-count first amended complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking damages and a mandatory injunction. Defendants, the Illinois Department of Professional Regulation ("DPR"), State of Illinois, Adrienne Hersh, Doris Barnes, Michael Johnson, Sanford Johnson, Howard Spinner, Thomas Chiola, Thomas Kean, Century 21 American Tradition ("Century 21") Northwest Suburban Board of Realtors ("Northwest"), Diane McMillian, Gillick Realtors, Fred Gillick, and Aurelia Pucinski all move to dismiss the first amended complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For the following reasons, we grant the motions to dismiss.
BACKGROUND
All of the claims asserted by Madsen stem from a December 9, 1993 Department of Professional Regulation ("DPR") hearing and events which occurred in its aftermath. As a result of the hearing, Madsen's real estate license was suspended for five years, and he was ordered to participate in additional professional education and pay a $5,000 fine.
On June 15, 1994, Madsen filed a complaint in state court, under the Illinois Administrative ProceduresAct, seeking a review of DPR's decision. On April 2, 1996, the Circuit Court of Cook County dismissed Madsen's complaint with prejudice for failure to name a necessary party. Madsen then appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court, First Judicial District. The Appellate Court affirmed the dismissal, finding that the Circuit Court did not have jurisdiction to consider Madsen's claim. Madsen then filed suit in this Court.
Although the first amended complaint is inartfully drafted, Madsen alleges that the defendants collectively "deprived the plaintiff of his lawful civil rights, impeding his defense against bogus (DPR) charges and depriv [ed] him of his property right to act freely as a real estate broker."
The majority of the Madsen's first amended complaint is focused on the administrative deficiencies of the DPR. Madsen claims that "massive civil rights violations [occurred] at every level of the DPR proceedings." Specifically, Madsen asserts that the DPR failed to follow various Illinois Revised Statutes and that these failures caused prejudice at his DPR hearing.
Madsen also files suit against several employees of DPR, claiming that they were integral in the unjust result at his DPR hearing. Howard E. Spinner is sued in his personal capacity for allegedly making a false assertion as a "technical advisor" during Madsen's DPR hearing and also for unlawfully altering evidence. Thomas Chiola, as general counsel of DPR, allegedly failed to comply with Madsen's information requests. Doris E. Barnes, DPR clerk, is named for allegedly failing to assemble a comprehensive, orderly record of the DPR hearing for Madsen. Michael Johnson, DPR investigator, allegedly testified falsely during Madsen's DPR hearing. Finally, Sanford Johnson, DPR attorney, allegedly "gratuitously" participated in the hearing even though he was not involved in the prosecution of Madsen.
Madsen also names several private parties in this suit who allegedly acted in concert with the DPR to deprive Madsen of his civil rights. Thomas Kean, president of Century 21 American Tradition, is named together with Century 21 for providing Madsen with illicit business cards. Diane McMillian, an officer of Northwest Suburban Association of Realtors, is included in this suit along with Northwest allegedly for failing to divulge information to a DPR investigator. Finally, Fred Gillick, president of Gillick Realtors, is named in the complaint together with Gillick Realtors allegedly for forging an instrument in Madsen's name "which ignited this decade long litigation." All of the aforementioned acts or omissions which Madsen complains of occurred prior to filing his complaint for administrative review in the Cook County Circuit Court on June 15, 1994.
Aurelia Pucinski, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County, is named in this suit in her official capacity for failing to timely docket and provide a computer record of the mandate from the Illinois Appellate Court. Pucinski's office allegedly received and time-stamped the mandate on December 29, 1997. Madsen claims that the mandate was not processed by Pucinski's office until three weeks later. Madsen contends that during this period of alleged neglect he remained unaware of the Appellate Court's decision, causing him to exceed the 21 day period to file his petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court.
DISCUSSION
When considering a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), the Court takes all well pleaded facts as true. Midwest Grinding Company v. Spitz, 976 F.2d 1016, 1019 (7th Cir. 1992). A complaint should not be dismissed unless it is clear that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of her claim that would entitle her to relief. Chaney v. Suburban Bus Division of the Regional Transportation Authority, 52 F.3d 623, 627 (7th Cir. 1995). However, even when construing the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, one "must allege sufficient facts to outline the cause of action, proof of which is essential to recovery." Ellsworth v. City of Racine, 774 F.2d 182, 184 (7th Cir. 1985). To withstand a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must go beyond "conclusory allegations concerning the legal effect of facts set out in the complaint." Baxter v. Vigo County School Corporation, 26 F.3d 728, 730 (7th Cir. 1994).
I. Madsen's Claims Are Barred By The Statute of Limitations
Each defendant, except Pucinski, moves to dismiss the first amended complaint on the grounds that it is time-barred. While § 1983 does not provide for a specific statute of limitations, federal courts look to the law of the state where the injury occurred to determine the applicable statute of limitations. Horton v. Marovich, 925 F. Supp. 540, 543 (N.D. Ill. 1996). In Illinois, the statute of limitations applied to § 1983 actions is two years. Cathedral of Joy Baptist Church v. Village of Hazel Crest, 22 F.3d 713, 716 (7th Cir. 1994). The two year statute of limitations begins when the plaintiff knows or should have known that his constitutional rights were violated. Id. at 717.
On June 15, 1994, Madsen filed suit in the Circuit Court of Cook County. It is undisputed that all the activities of which Madsen complains, except Pucinski's actions, took place on or before this date. Thus, the statute of limitations began to run, at the latest, on June 15, 1994 and, therefore, expired on June 15, 1996. On January 26, 1999, Madsen filed suit in this Court, more than two years after the cause of action arose. Therefore, Madsen's federal civil rights claims should have been brought on or before June 15, 1996, and are accordingly time barred. Madsen's failure to bring suit within the statue of limitations is dispositive of his suit, excluding his claim against Pucinski. Notwithstanding, this Court will now address the other arguments raised by the defendants in support of their motions to dismiss.
Madsen's complaint against Aurelia Pucinski stems from actions which occurred in January 1998. Since this falls within two years of Madsen's filing of his complaint in this Court, our analysis of the statue of limitations does not pertain to the claim against Pucinski.
II. Madsen's Claims Are Barred By The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
It is a basic tenet of federal law that the federal district courts lack jurisdiction to review or modify a judgment of state courts. This doctrine is commonly referred to as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 463 (1983). The Seventh Circuit described the doctrine in a recent case as follows:
The essence of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is that the lower federal courts do not have the authority to review the judgments of the state courts even when a federal question is presented. The only federal court possessing such authority is the Supreme Court of the United States . . . . Litigants who believe that a state judicial proceeding has violated their constitutional rights must appeal that decision through their state courts and then to the Supreme Court.Centres, Inc. v. Town of Brookfield. Wis., 148 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 1998).
A decision by a state court, no matter how erroneous, is not itself a violation of the Constitution actionable in federal court. If a party files suit seeking to have a federal district court review or set aside a state judicial proceeding, the federal court must dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Ritter v. Ross. 992 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1993);Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362 (7th Cir. 1996). "A litigant dissatisfied with the decision of a state tribunal must appeal rather than file an independent suit in federal court." Alpern v. Lieb, 38 F.3d 933, 934 (7th Cir. 1994).
In this case, the first amended complaint is brought by Madsen because he is unhappy with the outcome of his administrative hearing and the related state court case and appeal. In Count I, Madsen lists numerous state statutes with which DPR allegedly did not comply, and it additionally states that "he has strong and meritorious defenses against the DPR charges against him in the initial cause" and that "those same facts" are the evidence of the violation of his civil rights. ln Count II, Madsen prays that this Court order DPR to reinstate his license, vacate his fine and restore his continuing education exemptions. Additionally, in Count II, Madsen admits that this action and this Court is not the forum for the presentation of his alleged meritorious defenses of the DPR charges against him. Clearly, Madsen brings this action as a means to seek redress for the decisions made in the state court proceedings as well as the administrative hearing.
Madsen has had due process in this case. He appealed his administrative hearing decision to the Circuit Court, and when he was unsuccessful in the Circuit Court, and he appealed to the Illlinois Appellate Court, First Judicial District. Madsen claims that the instant complaint "is not an appeal from State Court Rulings, but is a complaint based on massive Civil Rights violations at every level of these proceedings, not addressed in the state courts. . impeding his defense against bogus charges and depriving him of his property right to act freely as a Real Estate Broker." However, the nature of the allegations and the remedies sought by Madsen makes it clear that he seeks to invalidate the findings against him at the administrative level and the state court appeals that followed.
Madsen claims that the defendants acted in concert to cause the entry of judgments against him without regard to merit or law. Said judgments allegedly deprived Madsen of property absent due process. However, Madsen's allegations are meaningless unless they seek a determination from this Court that the state court findings were wrong. In accordance with the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a federal lawsuit is not a means to circumvent state court decisions. Thus, because we find that Madsen's first amended complaint violates the tenets of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, we dismiss it for lack of jurisdiction.
III. Madsen Fails To State A Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
In addition to the above-stated reasons for dismissal of the first amended complaint, defendants also contend that Madsen's pleaded facts, taken as true, are insufficient to establish a cognizable cause of action under § 1983.
To fall under § 1983, the conduct complained of must have been "committed by a person acting under the color of state law," and the conduct must deprive a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 937, (1982). When a plaintiff wishes to assert a cause of action under § 1983, "there must be sufficient facts pleaded to allow the court and other defendants to understand the gravamen of the plaintiffs complaint." Doherty v. City of Chicago, 75 F.3d 318, 326 (7th Cir. 1996). A complaint inadequately alleges conspiracy when the facts it alleges are vague, conclusory and include no overt acts reasonably related to the promotion of the alleged conspiracy. Kunik v. Racine County. Wis., 946 F.2d 1574 (7th Cir. 1991).
A review of Madsen's first amended complaint demonstrates that it fails to allege facts sufficient to establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Madsen claims to have suffered a violation of his constitutional rights, but he fails to state with any degree of specificity the rights which were allegedly violated. Instead, Madsen claims that the defendants did not follow a number of state statutes during his administrative proceedings. Madsen does not allege how any of the named parties conspired against him to deprive him of his rights. While Madsen's allegations could possibly be construed as a complaint about the practices of DPR, they fall short of alleging a conspiracy between any of the parties to deprive him of his constitutional rights.
In determining whether a conspiracy exists in a § 1983 case, the Seventh Circuit has provided the following guidelines in Kunic v. Racine County, 946 F.2d 1574, 1580 (7th Cir. 1991):
First, a conspiracy requires an agreement. Second, the agreement need not be overt, but if not, the alleged acts must be sufficient to raise the inference of mutual understanding. Third, acts performed together by members of a conspiracy are adequate when they are unlikely to have been undertaken without an agreement. Finally, a whiff of the alleged conspirators' assent cannot await discovery but must be made apparent in the complaint.
Madsen has failed to raise even an inference of a conspiracy in his complaint. In his complaint, Madsen states that the public individual defendants acted "in concert with private individual defendants, depriving the plaintiff of his lawful civil rights." A "complaint inadequately alleges conspiracy when the facts it alleges are vague, conclusory and include no overt acts reasonably related to the promotion of the alleged conspiracy." Hansen v, Algrin, 520 F.2d 768, 770 (7th Cir. 1995). For these reasons alone, Madsen's first amended complaint must be dismissed.
A. The Private Defendants Were Not Acting Under Color of State Law
In addition, Madsen has failed to establish that any of the private parties acted in conjunction with the State to deprive him of his Constitutional rights. "Generally, employees of a private company cannot be charged with exercising state action." Roby v. Skupien, 758 F.2d 471, 472 (7th Cir. 1991). However, to act "under color" of law does not require that the accused be an officer of the State. "It is enough that he is a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents." Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152, (1970). Before a private party's conduct can be considered state action there must be a sufficiently close nexus between the state and private conduct so that the action "may be fairly treated as that of the State itself." Wade v. Byles, 83 F.3d 902, 905 (7th Cir. 1996). For the reasons stated below, Madsen has failed to establish that any of the "private" defendants acted under color of state law.
1. Thomas Kean and Century 21 American Tradition
Madsen contends that private actors Kean and Century 21 are liable under § 1983 for providing him with Century 21 American Tradition business cards which Madsen was prohibited to use because he was not a Century 21 realtor at that time. In order for Madsen to state a claim under § 1983, he must show a nexus between the private action and the State. Wade 83 F.3d at 905. Madsen's claim does not state how these business cards relate to any joint activity between Kean, Century 21 and the State. Accordingly, the § 1983 claims against Kean and Century 21 must be dismissed.
2. Fred Gillick and Gillick Realtors
Madsen claims that these defendants are liable because an unnamed Gillick real estate agent informed the DPR of Madsen's alleged illegal activities, initiating his disciplinary hearing. Madsen further alleges that the document used by the real estate agent had Madsen's forged signature on it. These allegations, taken as true, are insufficient to state an actionable claim.
Neither Gillick Realtors nor Fred Gillick were "acting under color of state law." Gillick Realtors is a private corporation and Fred Gillick is a principal of that corporation. Employees of a private company do not engage in State action. Roby v. skupien, 758 F. Supp. 471, 473 (N.D. Ill. 1991). The Gillick realtor's conduct of furnishing information regarding Madsen's conduct to DPR is inadequate to establish a nexus between private and State actors. Moreover, Madsen has failed to show the significance of the alleged forgery on the document in question. The DPR conducted a separate investigation into Madsen's professional conduct and concluded that there had been unlawful conduct on his part. Madsen fails to show how this document improperly influenced the DPR's investigation.
Assuming that Madsen's allegations are true, the actions of Gillick Realtors and Fred Gillick were purely the conduct of private individuals which cannot form the basis of a claim under § 1983. See Young v. Arkansas Children's Hospital, 721 F. Supp. 197, 198 (E.D.Ark. 1989). Accordingly, Madsen's claim against Fred Gillick and Gillick Realtors must be dismissed,
3. Diane McMillian and Northwest Suburban Board of Realtors "NWAR"
Madsen contends that McMillian, in her capacity as an officer of NWAR, failed to inform a DPR investigator that Madsen had been paying regular monthly association dues. Madsen does not show how McMillian's failure to communicate this information is a violation "under the color of law." Assuming McMillian did fail to inform the DPR of this information, this conduct by a private individual cannot be attributed to the State. The State must somehow be responsible for the allegedly unlawful actions taken by the private party. Wade v. Byles, 83 F.3d 902, 905 (7th Cir. 1996).
NWAR is a private association and McMillian is an officer of that association. Employees of a private company do not engage in State action. Roby v. Skupien, 758 F. Supp. 471, 473 (N.D.Ill. 1991). As alleged, Madsen's claim fails to sufficiently link McMillian's and NWAR's actions with the State of Illinois. Therefore, Madsen's claim against McMillian and NWAR must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
B. Allegations Against Pucinski Do Not Establish A Violation of § 1983
Madsen alleges that Pucinski, through her agents, failed to timely docket the mandate of Madsen's appeal which, according to Madsen, delayed his learning that the Illinois Appellate Court's decision was adverse to him. Although Madsen was provided notice of the issuance of the mandate, he asserts that the Clerk's docketing of the mandate from the Appellate Court foreclosed his opportunity to file a petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court. Specifically, Madsen asserts that on December 29, 1997, the Clerk's Office received the mandate from the Illinois Appellate Court. Madsen further asserts that he was in contact with agents of the Clerk throughout January, 1998 and was repeatedly informed that the mandate had not been received. Madsen asserts that the mandate was not located until January 22, 1998 when, for the first time, Madsen learned that the Appellate Court decision was adverse to him. Madsen alleges that Pucinski had an alleged policy of deliberate indifference among the Clerk's agents to set aside "unprocessed instruments" for future attention. Madsen alleges that the Clerk tolerated this policy.
Pucinski's office was not required to tender the Appellate Court mandate to Madsen. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 368 provides "the clerk of the reviewing court shall transmit to the clerk of the circuit court the mandate of the reviewing court, with notice to the parties." Thus, it is clear that the Clerk of the Circuit Court was not obligated to provide Madsen with a copy of the mandate, but only notice.
Moreover, the filing of a mandate in the Circuit Court does not affect the time limitation to seek review of an Appellate Court judgment in the Supreme Court. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 315(b), a party seeking leave to appeal must: 1) file the petition for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court within 21 days after entry of a judgment of the Appellate Court; or 2) within the same 21 days file with the Appellate Court an affidavit of intent to file a petition for leave, and then file the petition within 35 days after the entry of such judgment.
In this case, the judgment of the Appellate Court was issued on July 25, 1997, some five months prior to the issuance of the mandate in December, 1997. Thus, Madsen's allegations directed against Pucinski are misplaced because the time limitation established for filing a petition for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court had expired well before Pucinski's office received the mandate from the Appellate Court and well before the alleged inaction on Pucinski's part. Thus, Madsen suffered no prejudice by the alleged delay in docketing the mandate because the ability of Madsen to appeal the Appellate Court's order was not, in any way, related to the docketing of the mandate in the Circuit Court. Therefore, Madsen's first amended complaint fails to state a § 1983 claim against Pucinski.
IV. Public Defendants Are Entitled To Immunity Under The Eleventh Amendment
The State of Illinois, DPR, and state officials Howard Spinner, Thomas Chiola, Doris Barnes, Michael Johnson, Sanford Johnson, Adrienne Hersh, and Aurelia Pucinski all move to dismiss the claims against them on the grounds that they are immune to suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution.
Federal suits against a State and State officials in their official capacity for retrospective awards of damages are prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment. Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984); Kroll v. Board of Trustees, 934 F.2d 904, 907-08 (7th Cir. 1991). For purposes of the Eleventh Amendment, State agencies and State officials sued in their official capacity are considered "the State," and courts are without jurisdiction to hear claims against them as well. Will v. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). "[W]here a complaint alleges that the conduct of a public official acting under color of state law gives rise to liability under § 1983, we will ordinarily assume that he has been sued in his official capacity and only in that capacity . . ." Kolar v. County of Sangamon of the State of Illinois. 756 F.2d 564, 568 (7th Cir. 1985).
Unless the State waives its immunity or Congress expressly abrogates it within the statue, private party lawsuits against a State are prohibited in federal court. Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102-03 (1984). Congress, in enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983, did not abolish the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity. Quern v. Jordan. 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979). Accordingly, the Eleventh Amendment immunity provided to the State is dispositive of all of Madsen's claims in this suit against the State of Illinois.
This same immunity compels this Court to dismiss Madsen's claims against the DPR. A State agency is tantamount to the State for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Davidson v. Board of Govs., 920 F.2d 441, 442 (7th Cir. 1990). Because the DPR is a State agency that has not consented to suit in this Court, its motion to dismiss must be granted. Moreover, the DPR cannot be held liable for the conduct of its employees since it is a governmental entity. Jett v. Dallas Independent School District, 491 U.S. 701, 735-36 (1989). Accordingly, Madsen's suit against the DPR likewise cannot be heard in federal court.
Suits against individual State officials are sometimes permissible. The key inquiry is whether the State is "the real, substantial party in interest." Kroll v. Universtiy of illinois, 934 F.2d 904, 907 (7th Cir. 1991). "Personal capacity suits raise no Eleventh Amendment issues even though an official might have the requisite nexus to the state in order for his actions to be labeled state action." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-67 (1985). A victory in such a claim, however, is a victory only against that official's personal assets. Id. at 165-166. In contrast, official capacity suits are deemed to be against the entity that employs the individual. Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035 (1978). Accordingly, official capacity suits for retrospective relief, i.e. money damages payable from the state treasury, generally implicate the Eleventh Amendment. Quern 440 at 336. Suits against the state by private parties "may not include a retroactive award which requires the payment of funds from the state treasury." Eldman v. Jordan 415 U.S. 651, 677, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 1362 (1974). However, there is one exception. A federal court's remedial power, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, allows the remedy of prospective injunctive relief. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441 (1908).
For the alleged civil rights abuses caused by the defendants in their official capacity, Madsen requests monetary relief under Count I of his pleadings and injunctive relief from the DPR's penalties under Count II. Madsen cannot receive monetary damages directly as relief from public officials acting in their official capacities. Eldman 415 U.S. at 677. Since Madsen cannot receive monetary damages from the State officials in their official capacity, the only remedy left is the reversal of his DPR hearing under Count II of his claim.
To the extent that Madsen attempts to evade the Eleventh Amendment by couching his relief in Count II under the term "injunction," he fails. Madsen's prayer for relief is peculiar in that it does not seek to enjoin the State from any activity, but rather seeks to reverse a decision made by a State agency more than five years ago. There have been no recent actions, and there is nothing for this Court to enjoin or restrain. Any affirmative action ordered by this Court would not only change the status quo (which an injunction is supposed to preserve), but would result in the federal judiciary directing a state agency on how to enforce state laws. Accordingly, in regard to his claims against the public party defendants in their official capacities, Madsen fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted by this Court and as such the motion to dismiss must be granted.
V. Qualified Immunity Finally, even if we were to find that Madsen had stated a cause of action under § 1983 against the public defendants in their individual capacities, he would not be entitled to recover because these defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity protects government officials from monetary liability when their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.Kitzman-Kelley v. Warner, 203 F.3d 454, 457 (7th Cir. 2000). This protection is afforded to public officials in order to protect them from the expenses of litigation and the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, and to prevent the deterrence of able citizens from accepting public office. Id.
In his first amended complaint, Madsen has added paragraphs indicating that he is now suing the State defendants in their individual capacities. Madsen's complaints against these individuals range from a messy administrative record, to "injecting oneself into the case," and to "testifying falsely and failing in his duty to fairly research." None of the allegations that Madsen has added indicates that any "clearly established constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known" has been violated. The constitutional right has to be clearly established with reference to the particular facts facing the defendant.Anderson v. Creighton, 438 U.S. 635, 640; Azeez v. Fairman, 795 F.2d 1296, 1301 (7th Cir. 1986).
A review of Madsen's first amended complaint shows that he has merely added on paragraphs in an attempt to state a cause of action against the defendants in their individual capacity. Madsen has not alleged any behavior which takes away the protection that the State defendants are entitled to under the doctrine of qualified immunity. State officials cannot be expected to perform their duties at their own peril, especially with regard to state licensing, as there are many unhappy individuals looking for someone to blame when they have been disciplined or have had a license suspended or revoked. Madsen describes actions that range from "petty annoyances" to perhaps issues he should have brought to the Appellate Court's attention, but nothing that rises to the level of a constitutional violation. Madsen's allegations are insufficient to keep the State defendants, individually, in a federal lawsuit which arises out of their official duties. Thus, the first amended complaint against the State defendants should be dismissed, as they are protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity.
CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, the motions to dismiss filed by defendants State of Illinois, Department of Professional Regulation, Thomas Kean, Century 21 American Tradition, Howard E. Spinner, Thomas Chiola, Doris E. Barnes, Michael Johnson, Diane McMillian, Northwest Suburban Board of Realtors, Fred Gillick, Gillick Realtors, Sanford Johnson and Aurelia Pucinski, are granted. This complaint is dismissed in its entirety. This is a final and appealable order.