Opinion
C/A 7:22-cv-3549-TMC-JDA
11-03-2022
Marion Kenneth Madison, Jr., Plaintiff, v. De'Juan T. Shell, Officer, Immediate Supervisor, Name Unknown, Spartanburg Police Department, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
JACQUELYN D. AUSTIN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Marion Kenneth Madison, Jr., (“Plaintiff”) brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Defendants violated his rights under the United States Constitution. [Doc. 1.] Plaintiff is proceeding in this action pro se and in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the Complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. For the reasons explained below, the undersigned concludes that Defendants Spartanburg Police Department and the Unknown Supervisor are subject to summary dismissal. However, the case remains pending against Officer De'Juan T. Shell and the Complaint will be served as to that Defendant.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a non-prisoner litigant, but he sues the above-named Defendants related to his arrest, subsequent incarceration, and criminal proceedings in the Spartanburg County Court of General Sessions. [Doc. 1 at 6, 8.] Specifically, Plaintiff contends he was subjected to “malicious arrest” on December 21, 2020, when Defendant Shell arrested him without probable cause on the charges of prisoner/throwing of bodily fluids by a prisoner and resisting/assault, beating, or wounding a police officer. [Id. at 6.] Plaintiff contends that Defendant Shell filled out a false police report. [Id.] He contends that, at the time of the incident, he had Covid 19, was intoxicated, and was suffering from psychological defects and confusion. [Id.] Plaintiff contends that Defendant Shell falsely claimed that Plaintiff head butted him and spit on him, which was contradicted by the officer's body camera. [Id.] Plaintiff contends that anything he did was not intentional because he was not in his right state of mind and thus did not have the requisite mens rea to commit any crime. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that Defendants filed false charges against him, falsely arrested him, and falsely imprisoned him. [Id. at 6, 8.] For his relief, Plaintiff seeks money damages. [Id. at 10.]
The Court takes judicial notice of the records from the Spartanburg County Seventh Judicial Circuit Public Index related to the incident described above. Upon review of those records, the undersigned notes that Plaintiff was arrested on December 21, 2020, and charged in the Spartanburg County Court of General Sessions with the crimes of resisting/assault, beat, or wound police officer service process or while resisting arrest at case number 2020A4210206541 (the “resisting arrest charge”) and prisoners/throwing of bodily fluids by prisoner, detainee on state corrections or local law enforcement officer, corrections employee, or visitor at case number 2020A4210206542 (the “throwing of bodily fluids charge”). See Spartanburg County Seventh Judicial Circuit Public Index, available at https://publicindex.sccourts.org/spartanburg/publicindex/ (search by case numbers “2020A4210206541” and “2020A4210206542”) (last visited Oct. 19, 2022). As to the resisting arrest charge, an indictment was filed in April 2021 at number 2021GS4201873, and the charge was dismissed on August 3, 2022, as nolle prosequi. As to the throwing of bodily fluids charge, an indictment was filed in April 2021 at number 2021GS4201874, and the charge was dismissed on August 3, 2022, as nolle prosequi.
See Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'”).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute, which authorizes the district court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, even under this less stringent standard, the pro se pleading remains subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the Court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411,417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the Court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se Complaint and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in his pleadings, the Complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact); cf. Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011) (holding that plaintiff need not pin his claim for relief to precise legal theory). “A claim has ‘facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014).
DISCUSSION
The Complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Plaintiff contends Defendants violated his civil rights. [Doc. 1 at 3.] Liberally construed, the Complaint appears to assert claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. [Id. at 6, 8.] Nevertheless, certain Defendants are subject to dismissal from this action.
First, the Spartanburg Police Department is entitled to dismissal from this action. It is well settled that only “persons” may act under color of state law, and, therefore, a defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a “person.” See Harden v. Green, 27 Fed.Appx. 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding that the medical department of a prison is not a person pursuant to § 1983). “Police departments, buildings, and correctional institutions usually are not considered legal entities subject to suit.” Freeman v. Anderson City Police Dep't, No. 8:21-cv-03872-JMC-JDA, 2022 WL 507610, at *3 (D.S.C. Jan. 19, 2022), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2022 WL 507424 (D.S.C. Feb. 17, 2022); see also Miller v. Rock Hill Police Dep't, No. 2:09-cv-0737-JFA-RSC, 2009 WL 1160181, at *3 (D.S.C. Apr. 29, 2009) (explaining that, whether a plaintiff uses the term “‘Police Department' in an attempt to name the building where police officers work or to name the police department ‘staff' as a whole[, i]n either instance, such an entity is not a ‘person' amenable to suit under the statute”), aff'd, 333 Fed.Appx. 703 (4th Cir. 2009). Thus, because the Spartanburg Police Department is a facility, building, or group of people, it is not subject to suit because it cannot be sued as a “person” in a § 1983 lawsuit. See Harris v. Ryant, No. 7:18-cv-0716-TMC-KFM, 2018 WL 7825495, at *4 (D.S.C. May 3, 2018) (“The Spartanburg City Police Department is not a ‘person' subject to suit in a Section 1983 action.”), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2019 WL 926419 (D.S.C. Feb. 26, 2019).
Additionally, to the extent the Spartanburg Police Department is considered a municipal entity, it is subject to summary dismissal under the theory of municipality liability. A municipality or other local government entity may be held liable under § 1983 only “where the constitutionally offensive acts of [ ] employees are taken in furtherance of some municipal ‘policy or custom.'” Milligan v. City of Newport News, 743 F.2d 227, 229 (4th Cir. 1984); see also Kershaw v. City of Spartanburg Police Dep't, No. 7:18-cv-1079-BHH-KFM, 2018 WL 3215645, at *2 (D.S.C. June 8, 2018) (“To establish municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate a violation of his constitutional rights ‘taken in furtherance of some municipal “policy or custom.”'”), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 3209670 (D.S.C. June 29, 2018). Further, the doctrine of respondeat superior is generally inapplicable to § 1983 suits, such that an employer or supervisor is not liable for the acts of employees, absent official policy or custom resulting in an illegal action. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694-95 (1978). Plaintiff fails to identify any governmental policy or custom of the Spartanburg Police Department that caused his constitutional rights to be violated. Instead, Plaintiff simply alleges that the Spartanburg Police Department “provided Officer De'Juan Shell with the power” to arrest him. [Doc. 1 at 8.] Such an allegation is insufficient to support a claim for municipal liability or supervisory liability. Accordingly, the Spartanburg Police Department is entitled to summary dismissal as a Defendant from this § 1983 action. See Woodruff v. Spartanburg City Police Dep't, No. 7:18-cv-1920-BHH-JDA, 2018 WL 4017683, at *5 (D.S.C. July 30, 2018) (“Because the Spartanburg City Police Department is not a person amenable to suit under § 1983, Plaintiff's complaint against it should be summarily dismissed.”), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 4005828 (D.S.C. Aug. 22, 2018).
For similar reasons, the Unknown Supervisor is also entitled to dismissal from this action. First, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to support any claim against any Defendant for supervisory liability. As noted, the doctrine of respondeat superior is generally not applicable in § 1983 actions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”); Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 221 (4th Cir. 1999). For a supervisory official to be held liable for constitutional injuries inflicted by his subordinates, certain criteria must be established. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1994). Specifically, a plaintiff must show that the supervisory official was (1) actually or constructively aware of a risk of constitutional injury, (2) and deliberately indifferent to that risk, and (3) that an affirmative causal link exists between the supervisor's inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff. Carter, 164 F.3d at 221. Here, the Complaint contains no plausible allegations against the Unknown Supervisor to demonstrate that he was aware of, or deliberately indifferent to, any risk of constitutional injury to Plaintiff. As such, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts against this Defendant to subject him to supervisory liability.
Additionally, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts whatsoever against the Unknown Supervisor to establish his or her direct, personal involvement in the actions giving rise to Plaintiff's claims. Instead, Plaintiff merely names this Defendant in the caption and he makes only general, vague allegations about the injuries he allegedly suffered. However, “such general allegations, absent any specific facts of personal involvement in the events giving rise to this case, are insufficient to state a cognizable § 1983 claim.” Tracey v. Nelson, No. 1:12-cv-1614-JMC-SVH, 2012 WL 4583107, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 31, 2012), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 4588205 (D.S.C. Oct. 1, 2012). Because Plaintiff makes no factual allegations in the Complaint of personal involvement against the Unknown Supervisor, this Defendant is entitled to summary dismissal. See Potter v. Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1974) (“Where a complaint alleges no specific act or conduct on the part of the defendant and the complaint is silent as to the defendant except for his name appearing in the caption, the complaint is properly dismissed.”); Newkirk v. Cir. Ct. of City of Hampton, No. 3:14-cv-372-HEH, 2014 WL 4072212, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 14, 2014) (finding the complaint was subject to summary dismissal where plaintiff made no factual allegations against the named defendants within the body of the pleading).
RECOMMENDATION
In light of all the foregoing, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss the Spartanburg Police Department and the Unknown Supervisor from this action. The case remains pending against Officer De'Juan T. Shell.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 250 East North Street, Suite 2300 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).