Madison Metropolitan Sewerage District v. Department of Natural Resources

12 Citing cases

  1. Adams v. Northland Equip. Co.

    2014 WI 79 (Wis. 2014)   Cited 17 times
    Concluding that prior interpretations of a statute under consideration assist our current interpretation of the same statutes

    ¶ 46 Adams correctly notes that when given alternative statutory interpretations, we will select the interpretation that results in a constitutionally sufficient statute. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. DOR, 222 Wis.2d 650, 667, 586 N.W.2d 872 (1998); Madison Metro. Sewerage Dist. v. DNR, 63 Wis.2d 175, 185, 216 N.W.2d 533 (1974). Adams then argues that we should not interpret Wis. Stat. § 102.29(1) in a way that would allow a circuit court to compel an employee to accept settlement because that would violate the employee's constitutional right to a jury trial preserved by Article I, Section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution.

  2. Bacher v. State Engineer

    122 Nev. 1110 (Nev. 2006)   Cited 17 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that it is not the function of this court to "examine witness credibility or reweigh the evidence"

    Cannon v. Taylor, 87 Nev. 285, 288, 486 P.2d 493, 495 (1971), superseded in part on reh'g, 88 Nev. 89, 493 P.2d 1313 (1972); see generally White, 96 Nev. 634, 614 P.2d 536.Robert E. v. Justice Court, 99 Nev. 443, 445, 664 P.2d 957, 959 (1983) (quoting Madison Met. Sewer. Dist. v. Department of Nat. Res., 216 N.W.2d 533, 535 (Wis. 1974)).State v. State Engineer, 104 Nev. 709, 713, 766 P.2d 263, 266 (1988).

  3. Cable v. Eicon

    122 Nev. 120 (Nev. 2006)   Cited 11 times

    White v. Warden, 96 Nev. 634, 636, 614 P.2d 536, 537 (1980).Robert E. v. Justice Court, 99 Nev. 443, 445, 664 P.2d 957, 959 (1983) (quoting Madison Met. Sewer Dist. v. Department of Nat. Res., 216 N.W.2d 533, 535 (Wis. 1974)).Metz v. Metz, 120 Nev. 786, 792, 101 P.3d 779, 783 (2004).

  4. Robert E. v. Justice Court

    99 Nev. 443 (Nev. 1983)   Cited 69 times
    Looking to legislative history, reason, and public policy to determine legislative intent behind ambiguous statute

    See generally White, supra. "A statute or portion thereof is ambiguous when it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in either of two or more senses." Madison Met. Sewer Dist. v. Dep't of Nat. Res., 216 N.W.2d 533, 535 (Wis. 1974). Because NRS 62.080 refers to transfer of the juvenile's case out of the juvenile division, the statute can be reasonably interpreted as permitting relinquishment of the juvenile division's jurisdiction over the child for the sole purpose of dealing with the specific alleged violation pending in court.

  5. State v. Washington

    83 Wis. 2d 808 (Wis. 1978)   Cited 61 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Describing the statutory history

    Blado v. Knoll, 4 Wis.2d 184, 90 N.W.2d 176 (1958); State v. Marcus, 259 Wis. 543, 550, 49 N.W.2d 447 (1951). We have, however, had occasion to strike down legislative delegations of power which vested non-judicial powers in judges. See Madison Metropolitan Sewerage Dt. v. DNR, 63 Wis.2d 175, 216 N.W.2d 533 (1974); In re City of Fond du Lac, 42 Wis.2d 323, 329, 166 N.W.2d 225 (1969) (involving delegation of legislative authority). "It is easy to give general definitions of the three great governmental powers. The legislative power is the power which makes the laws; the executive, the power which enforces them; and the judicial, the power which expounds and applies them.

  6. Robinson v. Kunach

    76 Wis. 2d 436 (Wis. 1977)   Cited 28 times
    Denying injunctive relief as premature where there was no basis for assuming that the condemning authority would not make timely application for DNR permits prior to construction

    (Sec. 15.02, Stats.) In Madison Metropolitan Sewerage Dist. v. DNR, 63 Wis.2d 175, 179, 216 N.W.2d 533 (1974), this court stated the test of ambiguity has been consistently reiterated: "`". . . A statute or portion thereof is ambiguous when it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in either of two or more senses."'" Citing Milwaukee Fire Fighters Asso. v. Milwaukee 50 Wis.2d 9, 13, 183 N.W.2d 18 (1971); Kindy v. Hayes, 44 Wis.2d 301, 171 N.W.2d 324 (1969).

  7. In Matter of Estate of Walker

    248 N.W.2d 410 (Wis. 1977)   Cited 20 times
    In Matter of Estate of Walker, 75 Wis.2d 93, 104, 248 N.W.2d 410 (1977); Department of Revenue v. Milwaukee Refining Corp., 80 Wis.2d 44, 52, 257 N.W.2d 855 (1977).

    We apply the test of ambiguity to hold that here these statutes are capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in either of two or more senses. Madison Metropolitan Sewerage Dist. v. DNR, 63 Wis.2d 175, 179, 216 N.W.2d 533, 535 (1974), quoting Milwaukee Fire Fighters Asso. v. Milwaukee, 50 Wis.2d 9, 13, 183 N.W.2d 18, 20 (1971). DETERMINATION OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT. The finding that ambiguity exists permits this court, in construing secs. 72.17 and 72.18, to consider the legislative history of these statutes.

  8. Vandervelde v. Green Lake

    72 Wis. 2d 210 (Wis. 1976)   Cited 7 times
    Concluding that a statute's minimum population requirement affected towns but not cities where statute applied to “any city or village or any town having a population of more than 7,500”

    Since two constructions of the phrase are reasonable, it is proper to examine the legislative history for possible information as to the legislative intent. Madison Metropolitan Sewerage Dist. v. DNR (1974), 63 Wis.2d 175, 180, 216 N.W.2d 533. Prior to 1965, sec. 144.06, Stats., did not apply to towns at all, but only to cities and villages.

  9. State ex Rel. Lynch v. Conta

    71 Wis. 2d 662 (Wis. 1976)   Cited 69 times
    Noting that a necessary characteristic of a governmental body is that "collective power" has been conferred upon it

    A law embracing such private discussions would raise many constitutional objections. Given a choice of possible interpretations, this court must select the construction that results in constitutionality rather than invalidity, In re Petition of Madison Metropolitan Sewerage Dist. v. Department of Natural Resources (1974), 63 Wis.2d 175, 185, 216 N.W.2d 533, just as we will choose a reasonable construction rather than one that leads to unreasonable or absurd results, Browne v. State (1964), 24 Wis.2d 491, 131 N.W.2d 169. The strict rule of construction would also dictate that the law be so applied, if it could be contended that the legislative intent is indeterminative, because the proposed construction reaching two-member meetings is an outgrowth of statutory ambiguity at best.

  10. Security S. L. Asso. v. Wauwatosa Colony

    71 Wis. 2d 174 (Wis. 1976)   Cited 10 times
    In Security Savings Loan, 71 Wis.2d at 181, 237 N.W.2d at 733, the court construed an escalation clause to permit more than one escalation, although the clause did not specify that multiple increases were permissible. The clause was written in the terms of the statute allowing escalation, sec. 215.21(3)(b), Stats., and the court construed the statute and the note in light of "the scope of the statute, the policy behind the clause, [and] the ability of savings and loan associations to effectively manage the funds of its members and at the same time provide funds for borrowers."

    Are the terms of the statute and mortgage so plain and clear as to preclude the necessity for construction? In Madison Metropolitan Sewerage Dist. v. DNR (1974), 63 Wis.2d 175, 179, 216 N.W.2d 533, the following rule was restated: ". . . The test of ambiguity has been consistently stated: '"'A statute or portion thereof is ambiguous when it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in either of two or more senses.