¶ 46 Adams correctly notes that when given alternative statutory interpretations, we will select the interpretation that results in a constitutionally sufficient statute. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. DOR, 222 Wis.2d 650, 667, 586 N.W.2d 872 (1998); Madison Metro. Sewerage Dist. v. DNR, 63 Wis.2d 175, 185, 216 N.W.2d 533 (1974). Adams then argues that we should not interpret Wis. Stat. § 102.29(1) in a way that would allow a circuit court to compel an employee to accept settlement because that would violate the employee's constitutional right to a jury trial preserved by Article I, Section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution.
Cannon v. Taylor, 87 Nev. 285, 288, 486 P.2d 493, 495 (1971), superseded in part on reh'g, 88 Nev. 89, 493 P.2d 1313 (1972); see generally White, 96 Nev. 634, 614 P.2d 536.Robert E. v. Justice Court, 99 Nev. 443, 445, 664 P.2d 957, 959 (1983) (quoting Madison Met. Sewer. Dist. v. Department of Nat. Res., 216 N.W.2d 533, 535 (Wis. 1974)).State v. State Engineer, 104 Nev. 709, 713, 766 P.2d 263, 266 (1988).
White v. Warden, 96 Nev. 634, 636, 614 P.2d 536, 537 (1980).Robert E. v. Justice Court, 99 Nev. 443, 445, 664 P.2d 957, 959 (1983) (quoting Madison Met. Sewer Dist. v. Department of Nat. Res., 216 N.W.2d 533, 535 (Wis. 1974)).Metz v. Metz, 120 Nev. 786, 792, 101 P.3d 779, 783 (2004).
See generally White, supra. "A statute or portion thereof is ambiguous when it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in either of two or more senses." Madison Met. Sewer Dist. v. Dep't of Nat. Res., 216 N.W.2d 533, 535 (Wis. 1974). Because NRS 62.080 refers to transfer of the juvenile's case out of the juvenile division, the statute can be reasonably interpreted as permitting relinquishment of the juvenile division's jurisdiction over the child for the sole purpose of dealing with the specific alleged violation pending in court.
Blado v. Knoll, 4 Wis.2d 184, 90 N.W.2d 176 (1958); State v. Marcus, 259 Wis. 543, 550, 49 N.W.2d 447 (1951). We have, however, had occasion to strike down legislative delegations of power which vested non-judicial powers in judges. See Madison Metropolitan Sewerage Dt. v. DNR, 63 Wis.2d 175, 216 N.W.2d 533 (1974); In re City of Fond du Lac, 42 Wis.2d 323, 329, 166 N.W.2d 225 (1969) (involving delegation of legislative authority). "It is easy to give general definitions of the three great governmental powers. The legislative power is the power which makes the laws; the executive, the power which enforces them; and the judicial, the power which expounds and applies them.
(Sec. 15.02, Stats.) In Madison Metropolitan Sewerage Dist. v. DNR, 63 Wis.2d 175, 179, 216 N.W.2d 533 (1974), this court stated the test of ambiguity has been consistently reiterated: "`". . . A statute or portion thereof is ambiguous when it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in either of two or more senses."'" Citing Milwaukee Fire Fighters Asso. v. Milwaukee 50 Wis.2d 9, 13, 183 N.W.2d 18 (1971); Kindy v. Hayes, 44 Wis.2d 301, 171 N.W.2d 324 (1969).
We apply the test of ambiguity to hold that here these statutes are capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in either of two or more senses. Madison Metropolitan Sewerage Dist. v. DNR, 63 Wis.2d 175, 179, 216 N.W.2d 533, 535 (1974), quoting Milwaukee Fire Fighters Asso. v. Milwaukee, 50 Wis.2d 9, 13, 183 N.W.2d 18, 20 (1971). DETERMINATION OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT. The finding that ambiguity exists permits this court, in construing secs. 72.17 and 72.18, to consider the legislative history of these statutes.
Since two constructions of the phrase are reasonable, it is proper to examine the legislative history for possible information as to the legislative intent. Madison Metropolitan Sewerage Dist. v. DNR (1974), 63 Wis.2d 175, 180, 216 N.W.2d 533. Prior to 1965, sec. 144.06, Stats., did not apply to towns at all, but only to cities and villages.
A law embracing such private discussions would raise many constitutional objections. Given a choice of possible interpretations, this court must select the construction that results in constitutionality rather than invalidity, In re Petition of Madison Metropolitan Sewerage Dist. v. Department of Natural Resources (1974), 63 Wis.2d 175, 185, 216 N.W.2d 533, just as we will choose a reasonable construction rather than one that leads to unreasonable or absurd results, Browne v. State (1964), 24 Wis.2d 491, 131 N.W.2d 169. The strict rule of construction would also dictate that the law be so applied, if it could be contended that the legislative intent is indeterminative, because the proposed construction reaching two-member meetings is an outgrowth of statutory ambiguity at best.
Are the terms of the statute and mortgage so plain and clear as to preclude the necessity for construction? In Madison Metropolitan Sewerage Dist. v. DNR (1974), 63 Wis.2d 175, 179, 216 N.W.2d 533, the following rule was restated: ". . . The test of ambiguity has been consistently stated: '"'A statute or portion thereof is ambiguous when it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in either of two or more senses.