• 1 The Bank agrees, that under normal circumstances, a cashier's check cannot be countermanded. It has been held that the "* * * legal effect of a cashier's check issued by a bank is the same as a bill of exchange drawn by the bank upon itself and accepted in advance by the act of its issuance, and is not subject to countermand like any ordinary check." ( Madison K. State Bank v. Madison Square State Bank, 271 Ill. App. 12, 18.) The Bank contends, however, that in some circumstances a cashier's check should be subject to countermandment, like a certified check, where the issuance is a result of error or fraud and the rights of no other party have intervened.

• 1, 2 It is clear that in Illinois, a cashier's check is regarded as accepted by the act of issuance. ( Gillespie v. Riley Management Corp. (1974), 59 Ill.2d 211, 216, 319 N.E.2d 753, 756; Madison Kedzie State Bank v. Madison Square State Bank (1933), 271 Ill. App. 12, 18.) Further, under section 4-303 of the Uniform Commercial Code, a stop order is ineffective "after the bank has * * * accepted or certified the item."

) Once there is delivery, actual or constructive, of a cashier's check to a payee, the rule, with limited exceptions, is that it is not subject to countermand by either its purchaser or the issuing bank. Foreman v. Martin, 6 Ill. App.3d 599, 602 (1972); Acme Excavating Co. v. State Bank of Breese, 69 Ill. App.2d 280 (1966), and Madison Kedzie State Bank ex rel. Globe Indemnity Co. v. Madison Square State Bank, 271 Ill. App. 12, 18 (1933). • 6 Complications arise at attempting to apply the pronounced rules to the instant case, for in various stages of events Riley acted in two differing capacities: he was agent-purchaser for the Corporation and agent-payee of the Corporation.

The court concluded that in view of the apparent evil sought to be remedied by the enactment of the amendment that the defendant bank was justified in paying the checks in question upon presentation. Other cases in which a similar result was reached are Madison Kedzie State Bank v. Madison Square State Bank, 271 Ill. App. 12; Orton Crane Shovel Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 345 Ill. App. 284, 102 N.E.2d 663. The cases to which we have referred effectively dispose of the question whether under the 1931 amendment the bank or the maker should bear the loss occasioned by the forged endorsement of paper issued to a living person not intended to have any interest therein.

"* * * the general rule is that there is no right to countermand payment of a * * * cashier's check by the drawer, payee, or depositor at whose request the instrument was issued except for fraud or failure of consideration, or where payment is stopped by injunction proceedings * * *." See also: Madison and Kedzie State Bank v. Madison Square State Bank, 271 Ill. App. 12. In the purchase from a bank of a money order or a cashier's check, payable on its face to one other than the purchaser, the bank is the drawer, and the person named therein as the recipient of the amount specified to be transferred is the payee or drawee.